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ABSTRACT
States implement many of the environmental laws enacted during the last thirty 
years. A key policy issue is the effect o f differences in state institutions and environmental 
policies on the location o f livestock agriculture. There is widespread belief that the 
stringency of state environmental regulations, known as regulatory climate, is an important 
factor influencing the location, growth and expansion decisions o f livestock agriculture. 
Existing regulatory climate measures are not tailored to agriculture, and their use has given 
mixed results.
Conceptual and empirical models were developed for the U.S. aquaculture industry, 
based on elements o f public choice and firm location theories within an institutional 
economic framework. Because state regulatory climate is not directly observable, a 
summated scale measure o f regulatory climate was designed, with four property rights 
conditions as underlying dimensions. Exploratory factor analysis and structural equations 
modeling were used to determine the scale's structure, which consisted o f  nine items in 
three subscales, representing the ownership, specification and transferability property' rights 
conditions. The enforcement condition was subsumed within the other three subscales. 
The results demonstrated that property rights conditions can be useful as analytical tools 
in empirical analysis.
Two alternative forms of the regulatory climate scale were devised, a continuous 
0-18 scale and a five-category ordinal scale. They served as the dependent variables in 
two-limit truncated regression and ordered probit analyses. Key state institutional
xvii
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characteristics served as explanatory variables. Primary data were obtained from two 
national surveys o f  state aquaculture contacts and coordinators.
Estimation results suggest that establishing a formal state aquaculture development 
plan and transferring regulatory enforcement authority to state departments o f  agriculture 
will have significant, negative effects on regulatory stringency. Joint administration or 
enforcement adds a bureaucratic layer and increases regulatory' stringency.
The regulatory climate scale was also used to compare states’ regulatory climate 
toward aquaculture, by fish category. In the future, the scale can be used to evaluate the 
effect o f  institutional changes over time. The items in the scale appear to be applicable to 
other forms o f alternative livestock, and may form the basis for a more general property 
rights based regulatory climate scale with broad applications.
xviii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The system o f property rights within a community is the institutional instrument 
which describes the set o f  economic and social relations defining the position o f each 
individual with respect to the utilization o f scarce resources. The traditional neoclassical 
economic model assumes an unspecified, yet ideal property rights structure, resulting in 
efficient trade in resources. Alternative property rights structures and changes in property 
rights can alter economic outcomes.
Attenuations in property rights typically result from action by the state, especially 
when the state is called upon to manage nonexclusive natural resources. Government 
regulation, including environmental regulation, can be viewed as one form o f property 
rights attenuation, with the growth of government regulation weakening private property 
rights. All regulations raise the cost o f production and change the allocation o f economic 
surplus between producers and consumers and among producer groups (Batie. 1990). 
Indirect effects also occur as conventional inputs and production processes are changed 
(Barbera and McConnell, 1990). Industry innovation can be discouraged and small firms 
can be driven out o f  business (Ashford, Ayers and Stone, 1985; Pashigian, 1984).
Business location decisions may also be significantly affected by the stringency o f 
state regulations, known as regulator}7 climate. There is widespread belief that state 
environmental protection regulations and enforcement activities can present a significant 
influence on the location o f economic activity, especially for highly polluting and heavily
1
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regulated industries (Bartik, 1988; Feiock and Rowland, 1990; Jaffe, etal., 1995; Stafford 
1985).
Livestock agriculture is among the most heavily regulated sectors in most developed 
countries. The nature o f  modem agricultural environmental externalities, especially water 
pollution, is viewed by the public as justifying strong government intervention. 
Environmental regulation has become an issue o f major concern for livestock 
agribusinesses. The stringency o f state environmental quality regulations and their 
enforcement have been cited as an important factor influencing the location, growth and 
expansion decisions o f  livestock farms and related agribusinesses (Abdalla, Lanyon. and 
Hallberg, 1995; Mo and Abdalla, 1997).
Aquaculture, the aquatic counterpart o f livestock agriculture, has expanded rapidly 
over the last two decades, and is now the fastest growing component of U.S. agriculture 
(Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture. 1993). In response to the rapid growth o f the 
aquaculture industry, state development agencies have been formulating aquaculture 
industry' development plans to foster industry' growth. Rapid industry growth has also 
heightened concern over its potential negative environmental impacts, and resulted in 
increased levels o f environmental regulation and enforcement activities by state regulatory 
institutions. The current regulatory environment, especially the diversity o f agencies 
administering state regulatory efforts, is perceived to be a major constraint to aquaculture 
industry development (DeVoe and Mount, 1989; McCoy, 1996; Wypyszinski et ah, 1994).
The functioning o f  existing state aquaculture development and regulatory 
institutions is predicated on a particular set o f industry' conditions. Existing regulatory
9
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institutions, developed when the aquaculture industry was in its infancy, were designed to 
protect wild fish resources from overexploitation by commercial and recreational fishermen 
and to protect natural water supplies from overpollution by large industrial and municipal 
water users. The inadequacy o f the existing institutions to reconcile the expanding 
aquaculture industry's needs with changing social and environmental protection goals has 
been the source o f serious conflicts between the aquaculture industry and state regulatory 
institutions (DeVoe and Mount, 1989). Over the last decade, there has been a recognized 
need to adjust the structure o f institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture 
industry's rapid expansion. The resulting demand for institutional change has meant, in 
some cases, major changes in the states' approaches to the aquaculture industry. In other 
cases, new institutions have evolved which, by their nature, ensure attention to changing 
needs.
The wide variation in state regulatory policies toward the aquaculture industry have 
resulted in significant interstate differences in regulatory climate, and may affect where fish 
are grown. The purpose of this research is to develop an objective measure o f  states' 
regulator}' climate toward fish culture. The measure will be used to examine the 
significance and economic impacts of key state institutional characteristics on regulatory 
climate and develop recommendations for state institutional changes which will improve 
the regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry.
Research Problem
U.S. environmental regulatory programs and permit requirements vary from state 
to state. In many states it is difficult, costly, and time consuming to secure permits to
3
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establish new operations. Variability in state institutional characteristics and regulatory 
climate may affect the rate and intensity o f industry development.
As the aquaculture industry has expanded into almost every state in the U.S., state 
agricultural development officials have formulated appealing development plans to attract 
the aquaculture industry. Meanwhile, state regulatory agencies have been re-writing and 
re-interpreting environmental laws and regulations to protect important water and wildlife 
resources from potential negative environmental consequences. During this process, no 
information has been available to states regarding the economic impacts or significance o f 
various state development and regulatory strategies on aquaculture industry development. 
New and expanding aquaculture operations have also sought objective methods to compare 
states’ institutional characteristics, in order to facilitate business location and species 
selection decisions. Currently, there is little information and no objective method available 
to allow farmers to compare states on the basis o f regulatory climate toward the aquaculture 
industry.
Justification
A property rights based approach to resource control and use problems allows 
economic analysis to directly address theoretical and policy issues concerning institutional 
constraints. Dales (1992) suggested that analysis based on property rights provides a way 
of looking at pollution and other social problems. The clear relationship between property 
rights and government regulation provides an opportunity to develop the first objective 
measure o f regulatory climate based on the nature o f the regulations.
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This research will provide a method for aquaculturists and state officials to directly 
compare states on the basis o f  regulatory' climate toward the aquaculture industry for the 
various classifications o f fmfish raised in aquaculture operations, thus facilitating location, 
species selection, and production decisions. Use o f the measure o f regulatory climate as 
the dependent variable in empirical analysis will provide necessary information on the 
economic significance and impacts o f key state aquaculture institutions (both 
developmental and regulatory) and various institutional designs on regulatory climate and 
aquaculture industry development. The measure will also provide the basis for 
recommending actions for states to improve regulatory climate, and provide a means for 
evaluation o f changes in state institutional characteristics and regulatory climate overtime. 
Finally, this process o f developing a scale o f regulatory climate, although aquaculture- 
specific, can lead to a more general property-rights based scale o f regulatory climate with 
broad applications, especially for evaluating alternative livestock industries.
An Institutional Economic Framework
The social system contains three major components: the natural environment 
including the physical capital created to utilize raw materials, the structure o f social 
conventions and rules that control humans' dealings with each other, and the superstructure 
containing the belief system and values. The structural component provides society’s 
working rules, and includes institutions (Bromley, 1982).
Institutions are ordered relationships, including rules, norms, customs and their 
enforcement characteristics, among people which define their rights, privileges and 
behavioral responsibilities in economic transactions. Economic institutions are social
5
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decision systems which provide decision rules for the allocation o f scarce resources among 
competing uses and for the distribution o f income from resource use. One important 
purpose of institutions is to ensure that individuals’ behavior is consistent with society’s 
goals for resource allocation. Institutions provide stability to the economic system and are 
part o f the core o f the economy. The economic system is stable because people follow 
institutional norms for the public good, even though doing so is not always in their rational 
interest (Buchholz, 1990; Colander, 1996; Roy, 1995).
Institutional resource management decision systems are often hierarchical in nature. 
Norris, Carriker and Danielson (1994), for example, summarized a three-level hierarchy 
of decision systems: individual resource users, legislatures and government agencies, and 
the U. S. constitutional organization. The first level, individual resource users, relates to 
control o f resources as inputs into production processes. Resource users are constrained 
by the provisions o f civil and criminal law, which constitutes the institutional framework 
within which first level decisions are made. The evolution o f resource-related law in each 
state reflects the states’ reactions to conflicts over resource use, changes in the definitions 
of acceptable resource quality, and competing interests in addressing these issues. 
Decisions to change legal constraints are made at the second level, through state agencies 
created to enforce and implement legislative mandates.
Given the hierarchical nature o f institutional decision systems for resource 
allocation, people will pursue their own self-interest. However, some will violate the 
existing institutional norms or attempt to change the rules for their own benefit. There are 
always winners and losers from any change in resource allocation laws or rules. Pressures
6
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for institutional change exist whenever sufficient numbers o f influential people are unhappy 
over the outcomes o f  first-level decision making. The system, which is always on the edge 
o f chaos, thus imposes a cost that is borne by everyone, requiring the establishment o f a 
new set o f stability-creating norms. The end result is a continual evolution o f institutions 
(Colander, 1996). Therefore, the capacity o f an institution to evolve and adjust as 
conditions change over time is an important consideration in institutional design. Earp 
(1996) noted that since modifying institutions requires a complex political and cognitive 
game, institutions can exist even when they are of no use or when they are suboptimal for 
all.
The Institutional Approach to Economic Policy Analysis
The fundamental principle o f institutional economics is a  holistic methodological 
and philosophical approach to the discipline of economics. Institutional economists view 
the economy as a complex system, tacitly accepting a master model which encompasses the 
movement of the whole social system. The dynamics o f the social system are determined 
by a circular causation among all the endogenous conditions. This implies interdependence 
within the whole social process. There is no one basic causal factor; everything causes 
everything else. If one condition changes, others will change in response, and there is 
generally no equilibrium in sight (Colander, 1996; Elliott, 1978; Myrdal, 1978).
Institutionalism differs from mainstream neoclassical economics, both in terms of 
the scope and content o f its subject matter and its methods or modes o f approaching its 
substantive concerns. Neoclassical economics assumes the economy to be mechanistic, 
following simple laws, with the underlying interrelationships expressible in simple
7
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functional forms. Deductive hypotheses are constructed concerning the behavior o f 
selected economic variables from underlying assumptions. Nonmonetary factors are placed 
in the black box of assumptions called ceteris paribus, with these assumptions, typically 
pertaining to technology, institutions, and social attitudes and motivations, perceived as 
non- or extraeconomic in character. They are 'given,' not in the sense that they do not 
change or cannot be altered (for example, the substitution o f the oligopoly assumption for 
pure competition), but in the sense that they are typically regarded as beyond the 
explanatory scope of economic theory (Buchholz, 1990; Elliott, 1978).
Institutional economists criticize ordinary economics as working with narrowly 
closed models, and with analysis limited to too few conditions, or economic factors, which 
are readily quantifiable. In the view o f institutionalists, neoclassical models do not even 
closely correspond to observed reality. The underlying interrelationships are too complex 
to be represented by simple solvable equations. The seemingly greater precision offered by 
conventional economic analysis is only attained by ignoring a whole world of relevant 
factors, and as a result, almost the entire social system is kept out o f sight (Elliott. 1978; 
Myrdal. 1978).
Institutional analysis focuses upon the broad political character ot economic life, 
including society’s laws, ethos, and institutions. Institutional economists recognize the 
need to take into account the entire social system, including everything else o f  importance 
to what happens in the economic field. Foremost are institutions and attitudes, including 
the distribution o f power in society and, more generally, economic, social, and political 
stratification. The strategic starting point for an analysis o f any institutional change is a
8
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shift into variables o f the data compounded in the ceteris paribus assumptions of 
neoclassical economic theory. In institutional theory, these kinds o f data become variables 
for which hypotheses are to be constructed. Induced policy measures are added as an 
exogenous set o f factors, applied with the purpose of changing one or several o f  these 
endogenous factors. Thus, institutional economists include noneconomic factors, selected 
according to their relevance to what happens, in their analyses o f economic problems 
(Bartlett, 1994; Elliott, 1978; Myrdal, 1978).
The Role of Property Rights
Embedded within the structural component of the social system are property 
relations, the subset o f conventions and rules that define individuals in terms o f objects of 
value and their associated income stream (Bromley, 1982). Property rights institutions 
include the social norms and customs, in addition to formal laws and regulations and the 
level o f their enforcement, which help an individual form reasonable expectations in 
dealing with others. Thus, rights only have meaning in a social context which defines 
individuals' access to. and use of. resources. Access rights constitute authority to refuse 
use to others, while use rights constitute authority to determine what will be done with the 
resources. For every right an individual holds, rules exist that authorize or require specific 
actions in exercising that property right, in addition to formal laws and regulations and the 
level o f their enforcement (Eggertsson, 1990; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Santopietro 
and Shabman, 1992).
Traditional neoclassical economic market models assume an ideal, well-defined 
private property rights structure. In these models, consumers own all o f the resources of
9
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the economy, known as the total endowment. The initial endowments o f  consumers do not 
intersect and sum to the total endowment, so that individual ownership o f resources is 
exclusive and complete. Institutional constraints are eliminated from consideration by 
assuming that all resources are fully allocated, and voluntarily exchanged in efficiently 
operating markets with no information or transaction costs. Under these conditions, rights 
to resources are priced at their opportunity cost and, according to Coase's Theorem, 
resources flow to their highest-valued uses (Buchholz, 1990;Coase, 1960; De Alessi, 1980; 
Eggertsson, 1990; Spulber, 1989).
Property Rights Conditions
Randall (1987) identified four conditions necessary for an adequate set of 
nonattenuated private property rights, the prerequisite for efficient trade in resources: (1) 
ownership, (2) specification, (3) transferability, and (4) enforcement. Ownership, the most 
fundamental pre-condition to trade, is the legal mechanism which assigns the right to use 
a resource. Exclusive ownership, required for private property rights, imparts exclusive 
authority to choose how the resource will be used, to change its form and substance, to set 
the terms under which others may use the resource, and to receive the income generated 
from the use of the resource (Dales, 1992; De Alessi, 1980; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972).
Specification of rights o f  ownership is required if  trade is to be effective in 
allocating resources and resolving conflicts. Even when an ownership right is exclusive, 
ownership is not an unrestricted right. Ownership is limited by restrictions that are 
explicitly stated in the law. These limitations may also separate rights from the title holder
10
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of record, so that a resource may serve more than a single use at one tim e (Furubotn and 
Pejovich, 1972; Randall, 1987; Ward, 1982).
Transferability o f rights is the authority to exchange property rights with those o f 
other individuals at mutually agreeable prices. Transferability depends upon the method 
used to allocate the right. Some rights are not directly transferable, especially those granted 
by government licenses, which often incorporate rules preventing transfer. When the 
transfer o f a resource to alternative uses is not allowed, the owner will not consider the full 
opportunity costs o f other uses. The value o f  the alternative uses will be ignored, even if 
higher than the existing use value, resulting in inefficiency (Anderson, 1982; De Alessi, 
1980; Rolph, 1983).
Rights enforcement, the ability to exclude other users, will determine the likelihood 
that an owner can enjoy the benefits o f  ownership. Enforcement includes the discovery o f 
violations, the apprehension o f violators, and the imposition o f appropriate penalties. A 
system o f rights has to be enforceable and enforced. If enforcement is imperfect, the 
expected value o f penalties (the amount o f the penalty multiplied by the probability that it 
will be imposed) must exceed any possible gains a violator could hope to obtain (Anderson. 
1982; Randall, 1987).
Property Rights to Natural Resources
Property rights may not be clearly defined for natural resources, since the natural 
environment is often not divisible in a manner suitable for private ownership. Instead, the 
government has been viewed as the owner or manager o f environmental resources. 
Allocation of natural resources in the United States has traditionally been based on the prior
1 1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
appropriation doctrine, a rights system which places a higher value on those resource uses 
that came first. This doctrine, with its supporting laws and institutions, has primarily 
protected the economic interests o f  private property rights to natural resources for a century 
(MeEl fish, Jr., Warburg and Pendergrass, 1996; Spulber, 1989).
The natural resource allocation institutional system has been slowly undergoing 
changes as policy makers developed the public trust doctrine, a parallel, and equal means 
o f meeting society’s nonmarket resource needs. The public trust doctrine, an ancient 
English common law doctrine, recognizes two types of ownership in lands, theju s  privatum  
(private property title) and the ju s  publicum  (title held on behalf o f all people). The ju s  
privatum  component can be transferred into private ownership, but the ju s  publicum  
component is inalienable.
As adopted in the United States, the public trust doctrine specifies that each state 
manage tidal shorelands, navigable streams, and the lands underlying them for the benefit 
o f  the people of the state. Inalienable public rights along seashores and rivers include 
navigation, transportation, and fishing. This obligation continues as land is transferred into 
private ownership. Thus, subsequent private uses cannot obstruct public rights protected 
under the public trust doctrine (McElfish.Jr., Warburg and Pendergrass, 1996: Whittlesey 
and Huffaker, 1995).
The dynamic potential o f  the public trust doctrine was recognized in 1970. when 
Sax suggested that the public trust doctrine could be a useful tool for controlling 
government actions that benefitted private interests over the interests o f the public. 
Currently, there is no established single version of the public trust doctrine. Since 1970.
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the U.S. Supreme Court and each state court system have formulated versions o f the scope 
of the doctrine, including identification o f the lands and waters covered under the trust and 
the public activities that must be protected. Public trust obligations have been extended to 
a variety o f  lands and waters, including rural parklands, wetlands associated with navigable 
water bodies, nonnavigable tributaries, groundwater, and all waters usable for recreation 
purposes. Public trust uses have also been expanded to cover a broad range o f activities, 
including hunting, boating, bathing, skating and other recreation, and aesthetic beauty. 
Private resource uses previously considered vested property rights have been required to 
give way to the new understanding o f the public trust (McElfish,Jr., Warburg and 
Pendergrass, 1996; Whittlesey and Huffaker, 1995).
The degree o f interaction between the prior appropriation and public trust doctrines, 
and the extent to which the public trust will limit appropriative rights, varies significantly 
from state to state, and has been the source o f natural resource use and access conflicts 
between environmental interest groups and private industry interest groups. A common 
theme in these conflicts is fundamental disagreement over the rights that each side claims 
as its starting point for negotiations. Environmental groups insist that these resources are 
owned by the public, while private industry groups want a system that allocates private 
rights to natural resources. These conflicts over public versus private ownership, which 
extend across the entire range o f natural resources, often become intractable because each 
side uses a different reference point in arguing over fairness (Colby, 1995; Whittlesey and 
Huffaker, 1995; Willey, 1982).
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Property Rights Structures and Changes
The structure o f property rights can be categorized by using the rules o f resource 
access and use as differentiating characteristics. The result is a spectrum o f potential rights, 
with private property and open access at the extremes o f the rights spectrum. Any 
movement away from private property is a move toward open access. The term "common 
property” refers to all those property rights structures between the extremes. In common 
property rights structures, there is some sharing of access and use rights, based upon either 
law or tradition (Santopietro and Shabman, 1992).
Social values and policies are always in transition, so property rights are in a 
perpetual state o f flux. As a result, change is the norm, not the exception for property 
rights. Alternative property rights structures and changes in property rights present decision 
makers with different structures o f costs and rewards, which will systematically affect 
choices, and thus, can alter the structure o f contracts and affect economic outcomes (Colby, 
1995: Eggertsson, 1990).
Quiggin (1988) identified two types o f change in property rights. The first is 
voluntary exchange between individuals, within a given structure. This market exchange 
process has been the subject o f orthodox economic analysis. The second type o f property 
rights change involves changes in the structure of the rights. Changes in the structure of 
property rights can include the creation o f new rights, the abrogation or limiting of existing 
rights, and changes from common to private property rights or vice versa. These structural 
changes have been analyzed by property rights theorists as either the attenuation or the 
development of rights, depending upon one’s theoretical perspective. In the analysis o f a
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particular property right, the concept o f  attenuation, which is any limitation on the way in 
which property rights may be utilized, is normally used to describe rights changes. The 
attenuation o f private property rights to a resource affects the owner’s expectations about 
the uses to which he can put the resource, the value o f  the resource to the owner and others, 
and the terms o f trade. Attenuation o f property rights is, in general, viewed as undesirable 
(Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Quiggin, 1988).
The Property Rights - Regulation Institutional Relationship
Property rights attenuations typically result from actions by the state, including 
courts and statutory authorities which use the state’s coercive powers to define and enforce 
property rights. Property rights and government regulations are generally interdependent, 
since the government often uses regulations as the device for allocating property rights in 
order to limit a production or consumption activity that imposes undue costs on a user 
group or the community. The government’s allocative objective is to reduce exploitation 
o f the resource and distribute costs o f the reduction among the users. Thus, government 
regulations, including environmental regulations, can be viewed as private property rights 
attenuations, with the growth o f government regulation weakening private property rights 
(De Alessi, 1980; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Quiggin, 1988; Rolph. 1983). 
Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Climate
Environmental regulations, which are designed to protect the integrity o f  natural 
resources, have increased significantly in the United States since 1970. Environmental 
laws operate by identifying resources to be protected and then placing restrictions on those 
activities which negatively affect the resource (Hamilton, 1992; Jaffe, et al., 1995). Private
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business bears the brunt o f the cost o f environmental regulations. There are four different 
classes o f costs attributable to government regulation: administrative costs, compliance 
costs, transfers, and inefficiency. Expenses vary over time and between states and can 
influence the interstate allocation o f developmental resources (Feiock and Rowland, 1990). 
Business location decisions may be significantly affected by state environmental regulations 
(Bartik, 1988). Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f environmental regulations 
(i.e., the number and intensity o f regulations), was identified in the relocation decisions by 
a majority o f polluting industry CEOs and is the factor least likely to be regarded as 
unimportant (Davis, 1992). For plant location decisions where environmental regulations 
are o f some significance, uncertainties about required permits and permit processing time 
are more important than are spatial variations in the direct costs o f providing the necessary 
pollution control equipment (Stafford, 1985).
Attempts to measure regulatory climate have met with only limited success. 
Researchers have developed state-specific or industry-specific proxy measures, usually- 
based upon estimates o f state enforcement efforts or industry compliance costs (Jaffe, et al., 
1995; Tannenwald. 1997). Direct measures o f regulatory climate include several established 
qualitative indices, such as the Conservation Foundation Index (Duerksen, 1983) and the 
Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991). Development o f qualitative indices has, unfortunately, 
been limited to ad hoc indicator summation procedures. No attempts to statistically 
examine correlations between indicators or mathematically validate indicator importance, 
or weights, were reported for any established qualitative index.
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Efforts to measure regulatory climate for agriculture or natural resource based 
industries have been limited. None of the established indices o f regulatory climate or 
stringency are tailored to agriculture regulatory efforts, and efforts to use these indices to 
measure the stringency of state environmental regulations toward agriculture industries 
have met with mixed results (Mo and Abdalla, 1997).
The U.S. Aquaculture Industry: Growth and Constraints to Pevelonment
The U.S. aquaculture industry, ranked 10th in the world in value o f its products 
(nearly a billion dollars), is the fastest growing component o f U.S. agriculture, accounting 
for nearly 300,000 jobs and having direct and indirect economic impacts o f $8 billion. In 
terms of economic importance, the aquaculture industry is comparable in value to the sheep 
industry and equivalent to 30 percent of the turkey industry (USDA/APHIS/VS. 1995). 
However, to meet projected worldwide seafood demand, aquaculture production will have 
to increase seven-fold by the year 2025 (USDA/CSRS, 1994).
The diversity o f environmental conditions within the U.S. allows for the culture o f 
a wide variety o f warmwater, coolwater, and coldwater fish and aquatic animals. There are 
five principal cultured foodfish species in the U.S. (catfish, trout, salmon, tilapia. hybrid 
striped bass) and two categories o f non-food fish production (baitfish and ornamentals). 
Other species with limited production include walleye, perch, sunfish and largemouth bass 
(USDA/APHIS/VS. 1995).
Aquaculture can be environmentally destructive, causing productivity declines and 
reduced biodiversity (Pillay, 1992; Tisdell, 1995; Wirth and Luzar, 1997). The 
development o f aquaculture and recognition of its potentially negative environmental
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impacts has resulted in increased levels o f  environmental regulation. The implementation 
o f legal, regulatory, promotional, educational and other programs affecting the aquaculture 
industry are administered at the state level in the U.S. As a result, regulatory programs and 
permit requirements vary from state to state. Legal and regulatory obstacles are commonly 
cited as the major impediments to aquaculture growth and development. For example, in 
many states it is difficult, costly, and time consuming to secure permits to establish 
aquaculture operations (Wypyszinski et al.. 1994).
Heggelund (1993) suggested that the lack o f property rights which can be efficiently 
exchanged in the formal market economic system is the chief institutional obstacle to 
development o f the fish farming industry. Aquaculture operates in an informal market, best 
described in terms of its “extreme inefficiencies caused by prohibitive regulations and 
inconsistent state laws" (Heggelund, 1993. p. 3). The major constraints to aquaculture 
industry development typically manifest themselves as conflicts between industry, 
regulatory agencies, and interest groups over natural resource use and perceived adverse 
environmental impacts o f aquaculture. Conflicts arise over issues o f definitions of 
acceptable environmental quality, who should pay the costs o f environmental protection or 
restoration, and whose interests count when issues are decided. This suggests the need for 
a decision framework through which the concerns o f competing interests are addressed and 
resources allocated. Institutional arrangements serve the functional role for resource 
allocation (Norris, Carriker and Danielson. 1994).
Conflicts between the aquaculture industry and state regulatory institutions affect 
aquaculture firm decision making, especially site location and species selection decisions.
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In choosing a site for an aquaculture enterprise, the culturist must consider an array of 
environmental and operational factors, since aquaculture requires an aquatic environment 
and adjacent land base of operation. Site selection will be affected by the property rights 
provided. However, many states lack the necessary institutional and regulatory' structure 
for aquaculture operations that require the use o f public resources (DeVoe and Mount.
1989).
One issue that faces all aquaculturists is selection of a fish species for culture. The 
fish farmer can choose either native or non-native species. State fish and wildlife laws 
typically classify fish species into categories such as commercial food fish, baitfish. 
ornamentals, marine or freshwater game fish. Many native species, especially game 
species, meet all the criteria for ideal aquaculture species (Helfrich, Orth and Neves.. 1992; 
Wirth. 1993). However, most game laws completely prevent the marketing o f "wild game” 
species for food, even if the species was produced as a directed agricultural enterprise 
(Haby and Cuenco. 1987).
Research Objectives 
General Objective
The overall objective o f  this research is to examine the relationships between 
property rights, regulation, state regulatory structure and industry development as they 
relate to regulatory climate and its effects on aquaculture industry' development, firm 
location and species selection decisions.
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Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of this research are to:
1. Identify and review literature concerning the relationships between property 
rights, regulation, and industry development;
2. Formulate a conceptual model o f aquaculture industry regulation, illustrating 
the relationship between political actors, institutional structure, regulatory 
climate and firm decision making;
3. Use the conceptual model as a framework to develop and validate a summated 
scale measure o f state regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture, with 
underlying dimensions based on four property rights conditions;
4. Empirically evaluate the impact and significance o f key state institutional 
characteristics (lead administrative agency, enforcement agency, development 
plan, definition o f aquaculture as agriculture, finfish classification, region) on 
the regulatory climate; and
5. Provide policy recommendations to farmers and state aquaculture development 




The first objective o f this research is accomplished through the development of a 
comprehensive review of relevant literature to develop the appropriate theoretical 
background for the measurement o f regulation and the impacts o f regulatory climate. 
Studies on property rights, environmental regulation o f industry, the institutional 
relationships between property rights and regulation, and the impacts o f regulatory climate 
on industry growth and development are reviewed and form the basis o f the conceptual 
model.
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Objective Two
Based on the literature identified in objective one, a conceptual model o f 
aquaculture industry regulation is formulated. Elements o f public choice theory and firm 
location theory are combined within an institutional economics framework to explain the 
relationships between political actors, institutional structure, regulatory climate and 
aquaculture firm location and species selection decisions.
Objective Three
The conceptual model provides the theoretical foundation for the development and 
validation o f a property rights-based summated scale measure o f the regulatory climate 
toward finfish aquaculture. The items comprising the scale reflect the existence o f specific 
environmental regulations which attenuate the four property rights conditions identified by 
Randall (1987).
Data Sources
The initial scale item pool will be generated from three data sources. The 1995 
State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey by Wirth and Luzar o f aquaculture contacts from 
all 50 states and four U.S. territories will serve as the main data source o f scale items. 
Surveys completed by State Aquaculture Coordinators and contacts were obtained from 45 
states and Guam. This survey, which was the most comprehensive survey o f state 
aquaculture regulations conducted to date, obtained information about the state agency or 
institution responsible for developing and enforcing aquaculture regulations, ownership and 
specification o f property rights by categories o f fish (baitfish, ornamentals, commercial 
foodfish. freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish), escapement considerations, and use
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o f aquaculture best management practices. The 46 survey respondents provided answers 
for five different categories of finfish, resulting in 230 total observations.
The 1993 State Aquatic Health Policies Survey by the National Association o f State 
Aquaculture Coordinators (NAS AC) o f 35 states and Guam provides additional data for the 
empirical analysis. Since ten states which responded to the 1995 survey did not participate 
in the 1993 survey, a State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998 Supplemental 
Questionnaire was conducted with 1995 survey respondents, to clarify and update results 
for scale items developed from the 1993 survey. The 1998 supplemental questionnaire 
obtained information, by category o f fish, on marketing restrictions, legal status o f fish in 
aquaculture facilities, and health certifications for transport o f fish into and within a state. 
The supplemental questionnaire also obtained numbers of producers for each fish category, 
and Likert scale self-reports of state regulatory stringency which are used to validate the 
regulatory climate scale.
O bjective F our
The objective o f  empirically evaluating the impact and significance o f key state 
institutional characteristics on state regulatory climate is achieved through two econometric 
analyses using two alternative specifications o f the regulatory climate scale as the 
dependent variable. A two-limit truncated regression will utilize a truncated continuous 
version o f the scale. An ordered probit analysis will explore the use o f  a five-category 
strictly ordinal version o f the scale. For both analyses, key state institutional characteristics 
identified in the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey serve as independent 
variables.
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Objective Five
The development of policy recommendations is realized through the review o f 
relevant literature, an assessment and comparison o f the relative regulatory climate o f  states 
toward the culture o f different categories o f finfish, and an examination o f the significance 
and impacts o f state aquaculture development and regulatory characteristics on the 
aquaculture regulatory climate scale measure. Results and policy recommendations will 
be interpreted in light o f the information needs o f the aquaculture community and state 
aquaculture development and regulatory agencies.
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the research 
problem, objectives and procedures, and presents the institutional economic framework, 
property rights theory literature, a brief introduction to environmental regulation and 
regulatory climate, and the constraints to aquaculture industry growth and development. 
Chapter two reviews the relevant literature on the theories and impacts o f  government 
regulation, the environmental regulation o f firms, and the impacts o f environmental 
regulatory climate on industry economic development, firm location and production 
decisions. Chapter two also presents the regulatory climate conceptual model. Chapter 
three describes data collection procedures and provides descriptive statistics for both the 
1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. 
Classical test theory, the dichotomous choice scale development process, a description o f 
the final aquaculture regulatory climate scale measure and appropriate test statistics are 
presented in Chapter four. Chapter five includes a description o f the ordered probit limited
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dependent variable model and the empirical results o f  the analysis o f  the regulatory climate 
scale measure as a function o f  key state institutional characteristics. Chapter six discusses 
the findings, including implications for fish farmers and state aquaculture development and 
regulatory agencies, and provides policy recommendations and directions for future 
research.
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CHAPTER 2
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION
The study o f government institutions, including government regulation, has 
traditionally been viewed as the role o f political science. The structure o f  governmental 
institutions may have important policy consequences, since institutions may be structured 
to facilitate certain policy outcomes and to obstruct other outcomes. Any substantive policy 
change entails institutional change.
The institutional approach in political science has not devoted much attention to the 
linkages between the structure o f governmental institutions and the content ofpublic policy. 
Instead, institutional studies have usually been limited to describing specific governmental 
institutions, including their structures, organization, duties, and functions, without 
systematically examining the impact o f institutional characteristics on policy outputs (Dye. 
1992).
This chapter examines the political economy o f government regulation, including 
the influence o f industry and special interest groups in the development o f institutional 
structure and regulatory instruments. It identifies, based on previous research, the impacts 
of state government environmental institutions, especially environmental regulations, on 
the regulatory climate toward business, and documents the effects o f regulatory climate on 
firm decision making. Based on the research findings and firm location theory, a 
conceptual model o f the regulatory climate-institutional relationships for the finfish 
aquaculture industry is proposed.
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Government Regulation of Industry: An Overview
The power of the government to regulate citizens’ behavior in order to protect the 
public’s health, welfare, safety, and morals, is vested in state government. Regulation 
provides a mechanism allowing citizens to exercise political power through governmental 
units. All regulations attempt to promote economic welfare by correcting imperfections 
in private markets, such as monopolistic and oligopolistic practices, negative externalities 
generated in both production and consumption, imperfect information, and fraud. State 
regulations that most directly affect businesses take many forms, including environmental 
protection and land use, regulation o f  labor markets, health and safety codes, regulation o f 
financial institutions, and transportation (De Alessi. 1980; Randall, 1987; Tannenwald. 
1997).
Two common government regulatory institutions are government bureaus, headed 
by career civil servants, and independent regulatory agencies, headed by politically 
appointed commissioners. Regulatory' agencies charged with public health and safety 
typically have chosen uniform standards. All firms must comply, regardless o f the cost o f 
compliance. This suggests that agencies are mainly concerned with reducing harmful 
externalities, with less concern for firms’ costs (De Alessi, 1980; Jones and Scotchmer,
1990).
The Cost of Government Regulation
All regulations raise the cost o f production for firms and change the allocation o f 
economic surplus between firms and consumers and among producer groups. The costs 
attributable to regulation are measured by the difference between the costs that occur in the
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presence o f  regulation and the costs that would prevail in the regulation’s absence. The 
overall social costs o f  regulation will generally exceed direct compliance costs because 
regulations can cause reductions in output, inhibit investments in productive capital, reduce 
productivity, and bring about transitional costs. Regulations raise the costs o f  production 
and diminish factor productivity by internalizing negative externalities, constraining 
technological choice, and requiring outputs, such as periodic reports, that producers would 
not normally use (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Tannenwald, 1997).
Rosters (1979) distinguished four classes o f regulation-induced costs incurred by 
private firms: administrative costs, compliance costs, transfers, and inefficiency. 
Administrative costs include the costs incurred for the staff, supplies, studies, and 
consultants’ reports needed for regulatory record keeping and reporting. Compliance costs 
are comprised o f expenditures incurred by firms to meet the specifications established by 
the regulations. Transfer costs, not easily captured by cost estimation methods, are incurred 
by the diverting o f resources as a result o f  regulatory compliance. Inefficiency costs, 
commonly known to economists as deadweight losses, often result from regulatory 
restrictions on the range of permissible prices, practices, or processes.
Theories of Regulation
Theoretical and empirical studies o f regulation normally fall into three areas: (1) 
price and entry regulation in industries with competitive market structures, (2) price and 
entry regulation in monopolistic industries, and (3) qualitative regulation, which attempts 
to cope with various kinds o f market-failure problems indirectly linked to prices, profits, 
and market structure. Environmental, health, occupational safety, and product quality
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regulation fall within the third category, with the best-developed theoretical models in non­
economic regulation those dealing with environmental external diseconomies (Joskow and 
Noll, 1981). All models o f  regulation are based on either the “normative theory” o f 
regulation or various general process theories o f  regulation. The following sections review 
key concepts o f popular theories o f regulation
Normative Theory of Regulation
The “normative theory” o f regulation, part o f the public interest model of political 
economy, had great appeal until the 1960s, and is still often the beginning assumption o f 
research on regulation. The essence o f this theory is that analysis o f a regulatory process 
begins with the assumption that its purpose is to maximize some universal measure o f 
economic welfare, such as consumers’ surplus or total surplus, in the public interest. 
Market failure is the motivating reason for establishing regulations. Once established, 
regulator)' bodies were supposed to lessen or eliminate the inefficiencies caused by the 
market failure (Joskow and Noll, 1981).
As a positive theory o f regulation, the normative theory o f welfare economics has 
been largely rejected as economists have demonstrated that regulatory agencies, contrary 
to theory, make numerous decisions that reduce conventional measures o f economic 
welfare (Joskow and Noll, 1981). There are two reasons for the rejection o f this theory. 
First, individuals have objectives, such as constitutional freedoms and guarantees o f 
procedural fairness, that are affected by the actions o f  regulatory institutions, but are not 
accounted for in applied welfare economics. Second, political agents are economic actors. 
They respond to incentives created by political institutions and administrative processes,
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and would thus be unlikely to seek to maximize conventional measures o f  economic 
welfare (Joskow and Noll, 1981).
Process Theories of Regulation
General process theories o f regulation tend to be either legislative or bureaucratic. 
They focus analysis on the electoral process and the incentives operating on politicians, or 
on the bureaucratic process and the incentives operating on regulators. The first category 
is represented by the “economic theory’’ o f regulation. Stigler, Posner and Peltzman are its 
outstanding proponents (Joskow and Noll, 1981).
The Influence of Regulated Industries
The “economic theory" o f regulation was introduced by Stigler (1971) as an 
outgrowth o f capture theory, w'hich stated that over time, regulatory agencies come to be 
dominated by the industries regulated. Stigler (1971) noted that regulation may be actively 
sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon industry. Stigler’s central thesis 
hypothesized that regulation is acquired by the industry and designed and operated for 
industry’s benefit. He also hypothesized that every industry or occupation that has adequate 
political power to utilize the state will attempt to control entry, and that regulatory policies 
will often be fashioned to retard the rate of growth of new firms. Stigler also explained that 
the industry which seeks regulation must be prepared to pay with the two things that 
politicians and political parties need: votes and resources (Peltzman, 1989).
Subsequent refinements to Stigler’s economic theory o f  regulation by Posner 
(1974), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983) have forced an evolution o f the economic 
theory o f regulation away from its origins toward an emphasis on the coalitional aspects o f
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politics (Peltzman, 1989). The essence of this theory is that regulation is a device for 
transferring income to well-organized groups if the groups will return the favor with votes 
and contributions to politicians. The theory predicts that regulators will use their power to 
transfer income from those with less political power to those with more political power. 
The direction o f this income redistribution depends on the costs and benefits o f regulation 
as perceived by different interest groups and their ability to exercise their power in the 
political arena (Joskow and Noll, 1981).
Public Interest Group Theories
An organized interest group consists o f a voluntary association o f individuals who 
band together to move public policy in a particular general or specific direction. Interest 
groups form and multiply to capture rents from the political process by influencing policy 
decisions. The number o f  such groups increases when returns to lobbying activities increase 
or the cost o f organizing groups decreases. Most o f the theories that focus on the regulatory 
agencies themselves predict outcomes favorable to organized interests. The legislative 
committee structure, the judicial review mechanism, and the administrative process all 
favor well organized interests. Arguing one's case in a legislative, regulatory or judicial 
hearing is expensive, so organized groups that possess resources to expend in this manner 
can be expected to influence policies to the extent that the outcomes depend upon the 
information presented in these hearings (Roy, 1995).
Since the early 1970's, interest groups have multiplied in both number and 
effectiveness. The congested universe o f special interests with conflicting demands imposes 
high costs on the policy making process. Groups frequently block other interest groups'
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demands that might negatively affect them, seriously impeding any comprehensive or 
coordinated policy reformulations. Political gridlock is the eventual result. This explains, 
in part, why established government programs are difficult or impossible to terminate. As 
a result, there are few resources for new programs, and fundamental policy changes are 
almost impossible (Batie and Schweikhardt, 1995; Brown and Schweikhardt, 1995).
Bernstein’s (1955) *1ife-cycle theory” o f agencies proposed that agencies age from 
active advocates o f generalized consumer interests to passive conduits o f organized groups’ 
interests. Eckert (1972) explained organized interests’ capture o f  agencies by suggesting 
that regulators expect to become employees o f organized interests when their regulating 
days are over (Joskow and Noll, 1981).
Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory, sometimes called rational choice theory, involves applying 
microeconomic principles to the analysis and explanation of political behavior (Anderson, 
1994; Mueller. 1979). Public choice theory suggests that government must perform certain 
functions that the marketplace is unable to handle. First, the government must provide 
public goods, since the market cannot supply public goods because their costs exceed their 
value to any single buyer. Second, externalities, when the activities (i.e., air and water 
pollution) o f one individual imposes uncompensated costs on others, represent a market 
failure and justify government intervention. The government either regulates the activities 
that produce externalities or imposes penalties on these activities in order to compensate 
for their social costs (Anderson. 1994; Dye, 1992).
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Public choice theory emphasizes the importance of individual self-interest as a 
motivating force in policymaking and decision-making processes. Public choice theory 
recognizes that the interests o f politicians and bureaucrats can contrast with the interests 
o f voters. A basic axiom of public choice, described by James Buchanan, a leading 
proponent o f public choice, is that political actors act rationally in pursuit o f their own self- 
interest, rather than the people’s (Anderson, 1994). Politicians and bureaucrats are 
interested in winning reelection, garnering campaign contributions, expanding agency 
budgets, gaining greater authority and prestige, and expanding the power o f government 
(Dye. 1992).
Public choice theory also explains interest groups and their effects on public policy. 
The actions o f organizations can be explained in terms o f the behavior o f a "model” 
individual (Anderson, 1994). Individuals seeking special benefits, such as subsidies, 
privileges or protections, band together to pressure for government action. The costs o f the 
special benefits are dispersed to all taxpayers. No individual taxpayer bears enough of the 
cost to merit spending time, energy, or money to organize in opposition. The resulting 
concentration o f benefits and dispersal o f costs results in an interest-group system that 
favors small, well-organized, interests seeking government benefits at the expense o f larger 
but less organized groups o f taxpayers. The activities o f many special interest groups, over 
a long period of time, results in overcreation of government services, programs, and 
regulations (Dye, 1992).
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Hahn’s Unified Theory' of Regulation
Hahn (1990) presented a concise unified theory o f regulation within a game 
theoretic framework to explain why a particular pattern o f regulation occurs or does not 
occur in an industry. Focusing on standards, the dominant instrument in environmental 
policy, Hahn suggested that a regulator must balance competing concerns o f two groups, 
typically characterized as “the industry” and “political concerns, or environmentalists.” 
Industry is concerned with the economic impact o f regulation on profits, and 
environmentalists are concerned with the impact o f policy on the environment. While the 
regulator's first choice is to impose standards with both low political and economic costs. 
Hahn suggests that this solution is not always possible. Assuming that political costs tend 
to dominate economic concerns, a standard with low political costs and high economic 
costs will usually be preferred to a standard with high political and low economic costs.
Hahn also demonstrated how balancing the needs o f industry and environmentalists 
can result in more stringent regulation o f new sources of pollution than existing sources of 
pollution. Industry, seeking lower costs, generally prefers low standards. 
Environmentalists, in contrast, seek consistently high standards. Stricter standards for new 
sources are preferred by both groups over stricter standards for old sources. Hahn explains 
this result for industry by suggesting that lower costs to existing firms are more important 
than lower costs to new firms. Environmentalists reach this conclusion because they are 
thought to take a long-term perspective which concludes that overall environmental quality 
will be improved by imposing stricter standards on new sources o f  environmental
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degradation. The regulator’s choice reduces to choosing the alternative with a high 
standard for new sources and a low standard for existing sources.
Research on the Processes Underlying Regulation
Williams and Matheny (1984) analyzed conflicting assertions about the three 
fundamental processes underlying the politics o f regulation: (1) the relationship between 
market failure and social regulation; (2) the impact of the economic strength of regulated 
industries on the regulator)' process; and (3) the effect o f organized public interest groups 
on the regulatory process. Using data on states’ regulation o f hazardous waste disposal, 
Williams and Matheny (1984) concluded that, first, the most significant determinant o f  a 
state's effort in hazardous waste regulation was the size o f  the state's budget, not market 
failure. Second, the quality o f  a state’s laws had almost no impact on the level o f either 
public or private spending on hazard waste alleviation. These two results together imply 
that major changes in both laws and implementing institutions are necessary if social need 
is to determine resource allocation. Third, slate level regulator)- effort seemed to be 
significantly influenced by industry efforts to evade hazardous waste disposal costs, 
resulting in increased government spending and decreased industry spending. Fourth, 
public environmental interest group strength was an important determinant of the level o f 
state government hazardous waste regulatory effort, although the groups seemed to have 
little impact on the regulatory burden imposed on private industry (Williams and Matheny, 
1984).
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The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation
Stigler (1971) suggested that regulation may be sought by an industry for the 
industry’s benefit, or may be imposed by the government for the protection and benefit o f 
the public. Environmental regulations, which have grown significantly in the United States 
since 1970, fit in the latter category. The primary purpose o f  environmental laws is to 
protect the integrity o f natural resources. Most environmental laws operate by identifying 
resources to be protected, and then placing restrictions on what can be discharged into the 
protected resources. The laws usually identify the types o f conduct known to affect the 
resource and place restrictions on those activities (Hamilton. 1992; Jaffe, et al., 1995).
Although there are numerous instruments for environmental management, U.S. 
environmental management has traditionally been based on direct regulation, a regulatory 
approach known as "command and control” (Dudek and Palmisano. 1988). The most 
common "command and control" regulatory method is to require parties to obtain licenses 
or permits before engaging in a designated activity. Licenses are often issued to the 
individual applicant listed as the primary responsible party, rather than to the business 
entity, and are often not automatically transferable if business ownership changes hands 
(Corbin and Young, 1995; Hawke. 1991).
Hamilton (1992) suggested that by imposing a requirement to obtain a license or 
permit, the public has the opportunity to set minimum standards for performance, which 
must be satisfied before the permit will be granted. Standards may be framed in terms o f 
effluent emissions, ambient concentrations or technological specifications. Setting
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standards also requires the establishment o f a monitoring agency, which has the power to 
impose penalties for non-adherence.
Generally the specification o f aggregate standards includes maximum upper limits 
on the total production o f  pollutants. When several sources o f pollution exist in the same 
area, regulations must include some mechanism for dividing the aggregate limit among the 
several sources. The total o f individual firms’ pollution levels must not exceed the 
aggregate standards. Enforcement o f environmental regulations, therefore, reduces to 
allocating the rights to discharge pollutants, a scarce resource, among competing users. In 
this sense, the regulation o f pollution is identical to the regulation o f harvesting o f common 
property natural resources (Freeman, 1994; Spulber, 1989).
The Costs and Impacts of Environmental Regulation
Environmental regulations have a huge impact on business, which bears the brunt 
o f the cost o f environmental regulations. Pollution abatement has emerged as a major 
claimant on the resources o f the U.S. economy. Environmental spending in the United 
States has been estimated at about S I50 billion per year, or about 2.4 percent o f gross 
domestic product (GDP). Furthermore. EPA has projected that annual environmental 
compliance spending may reach $190 billion, nearly 2.6 percent o f the GDP by the year 
2000 (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Rice, 1994).
Jorgenson and Wilcoxon (1990) analyzed the impact o f environmental regulation 
on the U.S. economy by simulating the long-term growth o f the U.S. economy with and 
without regulation. They showed that the long-run cost o f environmental regulation is a 
reduction o f 2.59 percent in the level o f the U.S. gross national product. This is more than
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10 percent of the share o f total government purchases o f goods and services in the national 
economy during the period 1973-1985.
Environmental regulations have both direct and indirect effects on a firm ’s costs o f 
production, directly through the firm’s expenditures on pollution reduction and indirectly 
through the higher prices it must pay for certain factors o f  production that are affected by 
regulation. Barbera and McConnell (1990) developed a translog cost function approach to 
measuring the impact o f  environmental regulations on total factor productivity growth from 
1961 to 1980 for five industries which are among the most heavily regulated. The authors 
found that the net effect o f abatement requirements, including both the direct and indirect 
effects, was to lower total factor productivity in all five industries.
Jaffe. et al.. (1995) posited five ways in which environmental regulations could 
negatively affect productivity. First, measured productivity will fall because the production 
o f an additional output, environmental quality, causes diversion of the measured inputs o f 
capital, labor, and energy. Second, new production or management practices undertaken 
in response to regulations may be less efficient than old ones. Third, environmental 
investments could crowd out other investments by firms. Fourth, "new-source" bias in 
regulations can discourage investment in new, more efficient facilities. Finally, "best 
available control technology” requirements may increase adoption o f  technologies at the 
time regulations go into effect, but reduce firms’ incentives to develop new technologies.
Opportunity costs also have real, but much less obvious, effects than firm out-of- 
pocket expenses for environmental compliance. Opportunity costs often come in the form 
of the returns a firm would have earned had it invested its environmental compliance
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
expenditures in other areas, such as plant expansion, workforce retraining, or intensified 
research and development efforts (Gardiner and Portney, 1994; Jaffe, et al.. 1995).
Pashigian (1984) investigated the impact o f environmental regulations on optimal 
plant size and factor shares for the twenty industries with the highest and the twenty 
industries with the lowest weighted average o f gross pollution abatement operating cost per 
thousand dollars o f value between 1972 and 1977. Pashigian concluded that compliance 
with environmental laws has placed a greater burden on small than on large plants, and has 
reduced the number o f plants in the affected industries. Under environmental regulation, 
small plants have found it more difficult to compete and survive with larger plants 
(Pashigian, 1984).
States1 Role in Environmental Regulation
States are responsible for implementing many o f the key environmental laws 
enacted during the last thirty years. Most federal environmental laws call for shared 
implementation between the federal and state governments. The federal government sets 
minimum environmental standards, but states are given the latitude to design and 
implement their own laws. In essence, the states have program responsibility, while the 
federal government has retained authority to judge the acceptability o f states1 programs. 
The transfer o f  decision making authority to states was ideologically justified as a means 
o f promoting greater programmatic independence, responsiveness to constituent needs, and 
accessibility to citizen input (Davis and Lester. 1989; Lester, 1994).
This mandated expanded role for state governments required that states transform 
and modernize their institutional capabilities. State institutional capacity, the ability and
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willingness o f public officials to develop and administer public policies, encompasses three 
dimensions: political, fiscal, and managerial. States' behavior in environmental protection 
policy depends on the extent o f their commitment to environmental protection and the 
extent o f  institutional reforms (Lester, 1994).
Lester (1994) divided the states into four groups, known as the Lester Category, 
based on level o f commitment (high or low) to environmental protection and institutional 
capability (strong or weak). "Progressive" states were the ten states with a high 
commitment to environmental protection, coupled with strong institutional capabilities. 
Fifteen "struggler” states had a strong commitment to environmental protection, but limited 
institutional capacities. Fifteen "delayer" states showed strong institutional capacity, but 
a limited commitment to environmental protection. Finally, ten '"regressive" states had 
both weak institutional capacities and a limited commitment to environmental protection. 
State Environmental Regulation and Firm Behavior
Jorgenson and Wilcoxon (1990) identified three possible categories o f  existing 
producers’ responses to new environmental regulations: substitution o f  polluting inputs by 
less polluting ones, investment in pollution abatement devices to clean up wastes, and 
emission-reducing changes in production processes. The least disruptive response is 
switching to cleaner inputs, since it does not require a reorganization o f  the production 
process (Jorgenson and Wilcoxon, 1990).
Do state-imposed costs o f environmental regulation affect the interstate allocation 
o f developmental resources? There appears to be a widespread belief that the pollution 
setting standards and enforcement powers o f  state environmental protection agencies
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present a potentially significant influence on the location o f economic activity. Differential 
state regulatory policies may be exceptionally important to the strategic behavior o f 
corporations in their pursuit o f competitive advantage (Feiock and Rowland, 1990; Jaffe, 
et aL, 1995; Stafford, 1985).
Corporations attempt to take advantage o f  differences in state regulatory' regimes 
by shifting activities between locations, according to the differentials in the regulatory 
surface. Although new environmental regulations typically will not cause firms to relocate 
existing plants because o f significant relocation costs, firms have more flexibility in making 
decisions about the siting o f new plants. Some analysts believe that die threat o f  relocation 
alone increases the reluctance o f state administrators to impose strict regulatory controls 
which might place firms at a competitive disadvantage with similar companies in 
neighboring states. Davis (1992) suggested that state officials' regulatory commitment is 
inversely related to the economic importance o f pollution generating firms within the state 
(Davis. 1992; Dicken. 1992; Jaffe. et al.. 1995).
According to Feiock and Rowland (1990. p. 561), “A general model o f firm location 
decisions posits the location choice o f profit maximizing firms to be a function o f  the 
availability o f markets, labor costs, energy costs, raw material costs, and costs o f 
government.” with government costs and political factors less important than economic 
variables. Since state and local policies may affect a firm 's marginal cost o f  production, 
government costs may become an important factor in the choice among jurisdictions within 
a region, once a firm has decided to locate in a particular region (Feiock and Rowland, 
1990).
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Business location models and studies also suggest that firms consider the 
development level o f  their industry when searching for a location. Firms benefit from 
locating closely with other firms in the same industry, since a well-developed industry 
always suggests better infrastructure and service (Mo and Abdalla 1997).
Research on Firms’ Location Decisions
Numerous plant location decision analyses have been conducted in an effort to link 
such decisions to environmental regulatory factors. Blair and Premus (1987) reviewed the 
major findings o f  the industrial location literature. They found that since the 1970s. 
industrial location choices have been governed to a lesser extent than in the past by the 
traditional location factors: access to markets, labor, transportation and raw materials. The 
list o f important locational determinants has been expanded to include state and local taxes, 
education, business climate, labor skills, and state and local physical infrastructure, many 
o f which are directly influenced by state and local government expenditure, tax. and 
regulatory policies (Blair and Premus. 1987).
Tannenwald (1997) reviewed 17 different studies of the impact o f  state 
environmental regulation on economic development and plant location decisions. The 
studies fell into two major groups, based upon estimation method. Seven studies used case 
studies or surveys o f manufacturing firm executives, while ten surveys employed 
econometric estimation. Surveys generally found that pollution control laws and regulations 
exert, at most, a moderate influence on the location o f a new plant. Two representative 
survey-based studies were those performed by Stafford, (1985) and Davis (1992).
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To examine whether variations among areas in the amount o f time and effort 
required to obtain permits may be more important in location decisions than variations in 
pollution control costs, Howard Stafford (1985) identified the factors that were most 
important in the location o f 162 new branch plants o f  large U.S. corporations. Traditional 
location factors emerged as most critical in new manufacturing plant location decisions. 
Environmental regulations were not a major factor, although when included, environmental 
issues were usually considered early in the decision process, usually at the state level o f the 
site search process. Stafford found that when environmental regulations are significant, 
permit uncertainties and the time required are more important than spatial variations in the 
direct costs o f providing pollution control equipment. Gray (1997) concurred with 
Stafford, and noted that the consequences o f inefficiency and delays are especially severe 
for industries which are both capital intensive and cyclically sensitive. States identified as 
having uncertainty about final permit approval were viewed as especially unfavorable for 
new investment (Gray. 1997; Stafford. 1985).
Davis (1992) surveyed chief executive officers (CEOs) o f  the fifty largest firms 
listed within the mining and manufacturing directories o f  Colorado, Montana. Utah and 
Wyoming. The survey examined attitudes toward relocation decisions and the factors 
which play an important role in shaping these decisions. Over half o f the responding CEOs 
affirmed the importance o f state regulatory climate as a major factor. In addition, 
regulatory climate was least likely to be dismissed as an unimportant factor by CEOs.
Tannenwald's (1997) review of the ten econometric studies which form the 
backbone of the research on the impact o f state environmental regulation on economic
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development found that the majority of studies evaluate the impact o f environmental 
regulation on new plant locations and business start-ups. Two reasons were given. New 
branch plants are likely to be more responsive to regulatory differences than existing plants, 
and environmental regulations on new plants are usually more stringent than those on 
existing plants. The most commonly used dependent variable was new plant location. 
Other choices o f dependent variable included number o f  new firms in an industry, 
manufacturing employment and earnings per capita, growth rate in manufacturing 
employment, and new plant numbers and birth rate. The impacts o f regulations were 
usually measured using OLS regression or conditional logit analysis.
Most o f the econometric studies reviewed by Tannenwald (1997) found negative, 
statistically significant relationships between some measures o f regulatory stringency and 
their dependent variable for economic activity, although the estimated effects tend to be 
small. Moreover, many o f the models explained little o f the variation in their dependent 
variable (Tannenwald. 1997).
Four econometric studies o f the impact o f state environmental regulations on 
economic development and firm behavior, along with the researchers' major conclusions, 
are briefly described below. Two of the studies, one by Bartik (1985) and one by Feiock 
and Rowland (1990) were not included in the Tannenwald (1997) review.
In 1985, Bartik examined how new branch plant location decisions were influenced 
by various state characteristics. Although he did not take states’ environmental regulatory 
stringency into account, Bartik did show that firms are sensitive to cost variations among 
states when deciding where to locate new facilities.
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In a later analysis, Bartik (1988) included six measures o f environmental regulatory 
stringency, two measures o f state water pollution regulations and four measures o f  state air 
pollution regulations, in an examination of whether variations in state environmental 
regulations have affected the location o f new manufacturing branch plants by the Fortune 
500 companies for the 1972-1978 time period. Bartik included two variables for each 
environmental regulation measure: the measure itself, and the measure multiplied by an 
indicator o f the importance o f that regulation to the industry. This allowed the coefficient 
for each regulation measure to vary across industries, according to how strongly 
environmental regulations affect costs. No statistically significant effects o f state 
environmental regulation on business location were found. The point estimates suggested 
that even sizable increases in the stringency o f state environmental regulation are unlikely 
to have a large effect on the location decisions o f the average industry. However, for highly 
polluting industries, the statistical estimates w'ere not precise enough to rule out large 
negative regulatory effects that might be large enough to concern state policymakers.
Bartik's 1988 study ignored possible effects of environmental regulation on small 
business. To examine assertions that there are economies o f scale in business compliance 
with environmental regulations. Bartik (1989) estimated how the states’ characteristics, 
including the strictness o f  state environmental regulations, affect small business start-ups 
for 19 manufacturing industries. Bartik detected a small, significant, negative impact o f  
state-level environmental regulations on the start-up rate o f  small businesses. An increase 
in regulatory stringency o f one standard deviation was associated with only a one percent 
change in the small business formation rate.
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McConnell and Schwab (1990) used a conditional logit model, with a variety o f 
alternative measures o f environmental stringency, to examine the effects o f regional 
differences in environmental regulation and attainment o f federal ozone standards on the 
choice o f location for new automobile industry branch plants. Although they found no 
evidence that regional environmental policy played an important role in the location 
decisions, McConnell and Schwab did find some evidence that, at the margin, firms were 
deterred from locating plants in the most polluted ozone non-attainment areas.
Feiock and Rowland (1990) suggested that studies o f  regulatory effects on 
allocation of industrial resources should concentrate on heavily regulated mobile industries. 
They hypothesized that, given the relative rarity of massive plant relocations, incremental 
shifts o f new capital for plant expansion, from one state to another, are a more appropriate 
indicator of developmental resources than plant sitings, since new capital shifts may be 
much more sensitive to marginal costs o f environmental regulation. Feiock and Rowland 
tested their hypothesis by estimating the effects o f private pollution abatement costs on 
changes in Chemical and Allied Producer's (CAPs) inter-regional and intra-regional 
allocation of new capital, the most important developmental resource, from 1977 to 1982.
The five states where private regulatory costs were highest experienced a significant 
decline in new capital investment, while the five states that had the lowest regulatory costs 
in 1977 all experienced increases in capital investments. The results o f their dynamic 
disequilibrium-adjustment model o f  interstate investment provided strong evidence that 
private pollution abatement costs vary across time and among states and they do influence 
the interstate allocation o f  developmental resources by the chemical industry. In fact,
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regulatory costs were the single largest influence on the interstate distribution o f new CAP 
capital. Since this is contrary to results from studies o f plant sitings, Feiock and Rowland 
concluded that prevalent generalizations about the relationship between regulation and 
development may be misleading, inappropriate, and unwarranted.
Measuring the Stringency of State Environmental Regulation
The most difficult problem encountered in all ten econometric location studies 
reviewed by Tannenwald (1997) was the issue o f how to measure regulatory stringency. 
In their plant location study, McConnell and Schwab (1990) noted the difficulty they 
encountered in trying to develop one ideal measure o f  the severity of environmental 
controls faced by each plant at each potential site. "Existing data are severely limited in 
their ability to measure the relative stringency o f environmental regulation, making it 
difficult to use such measures in regression analyses o f  the effects of regulation on 
economic performance" (Jaffe. et al., 1995. page 158).
Few studies control for differences in regulatory climate and regulatory uncertainty 
between jurisdictions. Existing measures o f stringency are not comparable across states or 
partially reflect state-specific characteristics that have little to do with stringency. In 
situations where uncertainties or delays surrounding regulation are the greatest impediments 
to new plant location decisions, these effects will not be picked up by studies that look 
exclusively at source discharge standards or traditional spending for pollution control 
equipment as measures of regulatory intensity, unless these direct compliance costs are 
highly correlated with the costs o f uncertainty and delay (Jaffe, et al., 1995; Tannenwald, 
1997).
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Existing measures o f regulatory stringency fall into three closely related categories: 
estimates o f enforcement effort, estimates o f compliance costs, both o f which represent 
proxies for environmental stringency, and direct measures o f  stringency. Each type of 
measure has distinct advantages and disadvantages, which most researchers explicitly 
recognize and acknowledge (Tannenwald, 1997).
Measures o f enforcement effort include: (1) state spending on air and water 
pollution control, divided by either state employment in manufacturing , state value added 
in manufacturing, or total state employment; (2) number o f employees working for state 
environmental agencies per manufacturing plant; and (3) dummy variables indicating 
whether a state charges fees for permits for pollution control plant construction or 
operation. Bartik (1988. 1989) and McConnell and Schwab (1990) both warned that state 
expenditures or workforce devoted to pollution control enforcement may simply reflect the 
concentration o f heavily polluting industries within the state, rather than the intensity of 
enforcement efforts (Tannenwald. 1997).
Compliance cost proxies for environmental stringency include, but are not limited 
to the average cost o f purchasing and operating pollution control plant and equipment, the 
ratio o f pollution abatement capital expenditures to the gross product in the state, 
environmental control costs as a percentage of value-added, and the percentage by which 
industry compliance costs in a state exceed the national industry average. All these 
compliance cost proxy measures depend critically on accurate measurement of 
environmental spending. However, there is considerable guesswork involved in any 
allocation of investment costs to pollution abatement. There are also problems controlling
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for state-specific characteristics affecting compliance costs that have nothing to do with 
regulatory stringency, such as average firm size, industry mix, and aggregate size o f the 
manufacturing sector (Bartik, 1988; Gray. 1997: Jaffe, et al., 1995; Tannenwald, 1997).
A commonly used, but less direct, indicator o f compliance costs incurred within a 
jurisdiction is air quality. According to federal law, businesses in any jurisdiction whose 
air quality is below federal standards (non-attainment status) are subjected to stricter 
pollution control regulations than businesses in attainment status areas. Four o f  the ten 
econometric studies reviewed by Tannenwald (1997) included measures o f attainment with 
federal particulate emissions standards as independent variables. Unfortunately, in addition 
to precipitating more stringent environmental regulations, dirty air also makes a state or 
county unattractive to workers, thus driving up labor costs. This effect has nothing to do 
with regulatory stringency (McConnell and Schwab, 1990; Tannenwald. 1997).
Direct measures o f environmental regulation have been both qualitative and 
quantitative. Three qualitative standards that have been used to study environmental 
stringency include versions o f the Conservation Foundation Index (Duerksen. 1983). the 
FREE Index developed in 1987 by the Fund for Renewable Energy and the Environment, 
and the Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991). Components o f all three indices incorporate 
the existence and stringency o f common environmental laws and regulations affecting 
manufacturing industries, including requirements for state environmental impact 
statements, air quality, hazardous waste, superfund laws, air toxics programs, and water 
permit requirements.
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The Conservation Foundation Index (Duerksen, 1983) was constructed from 23 
environmental and land-use indicators, which ranged from voting records o f  a state's 
congressional delegation to existence o f  state laws that address specific environmental 
problems. Each indicator was assigned a point value, from zero to six, based on its relative 
importance in assessing a state’s environmental efforts, as judged by the Conservation 
Foundation staff.
The FREE Index provides a ranking o f  the states, based on each state's 
accomplishments in six environmental areas: air pollution reduction, soil conservation, 
groundwater protection, hazardous waste management, solid waste and recycling, and 
renewable energy and conservation. Ten indicators o f legislation, enforcement, funding 
and other considerations were developed for each o f the six environmental areas, and 
summed to provide a score (from zero to ten) for each environmental area and an overall 
combined score ( 60 points maximum) for each state. The overall scores were also used 
to rank the states. The ranking takes into consideration only those elements o f state 
programs that have been made into law. formal standards, or guidelines (Fund for 
Renewable Energy and the Environment. 1987).
The Green Index (Hall and Kerr, 1991) is a set o f 256 indicators that measure and 
rank each state’s environmental health. The final Green Index score is the sum o f each 
state’s ranks for ail 256 indicators, with each indicator carrying equal weight, and an 
appropriate multiplier to compensate for any missing items. One important component o f 
the Green Index is Green Policies, a composite o f 77 indicators used to rank the stringency 
o f state environmental regulations. The Green Policies composite includes the status o f 67
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environmental regulations or policies in each state, the state ranking for environmental 
program spending, and a count o f the leadership of pro-environmental forces in Congress.
Tannenwald (1997) does not consider quantitative measures o f stringency as 
especially useful because they are so numerous and varied, often not comparable across 
states, and highly industry-specific. For example, McConnell and Schwab (1990) included 
quantitative restrictions on volatile organic compounds, a major pollutant created by 
spraying and painting operations in motor vehicle manufacturing. Bartik (1988. 1989) 
attempted to overcome these limitations by using particulate emissions from industrial 
boilers, a quantitative environmental standard that is applied by most states to many 
different industries.
Gray (1997) disputed Tannenwald's characterization o f the limited usefulness o f 
quantitative measures o f the stringency o f environmental regulations. Gray acknowledged 
that quantitative measures are difficult to put together, and the importance o f  ensuring that 
the particular measure chosen is one that is expected to matter for the plants being studied. 
However, quantitative measures have a key advantage over the usual qualitative measures: 
they allow researchers to measure the marginal effects o f one more unit o f regulation. 
Environmental Management of Agriculture
The intimate relationship between primary industries, such as agriculture, and the 
natural environment distinguishes them from manufacturing industries. The natural 
environment is the factory floor for agriculture, and the production processes draw from the 
natural processes that produce the environment. As the most extensive user o f land and 
water resources, agricultural production activities can radically reshape the environment.
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Growing public alarm over the perceived deterioration o f the rural environment, especially 
from agricultural externalities affecting water quality, has resulted in increased pressure on 
governments to intervene by implementing strict environmental controls on agriculture 
through the imposition o f technical standards at the farm level. Agriculture is now among 
the most heavily regulated sectors in most developed countries (Clark and Lowe, 1992; 
Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
Production agriculture’s environmental externality problems are divisible into two 
basic types, input-related or fundamental. Input-related cultural problems, involving soil, 
water, fertilizer and pesticides associated with production activities, are potentially 
correctable problems. Fundamental problems are intrinsic to agricultural production and 
cannot be avoided without stopping production. Most problems in conventional agriculture 
are both fundamental and input-related (Torres, 1989).
Agricultural activities have broad social implications that extend beyond the farm 
boundaries. Both the benefits, such as open space and rural landscapes, and costs, 
including ground water and surface water contamination, are large. Balanced, joint public 
policy consideration o f both sides of the issue is warranted. Instead, agricultural 
environmental policies have often been disconnected and conflicting, primarily because 
state agricultural and natural resource institutions, including their philosophies, goals and 
policies, have evolved independently (Poe, 1997; Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
The institutions charged with developing and implementing agricultural policies 
frequently differ from those with responsibility for resource policies affecting agriculture. 
Agricultural agencies typically view their role as promoting the well-being o f the farm
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community. Agriculturally based environmental policies have tended to assign rights to 
agriculture. Influenced by agriculture's unique social contract with society, agriculture 
institutions have traditionally approached environmental policy problems through technical 
assistance, education, and financial subsidies, rather than regulations (Batie, 1990; Poe, 
1997; Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
In contrast, environmental and conservation agencies are mandated to protect the 
integrity o f natural resources. Environmental policies operate on an alternative, public trust 
rights allocation supporting the public's right to a clean environment. Regulations 
specifying quotas and standards are the predominant approach to controlling environmental 
risks (Poe, 1997; Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993).
As a result o f  the differences between agricultural and environmental protection 
institutions, it is difficult to identify a single, standard set of policies or policy objectives 
that apply specifically to agricultural resources. State agricultural/environmental policy 
instruments run the gamut from programs providing financial incentives for adoption of 
beneficial management systems, to laws that limit land use. restrict the use o f specific 
potential water contaminants (e.g.. fertilizers and pesticides) or establish the liability o f 
farmers whose practices create negative environmental externalities. Mandated practices 
can include bans on the use o f chemicals, and requirements for certain production practices 
(Reichelderfer and Kramer, 1993). Quotas and standards are the predominant state 
approach to controlling environmental risks from agricultural sources.
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Environmental Regulation and the Farm Economy
Mandated practices, quotas and standards all impose costs on agricultural producers. 
Torres (1989) discussed the importance o f understanding the nature and structure o f  the 
farm economy and the major role it plays in the development o f appropriate models for 
environmental regulation o f agriculture. Generally, the economic structure facing an 
individual farmer is a close approximation o f the neoclassical perfect competition 
paradigm. The farmer is a price-taker; in most cases, he cannot influence either the input 
prices he pays or the output prices he receives. The farmer’s control over income is in the 
number o f  units o f output produced for sale.
The farmer-as-price-taker economic fact demands regulators' sensitivity to the 
heterogeneity o f farming. Since a given regulatory program will impose costs unevenly 
across farming operations, the impact o f additional regulatory compliance costs will be felt 
differently, depending upon the farm’s size and organizational structure. This combination 
o f farm heterogeneity, combined with the competitive nature o f farm markets, severely 
limits the farmer's ability to pass pollution reduction costs to consumers or purchasers. 
Small farmers, unlike large farmers, cannot absorb regulatory' costs, nor can they spread 
costs through the operation like vertically integrated farms. Those small farmers subjected 
to especially high regulatory costs may not survive the regulation (Torres, 1989).
Schmitz, Boggess and Tefertiller (1995) interviewed thirty-six Florida dairy farmers 
from all the state’s major production areas, to determine the impact of the total government 
regulatory environment on their operations. The respondents ranked environmental 
regulations as the most important problem, with 75 percent o f  the farmers indicating that
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waste disposal regulations created the most serious problems. Farmers spent an average 
of 21.6 percent o f their work day dealing with regulations. Regulations also negatively 
affected the relationships between 86 percent o f the farmers and their bankers, and 
generally limited expansion o f dairy herd size. Costs increased, milk production declined, 
and production shifted to other areas of the state. The researchers also found that the most 
regulated region o f Florida, Okeechobee, bore the greatest costs.
The Industrializing U.S. Livestock Sector
"The current environmental problems o f animal agriculture are the result o f  the 
interaction o f a complex set o f public policy, institutional, technological, and economic 
forces," according to Abdalla. Lanyon. and Hallberg (1995, p. 1234). The U.S. livestock 
production and marketing system has been undergoing significant structural change toward 
industrialization for more than four decades. As livestock producers have invested in cost- 
effective, output-increasing technologies, often without consideration o f environmental 
effects, farm structure has been evolving from dispersed crop-livestock operations to fewer, 
larger farms specializing in livestock (dairy, cattle, poultry, hogs, fish) production. 
Livestock producers have also integrated into marketing stages, located in clusters near 
processing facilities and specialized infrastructure (Abdalla, Lanyon, and Hallberg, 1995).
The quantity and concentration of animal wastes have increased with the changing 
livestock sector structure, burdening local environments with water and air pollution, odors, 
and insect problems. Local conditions, including climate, soils, geology and existing 
pollution levels, all affect the environment’s capacity to assimilate agricultural pollution. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates that about one-third o f all agricultural
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nonpoint source water pollution is attributable to animal production operations, and that 
feedlots were a more important source of river impairments than storm sewers or industrial 
sources. In many cases, public concerns over the impacts o f animal operations have 
provided political pressure for imposition o f more stringent environmental controls and 
limits on the growth o f livestock agriculture (Abdalla, Lanyon. and Hallberg, 1995; Purvis 
and Outlaw, 1995).
Abdalla, Lanyon, and Hallberg (1995) examined the interaction between public 
policies and the dynamic forces o f livestock agricultural industrialization. They identified 
the factors that have shaped the present spatial distribution o f animal agriculture, described 
the nature o f public policy response to concerns over environmental effects, and illustrated 
the problems associated with devising new institutions to improve performance.
The transformation o f livestock agriculture to a specialized, capital-intensive 
industrial activity is consistent with changes in economic location factors over time. As 
described by Abdalla. Lanyon. and Hallberg (1995), three sets o f external forces, 
technological change, shifting market forces and demand, and new government policies and 
programs, initiated the processes o f structural change. The structural change prompts a 
four stage, evolutionary adjustment process, resulting in new subsector relationships and 
new institutional arrangements to manage and coordinate new risks (Abdalla. Lanyon. and 
Hallberg. 1995; Purvis and Outlaw, 1995).
The new institutional arrangements resulting from the industrialization o f animal 
agriculture include changes in state environmental regulatory policies. States have 
implemented a wide array of policy tools, with a mind-boggling degree o f  variation across
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states. States differ in their pollution discharge standards, facility requirements, permitting 
requirements (filing activity, waiting periods, and/or fees), monitoring, compliance 
enforcement, and noncompliance fines or penalties. The number o f  possible combinations 
o f these differing state regulatory instruments complicates attempts to systematically 
classify and compare states' statutory rigor (Smith and Kuch, 1995).
Purvis and Outlaw (1995) examined case studies o f Florida and Texas dairy 
producers to document experiences with variations in state environmental regulatory 
policies targeted toward animal agriculture. Implementation o f the Florida Dairy Rule from 
1987 to 1991 was handled in a manner which promoted technological innovation and 
experimentation, with cost-sharing and experimental permits as deliberate policy 
instruments. In contrast. Texas dairy farmers experienced contentious, divisive, and time- 
consuming public hearings on dairy farm siting and permitting. The result was high 
transaction costs and restrictions which constrained expansion, thus deterring technology 
adoption to exploit size and scale economies.
Environmental Regulation and Animal Agriculture Location Decisions
A key agricultural policy issue is the effect o f differences in state institutions and 
environmental policies on the location o f animal production. Environmental restrictions 
cannot induce someone to move an existing farm. Natural capital is immobile, even in the 
long run. However, environmental regulations pertaining to natural resource-based 
industries can affect where specific animal species are raised (Jaffe, etal., 1995; Smith and 
Kuch. 1995).
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Variations in state environmental regulatory policies targeted toward animal 
agriculture may alter the comparative advantage o f a state. Less stringent water quality 
regulations in North Carolina have been cited as an important factor influencing movement 
o f the hog industry into that state in the 1980s and early 1990s. Virginia, with restrictive, 
costly environmental permitting requirements, experienced a 21 percent loss of hog farms 
o f 1,000 head or more between 1987 and 1992. North Carolina, with minimal 
environmental permitting requirements, saw a 47 percent increase over the same period 
(Abdalla. Lanyon, and Hallberg, 1995: Mo and Abdalla 1997; Smith and Kuch, 1995).
National trends in livestock concentration suggest that other factors besides 
environmental regulations also play a role in the location o f livestock agriculture. 
Minnesota, with its highly restrictive regulations, and more lenient Iowa experienced 
almost identical rates o f growth in the number o f hog farms with 1,000 head or more. 
Arkansas and Oklahoma, despite significant differences in environmental regulations, were 
the two states that experienced the greatest rates o f growth (Smith and Kuch, 1995).
Research on the effects o f environmental policies upon the location of farms and 
related agribusinesses has been limited. Lopez and Henderson (1989) utilized telephone 
interviews of food processing executives in six Northeast states to identify factors affecting 
locational choices for their plants. Versecky and Lins (1995) surveyed Illinois agribusiness 
decision-makers about factors affecting expansion and contraction. Findings from both 
studies suggest that state environmental policies and their enforcement do appear to 
influence location, growth and expansion decisions of agribusinesses (Mo and Abdalla 
1997).
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Vesecky and Lins (1995) conducted surveys o f both Illinois agribusiness input 
supply firms and processing and distribution firms to determine business attitudes and 
perceptions with respect to factors associated with expansion or contraction decisions. The 
most important factor influencing the expansion decision for both input and processing and 
distribution firms is proximity to markets. W orker's compensation laws and insurance 
rates were the two most negative factors identified by expanding firms. Unemployment 
insurance taxes, liability award trends and costs related to environmental regulations also 
received negative rankings in both surveys.
The results for firms which had contracted by more than ten percent were much 
different than the results for expanding firms. For input supply firms, costs to comply with 
environmental regulation had the greatest influence on the contraction decision, followed 
by wage rates, stringency o f enforcement o f environmental regulations, worker's 
compensation insurance rates, and availability and cost o f labor. In contrast, the cost to 
comply with environmental regulation and worker's compensation insurance rates were not 
important for processing and distribution firms that contracted in size. All o f the top five 
important factors for processing and firms were unimportant factors for input supply firms, 
and the five least important factors for input firms were important factors for processing 
and distribution firms.
Mo and Abdalla (1997) investigated the role o f differences in state environmental 
policies on recent swine industry' changes for 16 major hog producing states. They 
specifically examined whether the stringency of environmental regulations affected the 
growth rate of hog inventory. They included four categories o f independent variables:
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natural endowment factors, economic factors, business climate factors, and regulation 
factors, which included two subcategories, general taxation policy and environmental 
regulation (Mo and Abdalla 1997).
Mo and Abdalla (1997) had difficulty obtaining data for the last two categories, 
business climate and regulation factors. The 1990 U.S. census data on the proportion o f 
rural population in the total population was used as a crude proxy for business climate for 
all seven years. Property tax per acre o f farm land was used as a measure o f  the stringency 
o f taxation policy. Two established indices o f the stringency o f environmental regulation, 
including the Lester Category, were tested (Mo and Abdalla 1997).
Mo and Abdalla (1997) found the general economic factors to be the most 
important, o f  the four categories of variables, affecting swine industry growth. The results 
for the two indices measuring the stringency o f state environmental policies were mixed. 
The Lester Category was both significant and o f the expected sign, supporting the 
hypothesis that expansion o f the sw'ine industry is influenced by differences in the 
stringency o f states' environmental regulations. Mo and Abdalla suggested that the Lester 
Category performed better because it accounts for each state's institutional capabilities to 
implement existing policies, in addition to indicators o f  the stringency o f environmental 
regulations.
Among the limitations of their research. Mo and Abdalla (1997) noted that the 
environmental indices used are not tailored to agriculture-specific regulatory efforts. They 
recommended that future research efforts should address regulations specifically aimed at
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pollution from animal agriculture, and should also encompass the states' institutional 
capacities to implement environmental rules (Mo and Abdalla 1997).
A Theoretical Model Explaining Firm Location Decisions
The institutional approach to economic policy analysis described in chapter 1, with 
its focus on the broad political character o f economic life, provides the underlying 
framework for developing a general theoretical model to explain firm location decisions. 
Embedded within this framework are elements o f both the public choice theory o f self- 
interested political actors and firm location theory, both previously described in this 
chapter.
The theoretical firm location model is illustrated in Figure 2.1. According to public 
choice theory, the relative political influence o f the political actors (self-interested 
individuals, bureaucrats and groups) determines the important structural characteristics o f 
state institutions affecting industry. The institutional structure, in turn, influences the status 
o f  the various location decision factors, including state regulatory climate. Finally, in 
accordance with firm location theory, firm location decisions are made based on an 
evaluation o f the various firm location factors.
Aquaculture Regulatory Climate Conceptual Model
Western, industrialized countries are perceived as having tended to over-regulate 
the aquaculture industry. Aquaculturists must cope with a restrictive state regulatory 
climate consisting o f a complex network o f laws and regulations dealing with land tenure, 
water use. environmental protection, pollution prevention, public health, and fisheries in
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Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model Explaining Firm Location Decisions
Location
Decision
general. The result has been confusion, conflicts and overlapping o f provisions, which 
causes industry frustration (Pillay, 1992).
As part of a Northeastern Regional Aquaculture Center project, Wypyszinski. et al., 
(1994) analyzed and made recommendations for the improved application o f laws directly 
affecting aquaculture in the northeastern United States. The authors identified seven major 
topical areas directly pertinent to the aquaculture industry: siting, water use. stocking, 
cultivation, harvesting, product marketing, and government assistance. Selecting the proper 
site was identified as the most important consideration in starting up an aquaculture 
operation. An aquaculture operation's success is dependent on the aquaculturisf s ability 
to exercise control over the site through ownership, lease or other form o f conveyance. Site 
selection was also the most difficult and least specific step in the aquaculture process 
(DeVoe and Mount, 1989).
The species selection decision directly affects four o f  the seven major issues: 
stocking, cultivation, harvesting, and product marketing. Fingerling stocking rate and 
timing varies by species. Cultivation and harvesting practices are also species-specific. 
Many states forbid or restrict possession and marketing o f aquaculture products from game 
species. Thus, the critical species selection decision is constrained by state fish and wildlife 
regulations, one component o f regulatory climate.
The theoretical model explaining firm location decisions, described previously, can 
be directly applied to the aquaculture industry to model the relationship between state 
institutions and regulatory climate toward fish culture. Path diagrams are a commonly 
used method for depicting causal relationships among a set o f  variables. By convention,
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squares or rectangles are used to represent measured variables, and circles or ellipses are 
used to represent latent variables. A straight arrow drawn from one variable to another 
indicates that the two are causally related, and also indicates the direction o f causality 
(DeVillis, 1991; MacCallum, 1995).
Figure 2.2 illustrates the conceptual model o f the aquaculture regulatory climate - 
institutional relationships. Both the site and species selection decisions represent location 
decisions within the context o f  the conceptual model. These decisions are. in large part, 
influenced by state regulatory climate, which can be considered one location decision 
factor. Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f state regulations impacting 
aquaculture, is shown as an ellipse, indicating that regulatory climate is a latent variable 
w'hich cannot be easily measured in a direct fashion.
The process o f  establishing the regulatory climate toward aquaculture begins with 
the relevant political actors, identified here as industry groups, bureaucrats, environmental 
groups, recreational interests, and consumer groups. The roles and importance o f the 
relevant political actors and state institution structural characteristics is described below. 
The Political A ctors
Aquaculture policy instruments are not usually developed using a logical and well 
ordered institutional process. Instead, they slowly evolve as agencies attempt to formulate 
and implement policies based on often vague legislative mandates. Thus, policy is 
developed by those who implement it. Decisions are often made within a public and 
political marketplace. The marketplace may be primarily bureaucratic, if  the process is 
based on scientific management, pluralistic if decisions are reached through an open
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Figure 2.2 Conceptual Model of Aquaculture Regulatory Climate-Institutional Relationships
political process, or a combination o f both approaches. This adaptive implementation 
process is often driven by bargaining among industry groups, resource user groups 
(sportsmen and recreational interests, etc.), environmental groups, and those bureaucrats 
charged with policy implementation (Sylvia, 1997).
While some state agencies handle aquaculture permitting with a cooperative, 
problem-solving attitude, there are usually some other parties, both public and private, 
which take an adversarial approach to aquaculture. Opponents ofaquaculture include some 
conservation coalitions, competing industries' spokesmen, and antagonistic government 
agencies (Mattei, 1995).
Floyd, et al„ (1991) examined the policy issues associated with expanded 
aquaculture production in the twelve-state north central region o f the U.S. They surveyed 
a sample of aquaculture producers, university aquaculture researchers, cooperative 
extension agents and specialists in aquaculture, state agency regulators in departments o f 
agriculture and environmental protection and natural resource agencies, and environmental 
group representatives. Post hoc analysis verified significant attitudinal differences between 
group pairs and confirmed policy issues that best predicted group membership.
Industry
The level o f development o f state aquaculture policy is largely a function o f the 
amount and scale o f industry activity and the experience o f regulatory agency staff. In 
many states, the regulations which control the aquaculture industry have been written and 
enforced by wildlife agencies; however, the agencies are not mandated to consider the 
effects o f regulations on industry'. As a result, industry has not been involved in forming
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regulations. In states where aquaculture has had a longer history and/or significant 
economic impact, permit and environmental monitoring programs tend to be better 
organized and more friendly to industry (Cline. Warren and Walker, 1994; Ewart, Hankins, 
and Bullock, 1995).
Bureaucrats
Decisions to manage and allocate natural resources are ultimately made using the 
currencies that characterize the political and bureaucratic arena, security and discretionary 
income within the corridors o f bureaucratic management, primarily state natural 
resource/environmental protection agencies and, to a lesser extent, state agriculture 
departments (Sylvia, 1997). Results o f a survey o f fish and wildlife agency regulators by 
Wheaton. Pybus and Blakely (1993) suggest that natural resource regulators perceive that 
agricultural agencies generally do not have the statutory authority to protect wildlife 
populations, nor the expertise to recognize the legitimate concerns for wildlife posed by 
potential adverse environmental effects o f aquaculture operations (Wheaton. Pybus and 
Blakely, 1993).
Interest groups that generally support natural resource and environmental protection 
agencies are firmly established and much more numerous than aquaculturists. Given the 
relative difference in political power, it is unlikely that state legislators will divest these 
agencies o f their regulatory powers over aquaculture because of support from the 
aquaculture industry (Floyd, et al.. 1991).
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Environmental Groups
Floyd, et al., (1991) found that fifty-three percent o f the environmentalists surveyed 
expressed interest in being involved with environmental regulatory issues associated with 
aquaculture, but only thirty-six percent indicated that they were familiar with aquaculture- 
related environmental issues. Members of the environmental community were also quick 
to voice their concerns about water quality issues from pollution o f  public waters from 
aquaculture effluents.
Consumer groups
To date, consumer advocacy groups have had little impact on aquaculture policy. 
Since aquaculture represents a relatively small source o f food in the United States, it 
captures little attention in the public arena, despite its possession o f what some believe is 
great potential. Many observers believe that if market demand is great, ways to cut through 
the institutional barriers will be found. (Nichols, 1985)
Institutional Structure
Institution structural characteristics directly determine the state’s regulatory climate. 
The choice o f state institutional structure characteristics important in the determination o f 
regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture was developed from the literature on the 
constraints to aquaculture industry growth and development. Important state characteristics 
include the existence o f  a state aquaculture development plan, the finfish classification 
(baitfish, ornamental, commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish, marine gamefish), the 
legal definition o f aquaculture as a form of agriculture, the lead state administrative and 
enforcement agencies, and the region.
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Develonmcnt Plan
Many states, through policy statements and legislation, have called for the 
accelerated development o f the aquaculture industry. States have been formulating formal 
aquaculture development plans to promote industry growth and expansion. These plans, 
which undergo continual clarification and refinement, provide guidance for the 
establishment o f contemporary developmental and regulatory mechanisms to accommodate 
the aquaculture industry’s needs (DeVoe and Mount, 1989).
Finfish Classification
United States common law has historically divided animals into one o f two 
categories: domestic (domitae naturae) and wild (ferae naturae). Domestic animals may 
be owned, with absolute private property rights. Wild animals are only considered property 
while the animal remains in a person’s possession. Courts have traditionally classified fish 
as wild. If the fish escapes, the former possessor has no property rights (McCoy. 1996).
State fish and wildlife agencies laws also classify fish species into categories, such 
as baitfish. ornamentals, foodfish and gamefish. Different classifications o f fish are 
regulated differently by state fish and game agencies. There appears to be a continuum o f 
regulatory restrictiveness, with baitfish culture being subject to the least restrictions, 
followed by ornamental and commercial foodfish. Gamefish species are legally considered 
wild, and not capable o f private ownership, regardless o f  100 percent possession. Thus, 
culture o f freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish is highly restricted in many states. 
Some states are taking action steps to solve this problem by specifying that fish raised in 
aquaculture facilities are privately-owned, thus providing more legal protection.
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Defining Aquaculture as Agriculture
Commercial aquaculture is in the early stages o f development in most states in the 
U.S. Regulators have tended to classify fish farming as an industrial activity requiring 
regulatory treatment different from other forms of agriculture (Ewart, Hankins, and 
Bullock, 1995). Major industry efforts have been expended to have states legally declare 
aquaculture a form o f agriculture, based upon the belief that agriculture status confers 
certain legal protections In the Floyd, et al., (1991) survey, there was general agreement 
among producers, researchers, extension agents and specialists that aquaculture should be 
defined as agriculture. In contrast, state natural resource regulators disagreed with defining 
aquaculture as agriculture. The Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture (1993) concluded that 
the treatment of aquaculture as a form of agriculture would provide a positive development 
climate.
Administrative and Enforcement Agency
Within states, conflicts arise between the agencies that have responsibility for the 
management o f natural resources and those agencies responsible for agricultural 
development. In most states, regulation o f the aquaculture industry has evolved in state 
game and fish departments that are often oriented toward production and protection of 
game species for recreational experiences rather than toward food production. (Devoe, 
Pomeroy and Wypyszinski, 1992).
According to the Floyd, et al., (1991) survey results, an important theme with fish 
farmers is regulatory jurisdiction. Which state agency should be responsible for industry 
regulation? Survey results indicated that producers, researchers, extension agents and
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specialists believe that jurisdiction over aquaculture belongs in state departments of 
agriculture, which producers feel would provide economic advocacy and sympathetic 
industry regulation. State natural resource regulators favored retaining control of 
aquaculture in natural resources departments.
Region
The 50 states maintaining widely varying rules and regulations create a bewildering 
array o f regulations. The aquaculture industry is openly frustrated that requirements often 
vary so much between neighboring states that it is difficult to satisfy each regulation and 
remain competitive. Regional compacts offer hope for addressing a wide array of 
conflicting state regulations that are hindering aquaculture (Cline, Warren and Walker. 
1994).
There are several additional reasons why the region may have significant impacts 
on state regulatory climate. For purposes of setting research priorities and disbursing 
federal aquaculture research funds, the USDA divides the United States into five regional 
zones (northeast, southern, western, north-central, and tropical-subtropical), each serviced 
by a regional aquaculture center. Although there is considerable overlap, regions differ in 
terms of environmental conditions, species cultured, population density, and importance 
and influence o f the aquaculture industry and environmental groups.
Summary
This chapter provided an overview on the political economy o f government 
regulation. Important theories o f  regulation, including public choice theory, were reviewed, 
and the costs and impacts o f state environmental regulations on firm location decisions
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were examined. The chapter also discussed the shortcomings and inconsistent performance 
o f existing regulatory climate proxies and indices used to measure the stringency o f  state 
environmental regulations. The unique environmental problems o f the industrializing U. 
S. livestock agriculture, and the limited research on the effect o f variations in state 
environmental regulatory climate on the location o f livestock agriculture were carefully 
delineated. By combining elements o f public choice theory and firm location theory within 
an institutional economics framework, a theoretical model was developed to explain the 
institutional relationships underlying firm location decisions. The theoretical model was 
then applied to the rapidly expanding U.S. aquaculture industry to develop a conceptual 
model which illustrates the relationships between political actors, institutional structure, 
regulatory climate and aquaculture firm location and species selection decisions.
The next chapter will describe the data collection procedures and descriptive 
statistics for the two primary data sources used in this research, the 1995 State Finfish 
Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. For each o f the 
two survey instruments, survey sample information, survey administration procedures, 
questionnaire design, and response frequency distributions will be reported and discussed.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The data used in the computation o f the state aquaculture regulatory climate scale 
and the estimation of the effects o f state institutional variables on regulatory climate were 
collected via two mail surveys conducted by the Louisiana State University Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness. The 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program 
Survey examined the issues associated with the development and assignment o f  property 
rights to cultured fish and the use o f incentive-based programs by states and U.S. territorial 
governments. A 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire updated and clarified information 
collected in two surveys: a 1993 Aquatic Animal Health Survey conducted by the National 
Association o f State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC) and the 1995 State Finfish 
Aquaculture Program Survey.
Both the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998 
Supplemental Questionnaire were conducted in accordance with Dillmams Total Design 
Method, which recommends particular questionnaire format and mailing procedures to 
maximize response rate and response quality (Dillman, 1991). This chapter reports survey 
sample information, survey administration procedures, questionnaire design, and 
descriptive statistics for both the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 
1998 Supplemental Questionnaire.
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1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey
The 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey, which was the most 
comprehensive survey o f state aquaculture regulations conducted to date, obtained 
information about the status o f state finfish aquaculture programs, the roles o f state 
agencies responsible for developing and enforcing aquaculture regulations, ownership and 
specification o f property rights to different categories of fish (baitfish, ornamentals, 
commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish), and states’ use o f 
incentive programs to promote aquaculture industry regulatory compliance (Appendix A). 
Survey Sam ple
The survey instrument was mailed to official aquaculture coordinators and contacts 
from all 50 states and four U.S. territories. The coordinators, state government officials 
who are responsible for coordinating aquaculture programs at the state or territorial level, 
represent the official state first contacts for state-level aquaculture development and 
regulatory program information. Names and addresses were obtained from the 1995 edition 
o f the Directory o f  State Aquaculture Coordinators and Contacts. compiled and maintained 
by the Alternative Farming Systems Information Center at the USDA/ARS National 
Agricultural Library in cooperation with the National Association o f State Aquaculture 
Coordinators (USDA/ARS, 1995).
Survey Administration
The first mailing to the aquaculture coordinators and contacts included a 
questionnaire, a postage-paid return envelope, and a letter identifying the survey’s puipose 
and the proposed application of the data (Appendix A .l). A second mailing, sent
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approximately two months after the first mailing, was directed to non-respondents. It 
included a letter reiterating the importance o f responding to the survey, another copy o f the 
original survey, and another postage-paid return envelope. Approximately two weeks after 
the second mailing, non-respondents were contacted by telephone and asked to please 
complete the survey and fax the completed survey. A copy o f the survey was faxed to any 
non-respondent who indicated that he did not have a copy o f the original survey.
Survey Design
The survey instrument (Appendix A.2) was divided into three sections designed to 
provide data for computation of the regulatory’ climate scale and estimation o f the 
regulatory' climate ordered probit model, along with information on states' use o f  incentive- 
based mechanisms and additional contextual information. Most questions were framed in 
the dichotomous choice form, asking a particular closed response, "yes", "no", or 
“uncertain" to a specified question.
The first section elicited general information about the state's finfish aquaculture 
program and industry. Question one (Q-1) asked whether the state has a formal aquaculture 
development program or initiative, and in what year the program began. The state agencies 
responsible for developing and administering aquaculture programs and enforcing 
aquaculture regulations were identified in question two (Q-2), since an important theme 
with fish farmers is regulatory jurisdiction. In most states, regulation o f the aquaculture 
industry has evolved in state game and fish departments, but some producers believe that 
state jurisdiction o f aquaculture belongs in state departments of agriculture, which are 
charged with developing agricultural industries for commercial purposes and are perceived
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as providing economic advocacy and sympathetic industry regulation (Floyd, et al.. 1991). 
As a result, there has been a movement, both at the state and federal levels, to have 
aquaculture legally declared "agriculture," with regulatory authority placed with 
departments o f agriculture. The next question in the first section, Q-3, explored whether 
aquaculture was legally considered an agricultural activity in the state, and in what year 
aquaculture was declared to be agriculture.
Question four (Q-4), determined the number o f  private finfish aquaculture facilities 
operating in each state. The state requirement that private fish farms obtain a general 
license or permit to operate in the state was the topic o f question five (Q-5). The legal 
status offish in aquaculture facilities as privately owned, exempt from wildlife laws, and 
livestock was explored in a three-part question six (Q-6). The final question in the first 
section, Q-7, asked the respondents to list, in descending order, the top four finfish species 
cultured in private aquaculture facilities in the state, based on farm gate market value.
The laws defining, regulating, and protecting aquaculture are often intermingled 
with laws pertaining to wild aquatic stocks. These state fish and wildlife laws typically 
classify fish species into categories such as ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish and 
game fish. Property rights vary, depending on the category, and often restrict possessing, 
killing or marketing for food, even if the species was produced as a directed agricultural 
enterprise. The second section o f the survey contained eight dichotomous choice questions 
which explored issues relating to the ownership and specification o f property rights to five 
different categories o f finfish (ornamentals, baitfish, commercial foodfish. freshwater 
gamefish, and marine gamefish) and an “other" category.
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Question eight (Q-8) asked whether fish from the different categories, when 
confined in an aquaculture facility, were considered private property owned by the farm 
operator. The next two questions investigated whether an aquaculturist is required to obtain 
a special license or permit to possess and culture the different categories o f fish (Q-9), and 
whether any required special possession permit is transferable upon change o f fish farm 
ownership (Q -10). Question eleven (Q -11) inquired if an aquaculturist is required to design 
his facility to prevent escapement o f the fish, while question twelve (Q-12) examined 
whether unauthorized removal or destruction o f cultured fish from an aquaculture facility 
was legally considered poaching or theft.
The last three questions in the second section investigated various reporting 
requirements and marketing restrictions. Written fish inventory or production report 
requirements were elicited in question thirteen (Q-13), while question fourteen (Q-14) 
determined if a marketing paper trail was required to sell farm-raised fish from the different 
categories. Question fifteen (Q-l 5) was an open-ended question requesting respondents to 
describe any specific limitation or regulations on the sale or disposition o f fish from the 
different categories.
The third and final section o f the survey examined states’ use o f incentive-based 
programs as an alternative policy option to costly regulatory programs for promoting 
regulatory' compliance by the aquaculture industry. Question 16 (Q -16) determined if states 
have developed aquaculture Best Management Practices.
Four questions examined states’ use o f the four general classes o f economic or 
market-based incentive instruments described by Luzar and Diagne(1993): direct payment
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systems for adopting specific management practices, including cost sharing, matching 
grants, and subsidies (Q -l7); environmental liability requirements, including surety bonds 
and liability insurance (Q -l8); special fees, taxes, or assessments, with receipts used for 
environmental or natural resource programs (Q -l9); and tradable pollution rights systems, 
such as tradable discharge permits, discharge reduction credits, waste deposit-refund 
system, and habitat mitigation banking (Q -21).
One o f the most significant policy problems affecting aquacultural development is 
effluents. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates all discharges o f 
pollutants under authority from the Clean Water Act (CWA), which provides for the 
issuance o f National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits to control 
all non-exempt point source pollutant discharges, including aquaculture production wastes. 
A CWA provision allows the EPA to delegate its NPDES permit authority to individual 
states to regulate point-source discharges into waters within the state borders. State 
NPDES programs must be equivalent to the EPA’s, and may impose more stringent permit 
requirements (Ewart. Hankins, and Bullock. 1995). Question twenty (Q-20) elicited 
whether the state issues permits for aquaculture effluent discharges and examined the 
discharge permit fee structure.
Survey Summary' and Descriptive Statistics
O f the surv eys sent to 50 states and four U.S. territories, completed surveys were 
returned by 45 states (90 percent) and Guam (25 percent) for an overall response rate o f 
85.2 percent. The 46 survey respondents provided answers for five different categories o f
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finfish, resulting in 230 total observations. Appendix A.3 contains summary statistics and 
frequency tables for the completed surveys.
Profile of State Finfish Aquaculture
Forty-three respondents provided estimates for the number o f  private finfish 
aquaculture facilities currently operating in the states (Q-4; Table A.3.4). The estimates 
totaled 4,908 private finfish aquaculture facilities. Individual state estimates ranged from 
zero to four hundred, with a mean o f 114 fish farms per state and a standard deviation o f 
119.6 fish farms. As expected, trout and catfish species were the top finfish species 
cultured in private aquaculture facilities, based on farm gate market value (Q-7; Table 
A.3.7). Nineteen states (41.3 percent) reported various trout species as the num ber one 
cultured species. Fourteen states (30.4 percent) reported catfish species as the top cultured 
species. Other top cultured species include tilapia (four states), salmon species (three 
states) and ornamentals (two states).
As the aquaculture industry has expanded, states have been formulating 
development plans to attract and retain the industry. Twenty-two responding states (47.8 
percent) reported having formal aquaculture development programs and initiatives, while 
twenty-two respondents (47.8 percent) indicated that their state has not yet formulated a 
formal program (Q -l; Table A.3.la). O f the twenty-two states reporting formal 
development programs, only four states (18.2 percent) had established a plan in the 1973 
to 1984 period (Q -l; Table A .3.lb). No plans were established in 1985-86. The rate o f 
program development accelerated after 1987 and through the early 1990s, with eight 
programs established in the three year period from 1987-89 and nine programs established
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in the 1990-92 period. No development plans were reported as being established during 
the 1993-95 three year period.
Based on survey responses, responsibility for developing and administering state 
aquaculture programs rests largely with state departments o f agriculture, state fish and 
wildlife departments, and university cooperative extension services, either individually or 
shared (Q-2a; Table A.3.2a). Twenty-eight responding states (60.9 percent) impart program 
responsibility to state departments o f agriculture. State fish and wildlife departments have 
program responsibilities in fifteen states (32.6 percent) and ten states (21.7 percent) grant 
program development authority to university cooperative extension services.
The agency responsibility picture reverses for enforcement o f aquaculture 
regulations (Q-2b; Table A.3.2b). State fish and wildlife departments have enforcement 
responsibility in 37 states (80.4 percent), and state natural resources departments have 
enforcement authority in 13 states (28.2 percent). Only fifteen states (32.6 percent) give 
enforcement authority (sole or shared) to state departments o f agriculture.
Despite the small percentage o f states which impart enforcement authority to state 
departments o f agriculture, over two-thirds (67.4 percent. 31 states) o f the responding states 
legally consider aquaculture an agricultural activity (Q-3; Table A.3.3a). In nine states (19.6 
percent), aquaculture is not considered a part o f agriculture. The temporal progression o f  
states’ establishing aquaculture as agriculture closely follows the inception o f state 
aquaculture development plans (Table A.3.3b). By 1987, only six states had legally 
declared aquaculture a form o f agriculture. The number had increased to twenty-five 
responding states (54.3 percent) by 1995. Six o f the thirty-one states reporting aquaculture
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as part o f agriculture failed to provide the year that aquaculture was legally declared an 
agricultural activity.
The vast majority o f states (38), representing 82.6 percent o f respondents, require 
that fish farms obtain a general license or permit to operate in the state (Q-5; Table A.3.5a). 
Only six states (13.0 percent) did not require a general license or permit. In most cases, the 
general license is not transferable upon change in fish farm ownership (Table A .3.5b). O f 
the thirty-eight states requiring the general license, twenty states do not allow license 
transferal, while only 14 states reported that the general license was transferable. Four 
states expressed uncertainty about the transferability o f the general license.
Property Rights to Fish
The overall legal status o f fish as property varies considerably between states. 
While the majority o f responding states (40 states or 87 percent) consider fish in 
aquaculture facilities to be private property, only 22 states (47.8 percent) exempt the fish 
from state wildlife laws and only 17 states (37.0 percent) bestow livestock status on fish 
confined in aquaculture facilities (Q-6: Table A.3.6). The legal status o f cultured fish as 
private property was relatively uniform across four o f the five fish categories: ornamentals, 
baitfish, commercial foodfish and freshwater gamefish (Q-8; Table A.3.8). Between 40- 
42 states (87.0-91.3 percent) considered all four categories as private property. However, 
only 28 states (60.9 percent) reported that cultured marine gamefish are private property. 
The other eighteen responding states (39.1 percent) were either uncertain or did not provide 
the information.
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Property rights to fish are often accompanied by state requirements for a special 
license to possess and culture the fish. The number o f  states mandating special possession 
licenses varied by category of fish (Q-9; Table A.3.9). Nineteen states (41.3 percent) 
reported special licenses to possess and culture ornamentals. Twenty-two states (47.8 
percent) require special licenses to possess baitfish and marine gamefish. Twenty-eight 
states (60.9 percent) mandate special permits for commercial foodfish, and twenty-nine 
states (63.0 percent) require the special possession license for freshwater gamefish. A large 
amount o f  uncertainty was noted in possession license requirements for marine gamefish; 
more than one-third o f states (16 states or 34.8 percent) were uncertain or did not provide 
the requested information. For all fish categories, less than one-half of the states requiring 
a special possession license allowed the special license to be transferred upon a change in 
fish farm ownership (Q-10: Table A.3.10).
In addition to special possession license requirements, property rights to farmed fish 
are usually accompanied by a requirement that the culture facility be designed to prevent 
fish escapement (Q-l 1; Table A .3.11). The number (and percent) o f  respondents requiring 
escape-proof design for ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish, freshwater gamefish 
and marine gamefish are twenty-six (56.5 percent), nineteen (41.2 percent), twenty-seven 
(58.7 percent), twenty-three (50.0 percent), and nineteen (41.3 percent), respectively. 
Although the degree o f uncertainty was relatively low, ranging from 2-3 states in each fish 
category, the number o f states which failed to provide information for this question was 
relatively large, especially for ornamentals and baitfish with seven non-responsive states 
(15.2 percent) and marine gamefish with thirteen non-responsive states (28.3 percent).
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Most states provide some legal protection for fish farmers’ property rights to 
cultured fish by considering unauthorized removal or destruction o f fish from an 
aquaculture facility as theft, rather than poaching, which is applicable to wild fish. 
Penalties for violating farmers’ rights are much more severe for theft than poaching. 
Poaching is usually punishable by small fines, while theft can involve large fines and jail 
sentences. For all fish categories except marine gamefish, thirty-five states (76.1 percent) 
consider unauthorized fish removal or destruction as theft (Q-l 2: Table A.3.12). Twenty- 
five states (54.3 percent) reported that unauthorized removal or destruction o f marine 
gamefish is considered theft. Twenty states (43.4 percent) were either uncertain o f the 
poaching versus theft status for marine gamefish or failed to provide the requested 
information. For all five finfish categories, only one state reported that unauthorized 
removal or destruction o f  fish from an aquaculture facility was considered poaching, rather 
than theft.
A small proportion o f states require that fish farmers submit an annual written fish 
inventory or production report for all categories o f fish in aquaculture facilities (Q -l3: 
Table A.3.13). The number (and percent) o f respondents requiring a written production 
report for ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish, freshwater gamefish and marine 
gamefish are ten (21.7 percent), fourteen (30.4 percent), seventeen (37.0 percent), seventeen 
(37.0 percent), and twelve (26.1 percent), respectively.
In addition to production reports, some states also mandate marketing reports in the 
form o f marketing paper trails required for a fish farm operator to sell farm-raised fish (Q- 
13; Table A.3.14). The marketing paper trail requirements vary significantly between fish
82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
categories. Ornamentals, baitfish and marine gamefish are less regulated, in terms o f 
marketing paper trails, than commercial food fish and freshwater gamefish. Only thirteen 
respondents (28.3 percent) require a paper trail for ornamentals. Seventeen respondents 
(37.0 percent) and sixteen respondents (34.8 percent) mandate paper trails for baitfish and 
marine gamefish. respectively. More than one-half of the respondents, twenty-five states 
(54.3 percent) for commercial foodfish and 26 states (56.5 percent) for freshwater 
gamefish. require a marketing paper trail to sell farm-raised fish.
A number o f responding states also reported and described specific limitations or 
regulations on the sale or disposition o f farm-raised fish from the five fish categories (Q -15; 
Table A.3.15). Possession and sales o f certain ornamental species are restricted, and some 
species cannot be released in any surface waters. Some states prohibit sales of live baitfish 
or restrict import or export o f  baitfish species. Commercial foodfish sales can be affected 
by sales possession seasonality limits and transport licenses. States often set maximum size 
limits for freshwater gamefish and restrict sales to recreational pond stocking only. States 
can set species and marking requirement for marine gamefish raised on sea ranches and 
limit sales of certain species.
States’ Use of Incentive Programs
During the 1990s, states have been taking positive action to reduce harmful 
environmental externalities caused by livestock agriculture operations. Policy makers have 
an array o f instruments at their disposal to control environmental externalities. One 
commonly used device has been voluntary or mandatory Best Management Practices 
(BMPs). Only nine states (19.6 percent) have developed finfish aquaculture Best
83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Management Practices (Q-16; Table A.3.16a). O f those nine states, four reported that the 
BMPs were voluntary, four reported that BMPs were mandatory, and one respondent was 
uncertain whether the BMPs were voluntary or mandatory (Table A.3.16b)
One approach to environmental protection that is generating much interest as an 
alternative to command and control regulations is incentive-based mechanisms (IBM), 
which provide continuing incentives for polluters to search for cost minimizing ways o f 
abating pollution (Markandya and Richardson, 1992). Four general classes o f economic 
or market-based incentive instruments have been used to control environmental 
externalities in other industries: direct payment systems for adopting specific management 
practices, environmental liability requirements, special fees, taxes, or assessments, with 
receipts used for environmental or natural resource programs, and tradable pollution rights 
systems (Luzar and Diagne, 1993). Several states have begun experimenting with the use 
o f incentive-based mechanisms for the aquaculture industry'.
Two states (4.3 percent) and Guam (2.2 percent) have implemented direct payment 
programs (cost sharing, matching grants, or subsidies) for finfish aquaculture operations 
to promote environmental compliance (Q -l7; Table A.3.17). Maryland reported 
development of a state cost sharing program for soil conservation and water quality 
practices. Maryland also has a 50 percent matching grants program for fish farmers to 
design and construct small wastewater treatment facilities which reduce discharge or 
recycle water. West Virginia Department of Agriculture provides low interest loans for 
aquaculture producers. Guam has implemented 50 percent cost sharing for heavy 
equipment, a tax rebate program, and low cost loans.
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Eight states (17.4 percent) reported the use o f environmental liability requirements 
(surety bonds, liability insurance) for finfish aquaculture operations (Q-18; Table A.3.18). 
Montana requires an annual bond as a condition for license renewal. Two states use 
environmental liability for eradication o f exotic species in cases o f escapement. Georgia 
specifies liability insurance for dangerous species, such as piranha. Louisiana requires a 
525,000 bond for tilapia producers to cover eradication or habitat restoration if  farmed 
tilapia should escape. Delaware requires that farmers o f  black bass species post a $5,000 
surety bond to guarantee environmental compliance. Bonding company eligibility 
requirements essentially guarantee the character o f the bond holder and minimize the risk 
o f illegal activity. Five states require surety bonds and/or liability insurance for restoration 
o f leased sites. Minnesota specifies that surety bonds are necessary to provide water 
restoration funds for net-pen aquaculture in mine pits. California requires both surety 
bonds and insurance for lessees of State water bottoms. Rhode Island. Maine, and 
Washington mandate bonds for leases sites, to cover clean-up in case o f abandonment.
Nine states (19.6 percent) reported the use o f special taxes, fees, or assessments, 
with receipts used for environmental or natural resource programs (Q -l9; Table A .3.19). 
Most were license, lease, or permit fees. Four state programs are worthy of note. Florida 
water management districts can add a mill to the property tax to pay for storm water 
management programs and operation o f district offices. Maine requires that all fish farms 
pay a special tax o f one cent per pound for benthic environmental monitoring. Oregon can 
mandate special study fees to determine possible impacts o f aquaculture facilities to native 
fishes. Vermont charges special fees used for a state fish health inspection program.
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Only two states (4.3 percent) reported the availability o f pollution rights systems to 
enhance aquaculture industry compliance with environmental quality standards (Q-21: 
Table A.3.21). Habitat mitigation banking is used in Colorado. It is also available in 
Louisiana, but to date had not been used for an aquaculture facility.
Little has been done by states to use incentive programs to reduce aquaculture 
facility wastewater discharges. No state or territory has tried tradable discharge permits, 
discharge reduction credits, or waste deposit-refund systems. Thirty-four responding 
states/territories (73.9 percent) issue NPDES or similar discharge permits for aquaculture 
effluents (Q-20: Table A.3.20a). However, seldom is the fee structure set-up to provide 
that "the polluter pays" or to provide incentives for discharge reductions (Q-20: Table 
A.3 .20b). Nine states (19.6 percent) charge no fee, while eight states (17.4 percent) charge 
a flat fee. Only three states (6.5 percent) specify a categorical fee, based on facility type 
(pond, flow-through, recirculating, etc.). Eight states (17.4 percent) reported some type of 
graduated fee: one state with the fee based on annual fish production, three states with a 
graduated fee based on effluent concentration, and four states with the discharge fee based 
on water flow rate.
1998 Supplemental Questionnaire
The State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire 
updated and clarified information collected in two surveys: a 1993 Aquatic Animal Health 
Survey conducted by the National Association o f State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC) 
and the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey described above (Appendix B). 
The 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire collected updated information about the size ofeach
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state's finfish aquaculture industry, ownership and specification o f property rights, state 
marketing restrictions, and health certification requirements for each o f  five categories o f 
fish (baitfish, ornamentals, commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish and marine 
gamefish). The questionnaire also obtained respondents’ self-assessment o f state regulatory 
stringency toward fish farming for each fish category.
Questionnaire Sample
The survey instrument was mailed to official aquaculture coordinators and contacts 
from the 45 states and one U.S. territory (Guam) who responded to the original 1995 State 
Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey. Names and addresses were obtained from the April 
1997 edition o f the Directory o f  State Aquaculture Coordinators and Contacts, compiled 
and maintained by the Alternative Farming Systems Information Center at the USDA/ARS 
National Agricultural Library in cooperation with the National Association of State 
Aquaculture Coordinators (USDA/ARS. 1995).
Questionnaire Administration
The first mailing included a 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire and a letter 
identifying the questionnaire’s purpose, the proposed application o f the data, and a request 
to fax back the completed questionnaire (Appendix B .l).
Approximately three weeks after the first mailing, non-respondents were contacted 
by telephone and asked to please complete and fax the questionnaire. A copy of the original 
questionnaire was faxed to any non-respondent who indicated that he did not have a copy. 
Ten days later, non-respondents were faxed another copy of the original questionnaire and 
a letter reiterating the importance of their response. One week later, continuing non-
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respondents were again contacted by telephone and asked to return the completed 
questionnaire.
Questionnaire Design
The 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire instrument (Appendix B.2) was divided into 
two sections. The first section requested general information about the state's finfish 
aquaculture program, including the total number o f private finfish aquaculture facilities (Q- 
1) and an estimate o f the number o f private fish farms raising each o f the five categories 
o f  fish (Q-2). The third question (Q-3) was framed in the dichotomous choice form, 
requesting a closed "yes"', "no", or "uncertain'* response to a question asking whether the 
state maintained a list o f fish species that are prohibited from entering state waters.
The second section consisted o f five dichotomous choice questions exploring issues 
related to regulation and ownership specification for farm-raised fish from the five fish 
categories previously described. The regulatory issues included any state limits or 
restrictions on sales and marketing o f farm-raised fish (Q-4), and requirements for a health 
certification for farm-raised fish entering the state (Q-7) or shipped within the state (Q-8). 
Ownership specification issues included whether the different categories o f fish, when 
confined in an aquaculture facility, are exempt from state wildlife laws (Q-5) and legally 
considered livestock (Q-6). The final question (Q-9) obtained self-reports o f the overall 
stringency o f state regulation o f fish farming for each fish category. The question used a 
Likert scale ranging from “ I” to "5” , where "1” represented extremely lenient regulation 
and "5** represented extremely stringent regulation.
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Questionnaire Summary and Descriptive Statistics
O f the questionnaires sent to the 45 states and one U.S. territory (Guam) which 
responded to the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey, 43 completed surveys 
were returned for an overall response rate o f 93.5 percent. The 43 survey respondents 
provided answers for five different categories o f finfish. resulting in 215 total observations. 
Appendix B.3 contains summary statistics and frequency tables for the completed surveys.
Profile of State Finfish Aquaculture
Forty-one respondents provided estimates for the number o f  private finfish 
aquaculture facilities currently operating in the states (Q -l; Table B.3.1). The estimates 
totaled 4.929 private finfish aquaculture facilities. Individual state estimates ranged from 
two to 609. with a mean o f 120 fish farms per state and a standard deviation o f 151.9 fish 
farms. Respondents also provided estimates o f the number o f private fish farms raising 
each o f five categories o f fish in the state: ornamentals, baitfish, commercial foodfish, 
freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish (Q-2; Table B.3.2). The total (and state mean) 
number o f farms raising each o f the five categories was: ornamentals. 378 (10.2): baitfish. 
486 (12.5); commercial foodfish. 2642 (66.1); freshwater gamefish. 1362 (34.1); and 
marine gamefish, 69 (1.8) farms.
Legal Status of Cultured Fish
The legal status o f cultured fish as exempt from state wildlife laws varied by fish 
category (Q-5; Table B.3.5). Commercial foodfish were most frequently exempted, with 
twenty-four states (55.8 percent) reporting that commercial foodfish were exempt from 
wildlife laws, while being subject to wildlife laws in nineteen states (44.2 percent). The
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number (and percent) of respondents exempting ornamentals, baitfish, freshwater gamefish 
and marine gamefish from state wildlife laws are twenty-two (51.2 percent), nineteen (44.2 
percent), twenty-one (48.8 percent) and fifteen (34.9 percent), respectively.
A similar situation exists with respect to states which legally consider fish in an 
aquaculture facility as livestock, although the number of states which consider the fish as 
livestock is lower for all categories o f fish and there is a high degree o f uncertainty among 
respondents (Q-6: Table B.3.6). Twelve states (27.9 percent) consider ornamentals as 
livestock, while eighteen states (41.9 percent) do not consider ornamentals as livestock, and 
thirteen respondents (30.2 percent) are uncertain. Sixteen states (37.2 percent) consider 
baitfish in aquaculture facilities as livestock, whereas 17 states (39.5 percent) do not, and 
ten respondents (23.3 percent) expressed uncertainty. Twenty states (46.5 percent) reported 
that commercial foodfish are considered livestock, while fourteen states (32.6 percent) did 
not. and nine respondents (20.9 percent) are uncertain. Freshwater gamefish in aquaculture 
facilities are considered livestock in fifteen states (34.9 percent). Eighteen states (41.9 
percent) do not consider cultured freshwater gamefish as livestock, while ten states (23.3 
percent) expressed uncertainty. Only ten states (23.3 percent) considered marine gamefish 
as livestock, while seventeen states (39.5 percent) denied livestock status to cultured marine 
gamefish and fourteen respondents (32.6 percent) were uncertain about the legal status of 
marine gamefish as livestock.
Regulation of Fish Farms
Most states control the species o f  fish that can be cultured within the state by 
maintaining a list o f fish species which are prohibited from entering state waters (Q-3;
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Table B.3.3). Thirty-five states (81.4 percent) maintain a prohibited species list. Only four 
states (9.3 percent) indicated that they do not have a prohibited species list.
Even when states allow fish species to enter the state, they sometimes require a 
health certification for farm-raised fish entering the state (Q-7; Table B.3.7) or being 
shipped within the state (Q-8; Table B.3.8). The number (and percent) o f respondents 
requiring a health certification for ornamentals, baitfish, commercial food fish, freshwater 
gamefish and marine gamefish entering the state are eight (18.6 percent), eleven (25.6 
percent), seventeen (39.5 percent), nine (20.9 percent), and eleven (25.6 percent), 
respectively. No states reported any health certification requirements for baitfish or 
commercial foodfish being shipped within the state. Six states (14.0 percent) reported 
intrastate shipment health certification requirements for ornamentals, and four states (9.3 
percent) required the health certifications for intrastate shipment o f  both freshwater and 
marine gamefish.
Many states also limit or restrict the sale or marketing o f the different categories o f 
fish (Q-4; Table B.3.4). Freshwater gamefish are the most heavily regulated fish category, 
with thirty states (69.8 percent) limiting marketing. Sales and marketing o f both baitfish 
and commercial foodfish are restricted by 18 states (41.9 percent), with twenty-four states 
(55.8 percent) reporting no restrictions. Marine gamefish marketing is limited by twenty- 
one states (48.8 percent), with fifteen states (34.9 percent) reporting no restrictions. 
However, there appears to be a some uncertainty about marine gamefish, with seven states 
(16.3 percent) either reporting uncertainty or providing no answer. Ornamental species are 
subject to the least marketing restrictions. Only ten states (23.3 percent) reported the
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existence o f marketing restrictions, while thirty-one states (72.1 percent) reported no 
restrictions.
Respondents used a Likert scale to rate the overall stringency o f their state 's 
regulation o f fish farming for each fish category (Q-9). The Likert scale ranged from " I"  
to "5". where “ 1" represented extremely lenient regulation and *'5V> represented extremely 
stringent regulation. Table B.3.9a provides a frequency table for the respondent ratings. 
Ratings for ornamentals and baitfish appeared to be bi-modal at ratings o f "T - and "3” 
while ratings for commercial foodfish. freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish clustered 
around a rating o f “2". Table B.3.9b provides summary statistics for respondent ratings 
o f overall regulatory stringency for each fish category'. Ratings for all five fish categories 
ranged from a minimum o f ” 1” to a maximum o f ”5". The mean ratings (and standard 
deviations) were ornamentals. 2.84 (1.41); baitfish, 2.10(1.03); commercial foodfish, 2.70 
(1.29): freshwater gamefish. 2.56 (.94); and marine gamefish. 2.61 (1.25).
Summary'
This chapter provided a detailed description of the two primary data sources for this 
research, the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1998 Supplemental 
Questionnaire. The 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey examined the issues 
associated with the roles o f state agencies responsible for developing and enforcing 
aquaculture regulations, the ownership and specification o f property rights to cultured fish, 
and the use o f  incentive-based programs by states and U.S. territorial governments. The 
1998 Supplemental Questionnaire collected information about the size o f each state's 
finfish aquaculture industry, the legal status o f cultured fish, state marketing restrictions.
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fish health certification requirements, and respondents7 self-assessment o f  state regulatory 
stringency toward fish farming. For both survey instruments, sample information, 
administration procedures, questionnaire design and response frequencies were described.
The next chapter details the development and validation o f  a measure o f state 
regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture. Since regulatory climate is a latent variable, 
not directly measurable, a procedure is described for developing an objective, quantitative 
summated scale measure of state regulatory climate for the aquaculture industry, using 
attenuations o f property rights conditions as underlying effect indicators o f regulatory 
climate. The final validated scale, which combines the advantages o f direct quantitative 
measures and qualitative indices, is presented.
93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 4
THE AQUACULTURE REGULATORY CLIMATE SCALE
Many constructs in social science research, such as regulatory climate, are latent 
variables, theoretical abstractions that are not directly observable or measurable. Although 
a latent variable cannot be quantified directly, it presumably takes on a specific value under 
a specified set o f conditions. The existence o f latent variables may be inferred from their 
behavioral consequences. In other instances, it is more useful to assess a latent construct 
through an objectively constructed and validated scale (DeVillis, 1991).
This chapter presents a summated scale measure o f state regulatory climate toward 
finfish aquaculture. First, classical test theory', the underlying rationale for measurement 
scales, is reviewed. The six-step scale development process is then detailed. Finally, the 
specific procedures used to develop the finfish aquaculture regulatory climate scale are 
described, and the final scale is presented and evaluated.
The Measurement Scale Concent
According to Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), measurement consists o f rules for 
assigning symbols to objects in order to represent quantities o f attributes numerically or to 
define whether objects fall in the same or different categories with respect to an attribute. 
These well-defined rules provide a level o f standardization and quantification which takes 
the guesswork out o f scientific observation and permits the use o f mathematical analysis 
which is often essential to the elaboration o f theories.
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Measurements fall into four major classes: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. 
Nominal scales contain rules for deciding whether two objects are equivalent or not 
equivalent. Ordinal scales involve rules for deciding whether one object is greater than or 
less than another object with respect to a given attribute. With ordinal scales, a set o f 
objects is ordered from "least’’ to "most” with respect to an attribute o f  interest, but the 
quantity o f the attribute which each object possesses and the distance between objects with 
respect to the attribute are unknown. With interval scales, the rank ordering and the 
distances among objects on an attribute are known. A ratio scale is an interval scale with 
a rational zero. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) noted that addressing the most common 
problems o f scaling rarely requires ratio scales. Although defining an interval can be 
important, ordering is the most crucial concept.
A summated scale measure is a collection o f multiple, equally weighted items 
intended to reveal the levels o f theoretical variables not observable by direct means 
(DeVillis. 1991; Spector. 1992). A summated scale may be either reflective or formative 
(Black. 1997). In a reflective scale, such as the regulatory climate scale developed in this 
chapter, the items which comprise the scale are "effect indicators” whose values are caused 
by the latent variable. The strength o f the latent variable is presumed to cause the set o f 
items to take on a certain value. The causality (represented by the direction o f  arrows in a 
path diagram) is from the latent variable toward the underlying dimensions represented by 
the items.
A formative scale, called an index, consists o f items which are “cause indicators” 
that determine the level o f the latent variable. The direction o f path diagram arrows in an
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index is from the scale items toward the latent variable (Bollen and Lennox, 1991; DeVillis, 
1991).
The causal relationship described above between a latent variable and the reflective 
scale items implies specific empirical relationships. If an item value is caused by the latent 
variable, then that item value and the true score o f the latent variable should correlate. The 
latent variable can also be invoked as the basis for correlations am ong items, and that 
information can be used to infer how highly each item was correlated with the latent 
variable (DeVillis, 1991).
Theory Underlying Scale Measures
Classical test theory provides the underlying rationale for summated scale measures. 
The theoretical value that a subject has on a variable o f interest is the subject’s true score, 
while the observed score is the score actually derived from the measurement process. The 
true score cannot be directly observed, and so is inferred from the observed score. Each 
individual item is designed to be an observation o f the latent variable, with each item 
representing an individual assessment o f  the true score (DeVillis, 1991; Spector, 1992).
According to classical test theory, the observed score is comprised o f three 
components: the true score, random measurement error, and bias. That is:
O = T + E + B (4.1)
where O is the observed score, T is the true score, E is random measurement error, and B 
is bias. Measurement errors, because they are random, are assumed to have a population 
mean o f zero. These measurement errors are inversely related to reliability. Bias consists 
o f systematic influences on observed scores that do not reflect the true score. Bias
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represents alternative latent variables that influenced observed scores. Validation o f a scale 
is essential to demonstrate that the scale measures what was intended, rather than bias 
(Spector, 1992).
Classical test theory, as described by DeVillis (1991), starts with three basic 
assumptions about items and their relationships to the latent variable and sources o f error. 
First, the amount o f error associated with individual items varies randomly. Second, item 
error terms are not correlated with one another. Third, error terms are not correlated with 
the true score o f the latent variable. This third assumption amounts to defining error as the 
residual after considering all relationships between a set o f  items and their latent variable. 
Theoretical Measurement Models
There are four types o f measurement models consistent with classical test theory 
which are used in developing scales: the model o f parallel tests, the tau-equivalent tests 
model, the congeneric model, and the general factor model. In its most orthodox form, 
classical test theory is based on the assumption of parallel tests, where each individual item 
is viewed as a test for the value o f the latent variable. The most stringent of the three 
models, the parallel test model is based on the underlying rationale that each scale item is 
precisely as good a measure o f the latent variable as any other scale item. Thus, individual 
items are strictly parallel. The parallel tests model adds two assumptions to the three 
classical test theory assumptions described earlier. The amount o f influence from the latent 
variable to each item is assumed to be the same for all items, and each item is assumed to 
have the same amount o f error as any other item. These two added assumptions mean that 
the correlation o f each item with the true score is identical, and implies that correlations
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among items are identical and the items all have equal means and equal variances (DeVillis, 
1991).
The tau-equivalent tests model relaxes the assumption that the error variances 
associated with each item are equal. Items are still parallel in terms of how much they are 
influenced by the latent variable, but are not necessarily influenced to the same extent by 
extraneous factors. Because errors can vary, item means and variances can vary (DeVillis, 
1991).
The congeneric model, which is the most common scale measurement model in 
social sciences, is based upon an even more relaxed set o f  assumptions. Beyond the three 
basic classical test theory assumptions, the congeneric model merely assumes that all scale 
items share a common latent variable, and that each item reflects the true score to some 
degree. The relationship between each item and the latent variable must be statistically 
significant, but the items need not have equal relationships to the latent variable, and error 
variances need not be equal.
The congeneric model is a special case o f the general factor model, a more liberal 
approach which does not assume that only one latent variable is the source o f all 
covariation among the scale items. Instead, the general factor model allows multiple latent 
variables to underlie a set o f items. The general factor model attempts to determine 
whether a set of items has one or many latent variables underlying them. With the general 
factor model, a construct o f interest can be operationalized at multiple levels o f specificity. 
Each level could subsume those that follow, allowing the possible development o f scale 
measures at each level of specificity (DeVillis, 1991).
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Scale Development Procedure
The scale development process, as described by Churchill (1979), DeVillis (1991), 
and Spector (1992) consists o f  six steps: (1) construct definition and construct domain 
specification, (2) generation o f an initial item pool, (3) determination o f  measure structure, 
(4) reliability assessment and item analysis, (5) confirmatory factor analysis, and (6) 
validity assessment. In practice, steps 3 and 4 are performed simultaneously in an iterative 
fashion.
Construct Definition and Construct Domain Specification
Defining the construct, or latent variable, can be the most difficult pan o f scale 
development. The nature o f the construct o f interest must be carefully and specifically 
delineated. A construct only takes on meaning as part of a broader network that describes 
relationships among many constructs. Substantive theories related to the construct being 
measured play an important role in conceptualizing the construct and should always be 
considered before trying to operationalize the construct. At the very least, a tentative 
theoretical model should be specified to serve as a guide to scale development (DeVillis, 
1991; Spector, 1992).
The conceptual effort begins with a general definition o f the construct, and then 
moves to specifics. A literature review typically serves as the starting point for construct 
definition, with prior conceptual definitions and uses providing the initial definitional 
foundation. The review is then broadened to encompass related constructs to articulate the 
target construct’s conceptual boundaries (Clark and Watson, 1995; Spector, 1992).
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Once the construct has been defined, the construct domain or dimensionality is 
conceptualized. Constructs can range from being highly specific to being multidimensional, 
with several underlying dimensions. The conceptual specification o f the dimensions o f the 
construct must be as exact as possible. Recurring issues and themes that have appeared 
when theorists have defined the construct o f interest should be identified through a review 
o f the literature. Ultimately, the decision on how finely to subdivide a construct must be 
based on both theoretical and empirical utility. Subdividing is indicated when subdividing 
adds to the explanatory power o f a theory and can be supported empirically (Churchill, 
1979; Spector. 1992).
Generation of an Initial Item Pool
The creation o f the initial item pool is a critical step in scale construction. The scale 
items that comprise the initial item pool are observed variables that represent the latent 
variable’s underlying domains. The fundamental goal is to systematically sample all 
content that is relevant to the latent variable (Clark and Watson, 1995). The content o f each 
item can be generated by the researcher or culled from research relating to the latent 
variable. Items should be scaled in the same direction, and each item should give an 
indication o f the strength o f the latent variable. A high score should represent a high level 
o f the latent variable, and a low score should represent a low level (DeVillis. 1991).
Number of Items
Multiple items should be identified to capture each o f the dimensions o f the 
construct o f interest. Many measured dimensions o f a latent variable are broad in scope and 
not easily assessed with a single item. Scale precision increases with multiple items.
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Single item scales are imprecise because they restrict measurement to only two levels. A 
multiple item scale is also more reliable than a single item scale; multiple items improve 
reliability by allowing random errors o f measurement to average out (Churchill, 1979; 
Spector, 1992).
Since the internal consistency reliability o f a scale varies as a function o f the 
number o f items, having many items in the initial item pool helps assure internal 
consistency. DeVillis (1991) noted that it is not unusual to have an initial item pool that 
is three or four times as large as the final scale. However, the initial item pool may be as 
small as 50 percent larger than the final scale if items are particularly difficult to generate 
for a given content area or if  empirical data indicate that numerous items are not necessary 
to achieve good internal consistency.
Item Format
Numerous formats for scale items exist, and to assure compatibility, the 
determination o f the format should take place simultaneously with the generation o f items. 
Classical test theory and the theoretical measurement models presented earlier in this 
chapter are more consistent with certain response formats. In general, scales consisting o f 
items which are scorable on some continuum and which are summated to form a scale score 
are most compatible with classical test theory (DeVillis, 1991).
Scale items typically consist o f two parts, a stem and a series o f response options. 
The stem may be a question or a declarative statement expressing an opinion. The response 
options accompanying each stem may be possible answers to the stem question or 
descriptors indicating the strength o f agreement or disagreement with the stem statement.
101
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The first issue to be decided in constructing response options is the nature o f the responses. 
According to Spector (1992), the three most common responses are agreement, evaluation, 
and frequency. Agreement requests that subjects indicate the extent to which they agree 
with the item stem. Evaluation asks for an evaluative rating for each item stem, and 
frequency asks for a judgment o f  how often each item has occurred (DeVillis, 1991; 
Spector, 1992).
How many response options should be available for each stem? Variability is a 
desirable quality of a scale. If a scale lacks enough variability to discriminate differences 
in the underlying construct, correlations o f the scale with other measures will be restricted 
and the scale's utility will be limited. Many scale items and numerous response options 
within items will both increase variability. Another consideration in selecting the number 
o f response options is the respondent's ability to discriminate meaningfully between 
response options. Items which limit response options to an obvious continuum of 
unambiguous choices, ordered from low to high with numbers assigned to each response 
choice, seem to work best for developing summated scales (DeVillis, 1991; Spector. 1992).
Specific Types of Response Formats
Although there are a wide variety o f scale item response formats, several ways to 
present items, reviewed by DeVillis (1991), are widely used and have been proven 
successful in diverse scaling applications. These include the semantic differential method, 
the Likert scale method, and binary responses. The semantic differential scale method is 
chiefly associated with attitude research, typically in reference to one or more stimuli. 
Identification of the target stimulus is followed by a list o f  bipolar adjective pairs
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representing opposite ends o f  a continuum defined by the adjectives. The respondent 
identifies the point along the continuum which characterizes the stimulus (DeVillis. 1991).
The Likert scale method is widely used in scales measuring opinions, beliefs and 
attitudes. With the Likert scale method, the stem item is presented as a declarative sentence, 
followed by response options which indicate varying degrees o f agreement or endorsement 
o f  the statement. Response options are worded to have roughly equal intervals with respect 
to agreement, forming a continuum from strong disagreement to strong agreement.
The binary options format, also called dichotomous choice, gives subjects a choice 
between two options for each item. For example, subjects might be asked to answer "ves" 
or "no" to a list o f items sharing a common latent variable. According to DeVillis (1991. 
pg. 73), "A major shortcoming o f binary responses is that each item can have only one o f 
two levels o f covariation: agreement or disagreement." Since the variance o f a summated 
scale is equal to the sum of all the elements in the covariance matrix for the individual 
items, each item o f a binary response contributes little to that sum because of the limitations 
in possible variances and covariances (DeVillis, 1991). Binary items do have one major 
advantage: they are extremely easy to answer, since the burden placed on the subject is very' 
low for any one item. Subjects are often willing to complete more binary items than they 
would be willing to complete if  the items used a format demanding concentration on finer 
distinctions (DeVillis, 1991).
Determination of Measure Structure
Once the first two steps in the scale development process described above are 
completed, a measurement model is proposed which shows the hypothesized relationship
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between a latent (unobserved) variable and its underlying dimensions, as represented by the 
observed variables selected from the item pool. The measurement model, usually displayed 
as a path diagram, forms an operational definition o f the latent variable from the theoretical 
definitions (Floyd and Widaman, 1995; Hoyle and Smith, 1994). The path diagram can 
help show how scale items are causally related to the latent variable, and can also help 
understand how relationships among scale items imply relationships between items and the 
latent variable (DeVillis, 1991).
In this research, the latent construct o f interest, state regulatory climate, represents 
the degree of regulatory stringency. Since regulation is conceptually viewed as an 
attenuation of private property rights, four property rights conditions (ownership, 
specification, transferability, and enforcement) are hypothesized to serve as underlying 
domains. Regulations which attenuate the four property rights conditions serve as observed 
indicator variables. The intensity o f regulatory climate determines the level o f  property 
rights attenuation. Thus, the regulatory climate scale is conceptualized as a reflective scale, 
with scale items as effect indicators o f regulatory climate. A path diagram illustrating the 
proposed congeneric measurement model for state regulatory climate is shown in Figure 
4.1.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
Preliminary determination of the scale’s structure is accomplished through 
exploratory factor analysis. Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical method used to 
analyze the structure o f the correlations among a large number o f  variables in a data matrix 
by defining a set o f common underlying dimensions, or factors. Exploratory factor analysis
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Figure 4.1 Proposed Regulatory Climate Measurement Model
has three purposes. First, it determines how many factors underlie the set o f items. 
Second, it condenses information by correlating items. Third, factor analysis defines the 
substantive content or meaning o f the factors. The overall goal o f  factor analysis is to 
maximize the variance explained by the measure while minimizing the number o f factors 
and scale items (Crocker and Algina, 1986; DeVillis, 1991; Hair et al., 1995; McDonald, 
1981; Nunnallv and Bernstein, 1994).
The factor analysis mathematical model, as described by Norusis (1994), appears 
similar to a multiple regression equation, with the independent variables in multiple 
regression analysis replaced by groups of variables that characterize unobserved factors. 
Each variable is expressed as a linear combination of unobserved factors. In general, the 
factor model for the /th standardized variable is given by;
x ,\ = A ,\F \ + + - + AtkFk + U, (4.2)
where the F s are the common factors, U is the unique factor analogous to the error term 
in regression analysis, and the A 's  are the coefficients used to combine the k  factors.
The factors, which are inferred from the observed variables, can be estimated as 
linear combinations o f the variables. The general expression for Fr the estimate o f the /th  
factor is:
F, = WlXX,  -  lVl2X2 + ... + I V ,^  (4.3)
where the IF/s are the factor score coefficients, and p  is the number o f variables (Norusis.
1994).
Exploratory factor analysis is accomplished through a three-step process. The first 
step is designing the factor analysis, and consists o f computing the correlation matrix for
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all the variables. The second step, factor extraction, consists o f  determining the number 
o f factors necessary to represent the data and the method for calculating them. The final 
step, interpretation o f the factors, includes factor rotation and examination o f  factor 
loadings and the factor matrix (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
Designing the Factor Analysis
Factor analysis design requires three key decisions: the number o f  variables and 
their measurement properties, the necessary sample size, and calculation o f  the correlation 
matrix which is the input data (Hair, et al., 1995). Variables used for factor analysis are 
generally assumed to be metric. Non-metric variables such as dichotomous choice 
variables can be used, but the limited variance in dichotomous choice variables may 
negatively affect factor analysis results. Several key variables which are theorized to 
closely reflect the underlying factors should be identified, and may serve as marker 
variables for interpretation o f  factors. The number o f  variables to be used also affects the 
sample size necessary to obtain factor analytic results. The general rule, stated by Hair, et 
al. (1995, p. 373) is that “the minimum is to have at least five times as many observations 
as there are variables to be analyzed, and the more acceptable range would be a ten-to-one 
ratio."
Two of the key underlying statistical assumptions o f factor analysis are that data 
have been gathered from independent observations and that the same process that describes 
variables’ influences on each other is operating in every' observation. These two basic 
statistical assumptions, typically known as “i.i.d.” or '‘independent and identically 
distributed observations,” assume that the processes underlying the model are homogenous
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across all observations (Bentler and Chou. 1987; Black, 1997). If process differences for 
identifiable subpopulations are suspected, it is appropriate to perform the analysis 
separately in these populations. The homogeneity assumption can be evaluated in part by 
a multiple-group or multiple population model (Bentler and Chou, 1987).
The factor analysis begins with the computation o f the correlation matrix for all 
variables, based upon the Pearson product-moment correlation (r) o f two continuous 
distributions. The sign and size o f r  denote the direction and degree o f relationship between 
two variables. The use of r requires that certain assumptions be met. First, the relationship 
between two variables should be essentially monotonic and preferably linear. Second, the 
relationship must be homoscedastic. Finally, the errors affecting each o f  the variables must 
be normally distributed. These three assumptions: linearity, homoscedasticity. and 
normality are important in interpreting correlation results. When the Pearson product- 
moment correlation is used in analysis, there will be no real problem unless these three 
assumptions are seriously violated. Differences in the distribution shapes o f the variables 
will restrict the size of the correlation. These effects will be slight with continuous 
variables, but can be quite large with categorical variables, especially when they are 
dichotomous (Nunnally and Bemstein, 1994). For this reason, factor analysis results for 
dichotomous or ordinal variables with few categories should be viewed with caution and 
as strictly exploratory.
In addition to the above statistical assumptions for the data correlation matrix, the 
matrix must have enough correlations to justify the use o f factor analysis (Hair, et al., 
1995). For factor analysis to be appropriate, there should be a substantial number of
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correlations greater than 0.30. The Bartlett test o f sphericity, a statistical test for the 
presence o f  correlations among the variables, estimates the statistical probability that the 
correlation matrix has significant correlations by testing the hypotheses that the correlation 
matrix is an identity matrix, with all diagonal terms equal to 1 and all off-diagonal terms 
equal to 0. The value o f the sphericity test statistic is based on a chi-square transformation 
o f the determinant o f the correlation matrix. If the hypothesis that the correlation matrix 
is an identity cannot be rejected because the observed statistical significance level is large, 
the use o f factor analysis should be reconsidered (Norusis, 1994).
Another measure o f the degree o f the appropriateness o f factor analysis is the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy, an index for comparing the 
magnitudes o f the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes o f the partial 
correlation coefficients. The index ranges from zero to one. Small values for the KMO 
measure, below the 0.5 level, are unacceptable and indicate that correlations between pairs 
of variables cannot be explained by the other variables and factor analysis may be 
inappropriate (Hair, et al., 1995: Norusis. 1994).
Factor Extraction
The process o f factor extraction involves determining the underlying latent variables 
(factors) that can account for the patterns o f correlation (DeVillis, 1991). Two basic 
methods, described by Hair et al. (1995) and Norusis (1994), are commonly used to obtain 
factor solutions: principal components analysis or common factor analysis, also called 
principal axis factoring. In principal components analysis, linear combinations o f the 
observed variables are formed. Unities are inserted in the diagonal o f the correlation
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matrix. As a result, the total variance in the matrix is considered in the factor matrix. The 
first principal component is the factor that accounts for the largest amount o f  variance in 
the data.
Common factor analysis proceeds in the same manner as principal components 
analysis, except that correlation matrix diagonals are replaced with estimates o f variable 
communalities, the proportion o f shared, or common, variance among the variables. Thus, 
factors obtained from common factor analysis are based only on the common variance. 
Common factor analysis suffers from the problem o f factor indeterminacy. There is no 
unique solution, since several different factor scores can be calculated from the factor 
model results (Hair, et al.. 1995: Norusis. 1994).
The choice o f which factoring method to use depends on the objective o f the 
researcher, but the problems inherent in common factor analysis have contributed to 
widespread use and popularity o f principal components analysis. When the researcher is 
concerned with identifying the minimum number o f factors needed to account for the 
maximum proportion of the variance in the data matrix, the principal components model 
is most appropriate. Both o f the factor extraction methods give essentially identical results, 
in most cases, if the communalities exceed 0.60 for most variables (Hair, et al., 1995).
Number of Factors Extracted
Once the extraction method has been determined, the initial unrotated factors are 
extracted. Examination o f the unrotated factor matrix can provide a preliminary' estimate 
o f the number o f factors which should be extracted. Several guidelines have been 
developed to determine the number o f factors to extract. In practice, one rarely relies on one
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criterion; instead, multiple criteria are examined over the course o f several trial analyses 
to arrive at the best representation of the data to use in determining the number o f factors 
to extract (Hair, et al., 1995). Four widely used criteria: the a priori criterion. K aiser’s 
eigenvalue rule, Cattell’s scree test, and the percentage o f  variance criterion are briefly 
discussed in the following paragraphs.
The a priori criterion is used when the analyst has prior knowledge about the 
number o f factors to extract. Analysis is stopped when the desired number o f factors has 
been extracted. The a priori criterion approach is useful when testing theory about the 
number o f factors (Hair, et al.. 1995).
Kaiser’s eigenvalue rule, also called the latent root criterion, is the most commonly 
used extraction technique. The eigenvalue is the sum o f squared loadings for a factor, and 
represents the amount o f variance accounted for by a factor. The total variance is the sum 
o f the variance o f each variable. All variables are expressed in standardized form, with a 
mean of 0 and a standard deviation and variance o f one. The eigenvalue rule is based on 
retaining only factors that explain more variance than the average variance explained by 
one o f the original items. Only those factors having eigenvalues greater than one are 
considered significant. The eigenvalue rule is most reliable when the number of variables 
is between 20 and 50. When there are less than 20 variables, the eigenvalue rule tends to 
extract too few factors (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
Cattell’s scree test is used to determine the number o f factors that can be extracted 
before the amount o f  unique variance begins to dominate the common variance. The scree 
plot is a plot o f  the total variance associated with each factor, and is developing by plotting
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the eigenvalues on the vertical axis and a horizontal axis corresponding to successive 
factors, in their order o f extraction. The plot, which bears a physical resemblance to the 
profile o f a hillside, shows a distinct break, or "elbow" between the steep slope o f the large 
factors and the gradual trailing off o f the eigenvalues for the later factors. The portion of 
the plot beyond the elbow corresponds to the rubble, or scree, that gathers at the base o f  a 
hillside. C attelfs guidelines suggest retaining factors above the elbow and rejecting factors 
below the elbow. As a general rule, C attelfs scree test results in at least one more factor 
being considered significant than does the eigenvalue rule (DeVillis, 1991: Hair, et al.. 
1995: Norusis. 1994).
The percentage o f variance criterion uses the cumulative percentages o f the variance 
extracted by successive factors as the criterion. Although no absolute threshold has been 
adopted, in the social sciences it is common to consider a solution that accounts for 60 
percent o f the total variance as a satisfactory factor extraction solution (Hair, et al., 1995).
Interpretation of the Factors
Once the initial factor analysis has been performed and the number o f factors has 
been extracted from the correlation matrix, the nature o f the latent variables (factors) 
underlying the set o f  variables in the matrix must be interpreted. It is often difficult to 
identify meaningful factors based upon the initial solution, since the variables and factors 
often do not appear correlated in any interpretable pattern (Norusis, 1994).
Factor Rotation
The rotation o f factors is an important tool in interpreting factors. Rotation attempts 
to transform a complicated initial matrix into a simpler one that is easier to interpret, thus
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reducing some o f  the ambiguities which accompany the initial analysis. With factor 
rotation, the reference axes o f the factors are turned about the origin until another position 
has been reached (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
In orthogonal rotation, the simplest type of rotation, the axes are kept perpendicular 
with respect to one another. The independence o f factors is preserved with orthogonal 
rotation; factors are uncorrelated. The true value o f a variable on any given factor is 
independent o f its true value on any other extracted factor (DeVillis, 1991). Varimax, the 
definitive orthogonal rotation method, approaches rotation by maximizing the sum of 
variances o f squared structure elements in the columns of the factor structure matrix. 
Before computing the variance o f the column squared structure elements, the squared 
elements in each row are divided by the sum of squares to normalize the variables. This 
makes the variables equally important in determining the rotated solution (Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 1994).
Alternatively, the factors can be rotated so that the axis for each successive factor 
is fitted optimally, without retaining the 90-degree angle between the reference axes. This 
type o f rotation, called oblique rotation, is more flexible than orthogonal rotation and more 
realistic because the important underlying factors are not assumed to be uncorrelated with 
each other. Instead of maintaining independence between the rotated factors, oblique 
rotation allows correlated factors (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al., 1995).
According to Norusis (1994), rotation does not affect a factor solution's goodness 
o f fit. The factor matrix changes, but the communalities and the percentage of total 
variance explained do not change. The percentage of variance accounted for by each of the
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factors does change, because rotation redistributes individual factors’ explained variance. 
Different rotation methods may identify somewhat different factors.
Hair, et al. (1995) suggested that the choice between an orthogonal or oblique 
rotation should be based on research needs. An orthogonal solution is best if  the researcher 
wants to reduce the number o f original variables, regardless o f the meaningfulness o f the 
resulting factors, or if  the researcher wants to reduce a large number o f variables into a 
smaller set o f uncorrelated variables for subsequent use in regression analysis or other 
prediction technique. An oblique rotation is most appropriate if  the goal is to obtain several 
theoretically meaningful factors.
Factor Loadings and the Factor Matrix
The final result o f  factor analysis is a rotated factor loading matrix with the 
identified factors as columns and the variables as rows. The factor loadings are the 
standardized regression coefficients in a multiple regression equation where the original 
variable is the dependent variable and the factors are independent variables. When the 
estimated factors are uncorrelated (orthogonal) with each other, the factor loadings are also 
the correlation between the original variables and the factors. Squared factor loadings 
indicate what percentage o f  the variance in an original variable is explained by a factor. 
The statistical significant o f factor loadings is determined by the desired significance level 
(a), power level, and sample size (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
Several guidelines have been developed to assist in the interpretation o f factor 
loadings. First, the larger the absolute size o f a factor loading, the more important the 
loading in interpreting the factor. A rule o f thumb is that factor loadings greater than +/-
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0.30 are minimally acceptable, loadings of +/- 0.40 are more important, and loading over 
+/- 0.50 have practical significance. Second, the statistical power concept can be employed 
to specify significant factor loadings for differing sample sizes. The larger the sample size, 
the smaller the loading to be considered significant. Finally, the number o f variables being 
analyzed and the number o f factors extracted both play a role in determining the acceptable 
level for a loading to be judged significant. The larger the number o f variables in the 
analysis, the smaller the loading to be considered significant. The larger the number o f 
factors, the larger the loading on later factors to be considered significant. Based on a .05 
significance level, a power level o f 80 percent, and standard errors assumed to be twice 
those o f conventional correlations, factor loadings above .45 are considered significant for 
a sample size o f 150 observations, while factor loadings above .40 are considered 
significant for a sample size o f 200 observations (Hair, et al., 1995).
After the factor loadings have been examined to determine the significant factor 
loadings for each variable, the researcher attempts to assign meaning to the pattern o f  factor 
loadings. According to Hair, et al. (1995. p. 366), factor loadings "are the key to 
understanding the nature o f a particular factor.” A factor may be defined by the variables 
that load most heavily on the factor. The content o f  the variables loading on a factor can 
help discern the nature o f the latent variable represented by each factor. For each extracted 
factor, a label is intuitively developed based on its appropriateness for representing the 
underlying dimensions o f the factor (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al., 1995).
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Item Analysis and Scale Reliability Assessment
The purpose of item analysis and reliability assessment is to "purify” the measure 
by discarding non-representative, poorly correlated items and, thus, reduce the number of 
items. The goal is to produce a tentative scale, ready for validation, consisting o f items 
which have a high correlation with the true score o f the latent variable (DeVillis, 1991; 
Spector. 1992). Although item analysis and reliability assessment are described separately, 
the two processes are performed together.
Item Analysis
Item analysis provides information on how well each individual item relates to the 
other items in a scale. The correlation between any two items equals the square o f the 
correlation between either item and the true score. The correlations among items provides 
information about relationships to true scores. The higher the correlations among items, 
the higher are the individual item reliabilities and the more reliable will be the scale. Item 
analysis seeks to find a set o f scale items that are highly intercorrelated (DeVillis. 1991).
The item analysis process involves examination o f the communality and the rotated 
factor matrix. The factor analysis solution is the starting point for item (variable) analysis. 
Communalities, which are provided for each item, should be evaluated to determine 
whether they meet acceptable levels. Communalties can range from 0 to 1. A communality 
o f 0 indicates that the common factors explain none o f the variable's variance, while a 1 
indicates that all the variance is explained by the common factors. For any scale items with 
communalities less than 0.50, the common factors do not account for at least one-half of
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the items' variance, and the item should be considered for deletion if the item is only of 
minor theoretical importance (Hair, et al., 1995; Norusis, 1994).
The rotated factor matrix also provides useful information for item analysis. Any 
items which do not load on any factor should be evaluated for possible deletion. Items o f 
minor importance may be eliminated, and the factor model respecified by deriving a new 
factor solution with non-loading items eliminated. Items with significant loadings on more 
than one factor should also be examined and considered for deletion. Ideally, each item 
should associate with only one factor (Hair, et al.. 1995).
Reliability Assessment
According to Schriesheim. et al. (1993. p. 393), "The reliability o f a scale is a 
situational indicator o f the effectiveness o f the instrument and it must be demonstrated a 
posteriori for every sample to which it is administered.” Reliability is a variance ratio equal 
to the true score variance divided by the total variance o f the scores. As discussed 
previously, classical test theory states that an observed scale score is composed o f two 
components, the true score and an error score, with measurement error uncorrelated with 
the true contribution to the score. Since the true score and error score cannot be observed 
directly, it is impossible to now the exact value o f a scale’s reliability. Researchers use 
reliability coefficients which represent approximations o f true scale reliability (Miller.
1995).
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, the most commonly used reliability coefficient, 
assesses the internal consistency o f a scale. Churchill (1979) asserted that coefficient alpha 
should be the first measure calculated to assess the quality o f a scale. Coefficient alpha is
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the proportion o f a scale’s total variance attributable to the true score o f  the latent variable 
underlying the scale items. The square root o f  coefficient alpha is the estimated correlation 
o f the test with errorless true scores. Coefficient alpha is computed by the formula:
a =
V  “ .
1- â}  )
(4.4)
k  -  1
where k is the number o f items in the scale (Crocker and Algina. 1986; Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 1994).
The value o f coefficient alpha, which can be used for any scale on which scores are 
produced by summing the scores o f two or more items, is a direct function of both the 
number o f items and the magnitude o f their intercorrelation. The coefficient alpha can be 
raised by increasing the number o f items in the scale. Coefficient alpha can range between 
0 - 1, with values above .70 generally considered good. In exploratory scale development. 
.60 is acceptable (DeVillis, 1991; Hair, et al.. 1995; Spector, 1992).
Miller (1995) noted that a computed coefficient alpha only equals the scale 
reliability under the assumption that all pairs o f  items are tau-equivalent (see previously 
described theoretical measurement models section). This assumption states that all items 
have equal loadings on a single common factor with their unique variances composed 
entirely o f  error. When the tau-equivalence assumption is violated, alpha tends to 
underestimate test reliability. Miller (1995) concluded that alpha is a lower-bound 
approximation to test reliability for scales designed to measure a single trait dimension. 
However, alpha has little value as an index o f scale dimensionality, and can badly 
underestimate reliability if  the scale is not unidimensional.
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Reliability assessment also involves examining information about the relationship 
between the individual items and the composite scale. Two reliability assessment outputs 
are useful for examining this relationship: item-total correlation, and alpha-if-item-deleted.
Since the goal o f  scale development is a set o f highly inter-correlated items, each 
item should correlate substantially with the set o f remaining scale items. This property for 
each item is evaluated by examining its item-total scale correlation. The corrected item- 
total scale correlation, which is the Pearson correlation coefficient between the score on the 
individual item and the sum of the scores on the remaining items, correlates the item with 
all the scale items, excluding itself. An item with a high corrected item-total scale 
correlation is more desirable than an item with a low value (DeVillis, 1991, Norusis. 1994).
It is useful to know how each item in a scale affects the internal consistency of the 
scale. The '‘alpha if item deleted” indicates the effect that deleting an item will have on the 
scale's coefficient alpha. If deletion of an item will significantly raise the value o f the 
coefficient alpha, then that item should be considered for deletion if the item is not 
theoretically important (DeVillis. 1991; Norusis. 1994).
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis, a special case of structural equation modeling, is used 
to confirm hypothesized factor structures and validate the dimensional structure o f the scale 
measure. A factor structure is explicitly hypothesized and tested for its fit with the 
observed covariance structure o f the measured variables (Floyd and Widaman, 1995). 
Confirmatory factor analysis can also be used to revise and refine scales and their structure.
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The Structural Equation Modeling Concent
Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a comprehensive, multivariate statistical 
technique for testing hypotheses about relationships among observed and latent variables. 
A key characteristic of SEM is its ability to represent unobserved, latent variables in these 
relationships. SEM combines aspects o f multiple regression for examining linear 
dependence relationships and factor analysis for representing latent variables with multiple 
observed variables. SEM allows multiple latent constructs indicated by observable 
explanatory (or exogenous) variables, recursive and non-recursive relationships between 
constructs, and multiple latent constructs indicated by observable responses (or 
endogenous) variables. SEM represents an efficient technique for estimating a series of 
separate, interdependent multiple regression equations simultaneously, while accounting 
for measurement error in the estimation process (Hair, et al.. 1995; Hoyle. 1995; Joreskog 
and Sorbom, 1996a).
A structural equation model consists o f two basic components (submodels), the 
measurement model and the structural model. The measurement model, which specifies 
the rules of correspondence between observed and latent variables, allows the use o f several 
observed variables (indicators) for a single independent or dependent variable. The 
measurement model specifies the indicators for each construct and describes the 
measurement properties (reliabilities and validities) of each observed variable for 
estimating the causal relationships (Hair, et al., 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a). For 
example, in scale development, the measurement model assesses the contribution o f each 
scale item and can incorporate the scale's reliability into the estimation o f the relationships
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between dependent and independent variables. Although similar to factor analysis, the 
measurement model differs from factor analysis in the degree o f research control. In the 
measurement model, the researcher specifies which variables are indicators o f  each 
construct, with variables having no loadings on any construct other than the specified 
construct (Hair, et al., 1995).
The structural, or path model, is useful in representing interrelationships o f 
variables between dependence relationships. The structural model specifies causal 
relationships among the latent variables, describes the causal effects, and assigns the 
explained and unexplained variances. Theory is used to determine which independent 
variables should predict each dependent variable (Hair, et al., 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom, 
1996a).
SEM requires a theory-based approach, since the models must be almost completely 
specified by the researcher. "Each component o f the structural and measurement models 
must be explicitly defined. Moreover, any model modifications must be made through 
specific actions by the researcher’' (Hair, et al., 1995; p. 625). For this reason, confirmatory 
modeling, where the researcher specifies a single model and structural equation modeling 
is used to assess its significance, is the most direct application o f structural equation 
modeling. Confirmatory factor analysis is especially helpful in the validation o f scales 
developed to measure specific latent constructs (Hair, et al., 1995).
Confirmatory factor analysis through structural equation modeling is accomplished 
through a series o f steps, described by Hair, et al. (1995). First, a theoretically based model 
is developed. Next, a set of structural and measurement equations is specified. Third, the
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input matrix type is chosen. The model is then estimated, and finally, the results are 
evaluated for goodness-of-fit. Potential problems in estimation are introduced when the 
observed variables are not multivariate normal. This can occur when the observed 
variables are continuous but nonnormal, dichotomous, or ordered categories. These 
problems can be accounted for by changing the correlation coefficients and adjusting the 
estimation procedure (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; West, Finch and Curran, 1995).
Developing the Structural Equation Model
The structural equation model, based on causal relationships between variables, is 
developed from a path diagram which portrays the relationships between the variables. The 
objective is to model the relationships between variables, both latent (also called 
constructs) and observed, with the smallest number of theoretically justifiable paths or 
correlations among variables. All variables are placed in one o f two classes: exogenous 
or endogenous. Exogenous variables, also called source or independent variables, are not 
caused or predicted by any other variables in the model. Endogenous variables are 
predicted by one or more other variables. Endogenous variables can predict other 
endogenous variables, but an exogenous construct can only be causally related to 
endogenous variables (Hair, et al.. 1995). A theoretical structural equations model path 
diagram is shown in Figure 4.2.
Once all the causal relationships have been developed in the path diagram, an 
estimation model is specified in formal terms through a series o f equations that define the 
measurement model by specifying which observed variables measure which latent 
variables, the structural equations linking the latent variables, and a set o f  matrices showing
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any hypothesized correlations among latent or observed variables. In developing the 
structural equations, each endogenous variable is the dependent variable in a separate 
equation (Hair, et al., 1995).
Using LISREL notation, a multi-factor, congeneric confirmatory measurement 
model can be taken directly from Joreskog and Sorbom (1996a) as
x = + 6 (4.5)
where x is a vector o f q observed variables. £ is a vector o f n underlying factors such that 
n<cj. A x is a q x  n matrix o f coefficients relating to the regression o f the observed variables 
x on the underlying factors £, and 6 is a vector of q variables that represent random 
measurement error and measure specificity. It is assumed that E(£) = 0 and E(8) = 0. and 
5 is uncorrelated with £. The variance-covariance matrix for x. defined as Z . is
£  = A<I>A' + 0  (4.6)
if O = E(££') is taken as a correlation matrix and 0  = E(55') is diagonal. If (q-n)2< q+n, 
this relationship can be tested statistically.
A confirmatory structural model which specifies the causal relations o f the latent 
constructs to one another is given by Joreskog and Sorbom (1996a) as:
q = Bti + TE, + C (4.7)
where q is a vector o f m endogenous constructs, E, is a vector o f n exogenous constructs,
B is an m x m matrix o f coefficients representing the effects o f the endogenous constructs
on one another, T is an m x n matrix o f  coefficients representing the effects o f the 
exogenous constructs on the endogenous constructs, and C is a vector o f m residuals (errors
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in equations and random disturbance terms (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). When B = 0, 
the endogenous constructs are specified as uncorrelated and equation (4.7) reduces to
The distinction between endogenous and exogenous constructs was not relevant in 
the confirmatory measurement model, where all observed variables were denoted as x. In 
the specification o f structural models, observed variables of exogenous constructs are 
denoted as x, while observed measures o f endogenous constructs are denoted as y. In 
modeling a confirmatory structural equation model, the latent variables from the 
measurement model become endogenous constructs, and the observed variables which were 
denoted as x in the measurement model are denoted as y, and are described by a separate 
measurement submodel, given as
where y is a vector of p  observed variables, q is a vector o f m  latent dependent 
(endogenous) variables, Av is a p  x m matrix o f coefficients o f the regression of y on q , and 
e is a vector o fp  measurement errors in y.
In confirmatory structural equation modeling, the structural submodel (4.8) and the 
measurement submodel for y given in (4.9) are estimated simultaneously by combining 
equations (4.8) and (4.9) to give
q = T$ + C (4.8)
y = A,, q + e (4.9)
y =  Av(r$ + C) + e (4.10)
with covariance matrix
£  = AV(T® n  + 'P)AV' + 0 C (4.11)
where Y is the residual covariance matrix (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a).
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Input Matrix Type
Unlike other multivariate techniques, structural equation modeling only uses the 
variance/covariance matrix or correlation matrix as the input data. Hair, et al. (1995; p. 
636) note that the correlation matrix in SEM is “'simply a standardized variance/covariance 
matrix in which the scale of measurement o f  each variable is removed by dividing the 
variances or covariances by the product o f  the standard deviations.” The correlation matrix 
is the preferred input data matrix in confirmatory factor analysis because the objective is 
exploration o f the pattern of interrelationships between variables (Hair, et al., 1995). When 
the observed variables to be analyzed by structural equation modeling are ordinal, without 
an origin or unit o f measurement, correlation matrices are also the only meaningful moment 
matrices (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996b).
As was the case in exploratory factor analysis, the Pearson product-moment 
correlation is the most widely used means o f computing the correlation matrix between the 
observed variables for structural equation modeling. However, the assumption o f metric 
variables underlying the product-moment correlation makes it inappropriate for structural 
equation modeling o f ordinal or censored observed variables. Bentler and Chou (1987) 
suggested that methods which require continuous observed variables can be used when the 
variables have four or more categories, but with three or fewer categories, alternative 
procedures should be used. Failure to use the right type o f correlations can lead to 
considerable bias in estimated structural equation parameters. The polychoric correlation 
is appropriate for use if the observed variables are ordinal with three or more categories 
(Hair, et al.. 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996b).
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The polychoric correlation is not a direct correlation between two sets o f ordinal 
variable scores, but is an estimate o f the correlation in the latent bivariate normal 
distribution representing the two ordinal variables. For each ordinal variable x . it is 
assumed that there is a latent continuous variable £ that is normally distributed with a mean 
o f zero and unit variance. A Monte Carlo study o f six correlation measures for ordinal 
variables reported by Joreskog and Sorbom (1996b) concluded that: (1) all correlations are 
biased downwards, but the bias for the polychoric correlation is small and negligible for 
moderate sample sizes; (2) the polychoric correlation is generally the best estimator; (3) the 
polychoric correlation is almost always the best correlation in the sense o f being closest to 
the true population correlation (p): and (4) only the polychoric correlation appears to be a 
consistent estimator o f p.
Model Estimation
Once the structural equation model has been specified and the input data correlation 
matrix selected, the specified model is estimated. Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Hair, 
et al. (1995) recommend a two-stage process o f structural equation modeling. The 
confirmatory measurement model developed through the exploratory factor analysis is 
estimated, respecified if necessary, and then fixed in the second stage when the respecified 
confirmatory measurement and the confirmatory structural models are simultaneously 
estimated.
The most widely used program for estimation o f structural equations is LISREL 
(Linear Structural RELations) by SSI Scientific Software International. LISREL can 
perform any o f seven different methods of estimation: instrumental variables (IV), two-
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stage least squares (TSLS), unweighted least squares (ULS), generalized least squares 
(GLS), Maximum likelihood (ML), generally weighted least squares (WLS), and diagonally 
weighted least squares (DWLS) (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a). For this research, the 
generalized least squares (GLS) estimation was selected and will be described.
Generalized least squares (GLS) is a full-information, iterative procedure which 
minimizes the fit function:
F=Vi*tr\QL- S ‘X):] (4.12)
where /r[(I -  S ' [£ )2] represents the sum of squares of the residuals weighted by the inverse 
o f the sample covariance matrix. The covariance matrix S is computed from the correlation 
matrix R using the formula
S=DRD, where D = (d iagS)''2 (4.13)
is a diagonal matrix o f standard deviations. The GLS fit function is equivalent to 
minimizing the sum o f squares o f the residuals weighted by the inverse of the sample 
covariance matrix. For theory testing and development, full-information methods, such as 
GLS. have several relative strengths. First, they provide parameter estimates that best 
explain the observed covariances in the data matrix. They also provide the most efficient 
parameter estimates and an overall test o f model fit (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).
In order to begin estimation, the GLS estimation method requires approximations 
to the parameters. These parameter starting values are computed in LISREL by Two Stage 
Least Squares (TSLS). The GLS estimator is consistently efficient and has large-sample 
standard errors under normal theory. GLS may be used to compute parameter estimates 
even if the distribution o f the observed variables deviates from normality. The computed
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standard errors and chi-square goodness o f fit measures may also be used, if  interpreted 
cautiously (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1989; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a).
One commonly encountered problem in estimation is rejection o f the input matrix 
because the matrix is not positive definite. Two reasons have been offered for this 
occurrence. First, there may be linear dependencies among the observed variables. Second, 
the input matrix may not be a covariance matrix o f real numbers, which will cause the 
matrix to have one or more negative eigenvalues. This can occur if the polychoric or 
tetrachoric correlations are used, rather than raw scores, in computing the covariance 
matrix. Negative eigenvalues can also occur when pairwise-deletion o f  missing values is 
used to generate a covariance matrix (Bentler and Chou, 1987; Chou and Bentler. 1995). 
To provide for situations in which the input matrix is not quite positive-definite, LISREL 
includes a provision for “ridge” estimation. In “ridge” estimation, a constant times the 
diagonal o f the input matrix is added to the input matrix. The constant is normally 
determined by the program, but may be specified by the researcher (Joreskog and Sorbom, 
1996).
Model Evaluation
The first step in evaluating a confirmatory structural equation model is an 
examination of the respecified measurement model and the structural model components. 
Evaluation begins by examining the models for offending estimates and correcting them. 
The most common types o f offending estimates are negative or nonsignificant error 
variances for any variable, standardized coefficients exceeding 1.0, or very large standard 
errors for any estimated coefficient. Evaluation also includes examining the significance
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o f estimated coefficients, based upon reported t values for each coefficient. In addition, the 
standardized solution, where the estimated coefficients all have equal variances and a 
maximum value o f 1 and closely approximate effect sizes shown by beta weights in 
regression, should be examined. The measurement model should also be examined to 
assess the magnitude and significance o f estimated loadings for the observed variables. 
The reliability for each latent variable can be assessed using Cronbaclvs alpha, composite 
reliability, and variance extracted for each latent variable.
Once any offending estimates have been corrected, the next step is to evaluate the 
m odel's goodness-of-fit. When the model estimation procedure has converged to a 
solution, a single number, the value o f the fitting function, is produced that summarizes 
the degree of correspondence between the observed covariance matrix and the covariance 
matrix implied by the model. Different tests and measures are available to evaluate the 
overall model fit. the measurement model fit. and the structural model fit. The different fit 
measures vary in effectiveness as model estimation method, model complexity, and sample 
size vary (Hair, et al., 1995; Hoyle, 1995).
Goodness-of-fit measures for assessing the overall model fit include absolute fit 
measures, incremental fit measures, and parsimonious fit measures. Absolute fit measures 
assess the overall fit o f the full model, including both the structural and measurement 
models collectively. The Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square, the Goodness-of-Fit Index, 
and the Root Mean Square Error o f Approximation (RMSEA) are commonly reported 
overall fit measures. The Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square is the only statistically based 
measure o f the goodness-of-fit available in structural equation modeling. A large value
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relative to the degrees o f freedom signifies considerable difference between the observed 
and estimated matrices (Hair, et al., 1995). The Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) is a non- 
statistical measure ranging from 0 to 1, with 0 representing a poor fit and 1 representing a 
perfect fit. The GFI compares the squared residuals from prediction with the actual data, 
but is not adjusted for degrees o f freedom.
The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is a measure which 
attempts to correct for the Chi-square statistic’s tendency to reject models with a large 
sample. The RMSEA represents the model’s expected goodness-of-fit if  the model were 
estimated from the population, not just the sample. Values in the .05 to .08 range are 
considered ideal, with a maximum acceptable value o f 0.10 (Hair, et al.. 1995).
Incremental goodness-of-fit measures assess the estimated structural equation model 
compared to a null model. The Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), an extension of 
the GFI adjusted for the degrees o f freedom, the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI). the 
Normed Fit Index (NFI). the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). and Incremental Fit Index (IFI). 
all with a recommended level o f .90, are five popular incremental fit measures (Hair, et al.. 
1995).
Parsimonious fit measures assess the parsimony o f  the estimated model by 
evaluating the model fit versus the number o f estimated coefficients or degrees o f freedom 
needed to achieve that level o f fit. An appropriate measures o f parsimonious fit is the 
normed Chi-square (AVdf). Normed Chi-square values in the 1.0 - 2.0 range are 
recommended. Values below 1.0 are typical of overfitted models, while values above the
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upper threshold are not truly representative o f the observed data and need improvement 
(Hair, et al., 1995).
Hu and Bentler (1995) noted three major problems with using Chi-square values 
and fit indices for evaluating goodness-of-fit: small sample bias, estimation effects, and 
effects o f violations o f  normality and independence. Chi-square tests may not perform 
adequately at all sample sizes. For example, the Normed Fit Index (NFI) tends to be far 
less than 1.0 when sample size is small. Different estimation methods yield chi-square 
statistics that perform better or worse at various sample sizes. All goodness-of-fit indices 
based on Chi-squares, used to evaluate results for non-normal variables estimated through 
GLS should be interpreted with caution, since these test statistics may not have the chi- 
square distribution if the multivariate normal distribution assumption is false. Results 
depend on the model and the degree o f nonnormality (Chou and Bentler. 1995: Joreskog 
and Sorbom, 1996a). In general, chi-squares are inflated, resulting in the rejection o f true 
models (West, Finch and Curran, 1995). For example, the NFI based on GLS estimation 
tends to over-reject models even at moderate sample sizes. The NonNormed Fit Index 
(NNFI) based on GLS rejected models too frequently at sample sizes o f 500 or less. The 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) and the Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI) both 
performed well under GLS estimation, at all sample sizes, when variables are distributed 
independent o f each other, regardless o f the form o f the distribution o f the observed 
variables (Hu and Bentler, 1995).
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Validity Assessment
Validity refers to the scientific utility of a measuring instrument, i.e., how well it 
measures what it purports to measure (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Reliability o f a 
scale, described previously, is a necessary pre-condition for validity. Validity assessment, 
as described by DeVillis (1991), Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), and Schriesheim, et al. 
(1993). involves examining three types o f  validity: content validity, predictive (criterion) 
validity, and construct validity. Validation o f a scale always requires empirical 
investigations, with the nature o f the scale and form o f validity dictating the needed 
empirical evidence.
Content validity is concerned with item sampling adequacy, the extent to which the 
set o f items reflects the content domain. The establishment o f  content validity can be 
viewed as a minimum initial requirement for all new or previously unexamined measures. 
There are two major standards for ensuring content validity: a representative collection o f 
items and sensible methods o f  scale construction. Theoretically, when a scale's items are 
a randomly chosen subset o f  the universe of feasible items, a scale has content validity. 
Content validity is also inferred from the manner in which a scale is constructed, and is 
ensured by a well-formulated scale construction procedure. Most content validity problems 
appear to derive from shortcomings in the scale construction or refinement process when 
scales are developed without adherence to the steps outlined above (DeVillis, 1991; 
Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994; Schriesheim, 1993).
Predictive (criterion) validity evaluates the functional relations between the measure 
and criterion variables, and concerns using the scale to estimate some criterion behavior
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that is external to the scale itself. According to DeVillis (1991. pg. 45), "the most 
important aspect o f criterion-related validity is not the time relationship between the 
measure in question and the criterion whose value one is attempting to infer but, rather, the 
strength of the empirical relationship between the two events.” The correlation coefficient 
has been the traditional index o f predictive validity. Once the criterion variable is obtained, 
the validity o f prediction primarily consists of correlating scores on the predictor with the 
criterion values. The size o f  the correlation, commonly called the "validity coefficient” 
directly indicates the predictive validity o f the scale. If the correlation is high, no other 
standards are necessary (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).
Construct validity is concerned with the relationship o f a scale score to other 
variables, and refers to the extent to which the measure behaves the way it should 
(correlation) with regard to established measures o f other constructs (DeVillis. 1991; 
Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Some researchers have argued there is only one type of 
validity, construct validity, and that both content and predictive validity are subsumed 
within construct validity. Satisfactory demonstration o f both content validity and criterion- 
related validity are necessary forjudging a measure as having reasonable construct validity 
(Schriesheim, et al.. 1993). The most prevalent point o f view, as described by Nunnally 
and Bernstein (1994) is that there are three major aspects o f construct validation: (1) 
specifying the domain o f observables related to the construct; (2) using empirical research 
and statistical analysis to determine the extent to which the observables tend to measure the 
same, several different, or many different things; and (3) determining the extent to which 
the supposed measure o f the construct is consistent with "best guesses” about the construct.
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This consists o f determining whether a scale measure o f a construct correlates in expected 
ways with measures o f other constructs - how well the measure fits into a network of 
expected relationships, the "nomological network” (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994).
Although construct validity usually stresses correlations among various measures, 
but there is no simple correlation strength cutoff to demonstrate construct validity. Two 
measures may share more than construct similarity. For example, some o f the covariation 
between two constructs may be due to measurement similarity, rather than construct 
similarity. To conclude construct validity, the magnitude of correlations between the 
constructs should, at a minimum, demonstrate covariance above and beyond that 
attributable to shared method variance. Unfortunately, such a differentiation o f covariance 
is not possible by simply examining a single correlation between two constructs (DeVillis. 
1991).
Anderson and Gerbing (1988) contend that the comprehensive two-stage modeling 
and estimation approach, discussed previously, enables a comprehensive, confirmatory 
assessment o f construct validity. They assert that the measurement model provides a 
confirmatory assessment of convergent and discriminant validity. The test o f the structural 
model, given acceptable convergent and discriminant validity, constitutes a confirmatory 
assessment o f nomological validity (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).
ICnown-groups validation, another construct validity procedure, involves 
demonstrating that the scale can differentiate members o f one group from members of 
another group, based on their scale scores. The purpose may be either theory related or 
purely predictive (DeVillis, 1991; Spector, 1992). Known-groups validation is closely
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related to the concept o f measure invariance between groups, which concerns the degree 
to which a measure retains its meaning across groups. Measurement invariance can be 
viewed as a continuum ranging from equivalence o f the measurement model form and all 
parameters to nonequivalence o f form. To justify meaningful between-group comparisons 
o f the means o f latent variables specified in the measurement model, between-group 
invariance must be demonstrated in the number o f factors, the pattern o f factor loadings, 
and the magnitude o f at least one factor loading per latent variable, and preferably all factor 
loadings. If these conditions are met, then between-group comparisons can be undertaken, 
using f-tests or Analysis o f Variance (ANOVA) (Hoyle and Smith, 1994).
Regulatory Climate Scale Estimation Results
This section describes the actual procedures used to develop and validate an 
aquaculture regulatory climate summated scale. The scale development and validation 
process closely followed the six-step scale development procedure outlined previously. 
Initial Item Pool
The initial item pool consisted o f 18 dichotomous choice items reflecting the 
existence and stringency o f state regulatory conditions attenuating each o f the four property 
rights dimensions. For example, ownership rights can be affected by possession permit 
requirements and definitions specifying legal status as wildlife, private property, and/or 
livestock. Transferability can be represented by regulations affecting transportation and 
marketing, such as marketing restrictions, marketing paper trails, and transportation health 
certifications.
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These 18 items were obtained from a 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program 
Survey and a follow-up 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. Forty-five states and Guam 
participated in the surveys and provided answers for five categories o f  finfish. including 
ornamentals, baitfish, commercial foodflsh, freshwater gamefish and marine gametish, 
resulting in 230 observations. Table 4.1 describes the 18 items which constituted the initial 
item pool, including the designated variable names, the source o f  each item, and the 
property rights condition hypothesized as attenuated by each item.
Items were coded as three-category ordinal variables: No = 0, Uncertain = 1. and 
Yes = 2. Items were scaled in the same direction, requiring that some items be reverse- 
coded so that the "2" coded value represented the high stringency condition. Table 4.1 
indicates which items were reverse-coded.
Four items (GLTR, SLTR, BMP, and ENVL) were deleted from the initial item 
pool based on various criteria, including judgement o f the theoretical adequacy ofthe items, 
large percentage of missing values, and lack o f variance. The remaining fourteen items 
were included in an initial exploratory factor analysis.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
The fourteen remaining items were subjected to a principal components factor 
analysis with Varimax orthogonal rotation. Five factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 were 
extracted. Examination o f the factor loadings indicated that ten items had significant 
loadings on only one factor, while four items loaded on multiple factors. Three ot the four 
multiple loading items represented the only items for which data were not directly reported
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G en L ic e n se G L Q 5 a , 95 S p ec ifica tio n General license required for fish farms
G en L icT r G L T R * Q 5 b , 95 T ransferability Required general license is transferable
PrivProperty C P P R * Q 8 . 9 5 O w nersh ip Fish in aquaculture facility are considered  
private property
S p L ice n se SL Q 9 , 9 5 S p ec ifica tio n Special state license/perm it required to 
possess, culture fish
Sp L icT rans SL T R * Q IO , 9 5 T ransferability Special license is transferable
E scape ESC Q 1 1. 95 S p ec ifica tio n Facility design required to prevent fish 
escapement
T heft TH 0 1 2 .  9 5 E nforcem ent Unauthorized rem oval or destruction o ff ish  
from facility is considered theft vs. poaching
Report REP Q 1 3 , 95 S p ec ifica tio n Slate requires a written fish inventory or 
production report
PaperTrail M P T Q 1 4 , 95 S p ec ifica tio n Marketing paper trail required to sell farm- 
raised fish
B m gm tP r B M P Q 1 6 , 95 S p ec ifica tio n State has developed aquaculture Best 
Management Practices
E nvirL iab E N V L Q 1 8 , 95 S p ec ifica tio n State mandates environm ental liability 
requirements for aquaculture operations
D isP erm it DP Q 2 0 , 95 S p ec ifica tio n State issues permits for aquaculture effluent 
discharges
ProSL ist PSL Q 3 , 98 O w nersh ip State has a list o f f ish  species that are 
prohibited from entering state w aters
M ktR estrict M R Q 4 , 98 T ransferability State limits or restricts sale or marketing o f  
farm-raised fish
E x em p t W L aw E X R * Q 5 , 98 O w nersh ip Fish in aquaculture facility are exem pt from 
state w ildlife laws
L iv esto ck LSR * Q 6 , 98 O w nersh ip Fish in aquaculture facility are legally  
considered livestock
H ealthC ertE H C E Q 7 , 98 T ransferability Health certification required for farm-raised 
fish entering state
H ealthC ertW new Q 8 , 98 T ransferability Health certification required for fish shipped 
w ithin the state
a Source shown is Question number. Surv ey year 
* Variable was reverse-coded
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for the five fish categories; the data for the five categories were extrapolated. These three 
items (DP, GL, and PSL) were subsequently dropped because of concerns over possible 
violations o f the independence o f observations assumptions o f  factor analysis.
The remaining 11 items were factor analyzed with the SPSS statistical analysis 
computer program, using principal components factor analysis with orthogonal rotation. 
The output from this exploratory factor analysis is shown in Appendix C. The Kaiser- 
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy value (.654) and the Bartlett's test of 
sphericity Chi-square value o f 421.701 demonstrated that there were enough correlations 
to justify the use o f factor analysis. Communalities (Table C.2) for all items, except 
Livestock (.489), were above the 0.5 desired level. The Livestock item was retained 
because of theoretical importance. Four factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 were extracted. 
These four factors explained 64.6 percent o f the total variance (Table C.4), which is above 
the 60 percent threshold for a satisfactory factor extraction solution. Examination o f the 
final rotated factor matrix, shown in Table C.6. indicated that ten variables had significant 
factor loadings on only one factor. Only one variable (Report) loaded significantly on 
multiple factors. The variable was retained because o f theoretical importance. The pattern 
o f item loadings also allowed clear interpretation o f the four extracted factors. The first 
factor, which accounted for 26.6 percent o f the total variance, represented the 
Transferability property right condition. Factors two, three, and four represented 
Specification, Ownership, and Enforcement, respectively. The results suggest that the 11 
items constitute an overall scale with four distinct subscales representing the four property 
rights conditions.
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Because the observations for this research were gathered for five categories o f  fish 
for each state, the observations can be viewed as five repeated measures for each state. 
Therefore, it was deemed necessary to test the independence o f observations assumption 
underlying factor analysis (Black, 1998). Two procedures were used. First, observations 
were averaged across fish categories for each o f the 11 variables, giving an average variable 
value for all categories for each state. Each total variable thus became the average extent 
o f regulation in the state for that variable. In essence, the data were aggregated by state 
before factor analysis. A factor analysis was performed using the variable averages. 
Second, observations were sorted by fish category, a separate correlation matrix was 
developed for each fish category, and factor analysis was performed for each fish category. 
No valid results were obtained for fish category five (marine gamefish) because the 
correlation matrix was not positive-definite, due to a large number o f missing observations.
The significant factor loadings from both independence test procedures and the 
exploratory factor analysis (considered a disaggregate analysis) described above were 
displayed together in a single factor matrix, shown in Table 4.2. This allowed for a visual 
comparison of the pattern o f significant factor loadings, by variable, for the disaggregate 
exploratory factor analysis, the analysis o f the variable averages, and the analysis for the 
five fish categories. While some differences in factor loading patterns are expected, a close 
similarity in factor loadings can serve as confirmation o f the validity o f the independence 
assumption for the data set (Black, 1998).
The patterns o f factor loading for the disaggregate and averaged variable were 
almost identical. Since aggregating before factor analysis gives the same structure as the
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Table 4.2 Factor Loading Matrix for Tests of Independence Assumption









PrivProperty 2 2 D, A, 1 ,3 ,4
Escape D, A, 2, 3, 4 I 1
ExemptWLaw D, A, 2 ,3 ,4 1,2
HealthCertE D. A. 1,2, 3 .4
HealthCertW D. A. 1, 3 .4 J 2
Livestock D, A, 1,2, 3, 4
PaperTrail D, A. 1,2. 3 .4
MktRestrict D. A. 1 ,2 .4 D, A, 2, 3 4
Report D, A. 3 D, A. 1 ,2 ,4 A, 4
SpLicense D. A. 1.2. 3 .4
Theft D. A. 1.2. 3, 4
D = Disaggregate exploratory factor analysis 
A = A verage variables across fish categories for each state
1 = Ornamental fish category
2 = Baitfish fish category
3 =  Commercial t'oodfish fish category
4 = Freshwater gamefish fish category
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disaggregate analysis, the similarity in factor loadings serves as a first-level confirmation 
o f the independence assumption. The pattern o f factor loadings for the analyses by fish 
category were also very similar, which serves as further confirmation of the independence 
assumption.
Reliability assessment was performed on the 11-item factor correlation matrix and 
the four individual factor subscales. The results are shown in Appendix D. The corrected 
item-total correlations, shown in Table D .l, were reasonable for all items except 
PrivProperty and Livestock, the two items which constitute the Enforcement factor. Both 
items showed weak, negative correlations with the other nine scale items.
Cronbach’s alpha, also known as the reliability coefficient, is the major criterion in 
reliability analysis for assessing the internal consistency of a scale. The alpha coefficient 
is a direct function o f both the number o f items and magnitude o f their intercorrelation. 
Alpha for the 11-item scale, shown in Table D.2 was .673. w'hich is above the minimum 
.60 threshold for exploratory scale development. The alpha coefficients for the 
transferability, specification, ownership, and enforcement subscales are .638. .686. .552. 
and .382, respectively. These reliability coefficients suggest that the enforcement subscale 
has weak internal consistency. Despite the questionable results for the Enforcement factor 
with its two items, the factor and items were retained for further analysis because o f 
theoretical importance, since the factor analysis was viewed as strictly exploratory. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Confirmatory factor analysis through structural equation modeling requires the 
specification of two models, the measurement model and the structural model. The
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measurement model specifies the indicators for each construct and describes the 
measurement properties (reliabilities and validities) o f  each observed variable for 
estimating the causal relationships. The structural model specifies causal relationships 
among the latent variables, describes the causal effects and assigns the explained and 
unexplained variances (Hair, et al., 1995; Joreskog and Sorbom, 1996a).
The confirmatory factor analysis was performed through the recommended two- 
stage process o f structural equation modeling (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Hair, et al.. 
1995). The measurement model developed through the exploratory factor analysis was 
estimated, respecified and then fixed in the second stage when the respecified measurement 
model and structural model were estimated simultaneously.
Measurement Model Estimation
The 11 -indicator, four-latent variable congeneric measurement model developed 
through exploratory factor analysis was estimated with generalized least squares (GLS), an 
iterative procedure which minimizes the sum of squares o f the residuals weighted by the 
inverse o f the sample covariance matrix. The input data were the correlation matrix 
between the observed variables. However, since the observed variables were ordinal, the 
Pearson product-moment correlation was inappropriate for confirmatory analysis. A matrix 
of polychoric correlations was computed through the PRELIS 2 computer program. 
PRELIS 2 is a program for multivariate data screening and data summarization which 
serves as a preprocessor for the LISREL structural equations modeling program. The 
polychoric correlation matrix was used as the input data matrix for the confirmatory factor 
analysis.
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Evaluation o f  the estimated measurement model confirmed the results o f the 
exploratory factor analysis. The enforcement latent construct and its two indicator items 
did not correlate adequately with the other three latent variables, and the coefficients for 
the two indicator variables (PrivProperty and Theft) had opposite signs. The enforcement 
latent variable and the two indicator variables were dropped from the measurement model. 
A modified measurement model was specified, consisting o f  three latent variables 
representing transferability, specification, and ownership. Each latent variable was defined 
by three observed variables.
The nine-indicator, modified measurement model was re-estimated using a new 
polychoric correlation matrix and GLS estimation. Results are shown in Appendix E. The 
polychoric correlation coefficient was not positive definite, so the ridge option in LISREL 
was invoked, with a ridge coefficient o f 1.00 (Table E .l). All estimated regression 
coefficients are significant and o f expected signs. There were no offending estimates: all 
error variances are positive and significant, and no standardized coefficients exceed 1.0.
Goodness-of-fit measures were examined to assess the overall measurement model 
fit. These include absolute fit measures, incremental fit measures, and parsimonious fit 
measures. The goodness-of-fit statistics are shown in Table E.4. Absolute fit measures 
assess the overall fit o f the full model, including both the structural and measurement 
models collectively. The Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square (41.69) was higher than 
desired, but chi-square values for non-normal variables estimated through GLS should be 
interpreted with caution (Joreskog and Sorbom. 1996a). The Root Mean Square Error o f  
Approximation (0.084) was slightly higher than the ideal .05 to .08 range, but was below
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the maximum acceptable value o f 0.10. The Goodness-of-Fit Index (.96) was close to the 
1.0 value which represents a perfect fit.
Incremental goodness-of-fit measures assess the estimated structural equation model 
compared to a null model. The Non-Normed Fit Index (0.73) was lower than the 
recommended 0.90 level. The Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (.92) was above the 
recommended acceptance level o f greater than 0.90. The Comparative Fit Index (0.82) and 
Incremental Fit Index (0.84) values did not reach the desired 0.90 level, but the fits are 
reasonable.
Parsimonious fit measures assess the parsimony o f the estimated model by 
evaluating the model fit versus the number of estimated coefficients or degrees o f freedom 
needed to achieve that level o f fit. An appropriate measure o f parsimonious fit is the 
normed Chi-square (AfVdf) (Hair, et al., 1995). The calculated normed Chi-square o f 1.74 
was within the recommended 1.0 - 2.0 range.
Based upon the regression coefficient results and key goodness-of-fit measures 
(GFI. AGFI. normed Chi-square) which perform well with GLS estimation, the estimated 
nine-item, three latent construct congeneric measurement model was accepted as 
adequately representing the relationships between the nine observed indicator variables and 
the transferability, specification and ownership latent constructs.
Structural Model Estimation
A structural model with regulatory climate as a second-order latent factor was 
specified, based on the regulatory climate conceptual model presented in chapter 2 and the 
estimated measurement model, and estimated using GLS. The estimation results are given
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in Appendix F. The path loadings and error variances are provided in Table F. 1 The path 
regression coefficients, along with their t - values, are also shown visually in path diagram 
form in Figure 4.3. All path coefficients are o f  the expected sign. All path coefficients, 
except for the RegClimate -  Ownership path (r = 1.90), are statistically significant at the 
a  = .05 level. The RegClimate -  Ownership path is significant at the a  = .10 level. 
Because the measurement model was specified in the structural equation model, all 
goodness-of-fit measures are identical to measurement model goodness-of-fit results.
Final Regulatory Climate Scale
The confirmatory factor analysis results suggest that state regulatory climate can be 
adequately represented by a nine-item, three-latent variable summated scale. The final 
regulatory climate scale, shown in Table 4.3, consists o f three subscales which represent 
three underlying property rights conditions: transferability, specification and ownership. 
Each subscale (three items with item values ranging from 0 - 2 )  has a range o f 0 - 6. The 
overall summated regulatory climate scale has a theoretical range from 0- 18 .  Descriptive 
analysis indicates that the overall regulatory climate scale has observed minimum and 
maximum values o f 0 and 17, respectively, a mean value o f  8.08, standard deviation of 
4.446. a median value o f 8, a mode o f 10, skewness o f .035 and -.808 kurtosis. The 
frequency distribution for the respondents’ computed regulatory climate scale values is 
given in Table 4.4. A histogram illustrating the shape, center, and spread o f the distribution 
is shown in Figure 4.4. A normal curve is superimposed on the histogram to help judge 
whether the data are normally distributed.
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HealthCertE HCE Health certification required for farm-raised 
fish entering state
Escape ESC Facility design required to prevent fish 
escapement
HealthCertW HCW Health certification required for fish shipped 
within the state
Specification:
SpLicense SL Special state license/permit required to possess, 
culture fish
Report REP State requires a written fish inventory or 
production report
PaperTrail MPT Marketing paper trail required to sell farm- 
raised fish
Ownership:
ExemptWLaw EXR Fish in aquaculture facility are exempt from 
state wildlife laws
Livestock LSR Fish in aquaculture facility are legally 
considered livestock
MktRestrict MR State limits or restricts sale or marketing o f 
farm-raised fish
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Table 4.4 Frequency Distribution of Computed Regulatory'Climate Scale Values 
(Scale = 0-18 ,  with higher number reflecting more strict regulatory 
stringency)
Scale Value Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum. Percent
Valid 0 10 4.3 5.8 5.8
1 1 .4 .6 6.4
2 9 3.9 5.2 11.6
->J 13 5.7 7.5 19.1
4 10 4.3 5.8 24.9
5 11 4.8 6.4 31.2
6 13 5.7 7.5 38.7
7 8 3.5 4.6 43.4
8 17 7.4 9.8 53.2
9 8 3.5 4.6 57.8
10 21 9.1 12.1 69.9
11 12 5.2 6.9 76.9
12 13 5.7 7.5 84.4
13 2 .9 1.2 85.5
14 11 4.8 6.4 91.9
15 2 .9 1.2 93.1
16 9 3.9 5.2 98.3
17 j 1.3 1.7 100.0
18 0 0.0 0.0
Valid Total 173 75.2 100.0
Missing 57 24.8
Total 230 100.0
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Figure 4.4 Histogram Illustrating the Shape, Center, and Spread of the 
Regulatory Climate Scale Distribution
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A Shapiro-Wilks test o f normality was performed in SAS to evaluate the normality 
o f  the regulatory climate scale. The results (W = 0.948, p  = 0.0001) indicate that the 
distribution o f  the regulatory climate scale deviates significantly from normality. The 
scale's normal probability plot suggests that the distribution o f the regulatory climate scale 
is truncated at both ends, with a large degree o f truncation at the lower end o f  the scale. 
Validity Assessment
Construct validity o f a summated scale is accomplished by examining the 
correlation o f the scale with other established measures o f the same latent construct. 
However, there are no established measures o f  regulatory climate for agriculture, and 
previous studies using existing manufacturing industry measures have shown mixed results. 
To evaluate the validity o f the regulatory climate scale, the scale values for each state and 
Guam were computed for each category o f fish (shown in Table 4.5) and correlated with 
two proxies for state regulatory climate. The two proxy measures were obtained from the 
State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire, which 
elicited the respondents' Likert scale self-assessments o f  state regulatory climate toward 
aquaculture for each fish category (Table B.3.9), and the number o f fish farms in each of 
the five categories (Table B.3.2). The correlation o f .274 with self-assessments o f state 
regulatory climate was significant at the 0.01 level and o f the expected sign. The 
correlation between the regulatory' climate scale value and the number o f fish farms in each 
o f  the five categories of -.170 was significant at the 0.05 level and of the expected sign, 
indicating a negative relationship between regulatory stringency and the number o f fish
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Table 4.5 Computed Regulatory Climate Scale Values for each State and Guam, 
by Category (Scale = 0-18,  with higher number reflecting more strict 
regulatory stringency)
O rn am en ta ls B a itfish C o m m erc ia l
F o o d fish
F resh w a ter
G a m e fish
M arine
G a m efish
A la b a m a 2 2 0 9 2
A la sk a N A N A N A N A N A
A r izo n a 8 10 16 16 16
A rk an sas 0 0 0 2 N A
C a lifo rn ia 8 10 1 1 11 11
C o lo ra d o 10 10 12 16 N A
C o n n e c tic u t N A N A N A N A N A
D ela w a re 4 3 6 6 7
F lorida 0 0 0 6 4
G eo r g ia 12 10 10 10 10
H a w a ii 4 4 14 8 8
Idaho 12 12 10 12 N A
Illin o is 3 3 4 5 N A
Indiana N A N A N A N A N A
Iow a I 9 13 1 1 N A
K ansas 3 3 3 3 N A
K en tu ck y 2 2 4 N A
L o u is ia n a 7 4 6 9 9
M a in e N A N A 11 N A N A
M aryland 10 14 14 14 14
M a ssa ch u se tts N A N A N A N A N A
M ich ig a n 6 6 6 8 5
M in n eso ta N A N A 11 N A N A
M ississ ip p i 13 7 2 8 11
M isso u r i 0 0 2 0 N A
M ontana 14 16 16 16 N A
(table 4.5 continued)
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O rnam entals B a itfish  C o m m erc ia l F resh w a ter  M arine
F o o d fish  G a m e fish  G a m efish
N eb rask a 10 10 10 10 N A
N e v a d a N A N A N A N A N A
N e w  H am psh ire 8 16 14 14 15
N e w  Jersey N A N A N A N A N A
N e w  M e x ic o N A N A N A N A N A
N e w  Y ork N A N A 12 16 14
N orth  C arolin a 4 3 3 3 7
N orth  D ak ota 5 7 10 12 8
O h io 7 5 9 9 N A
O k la h o m a 10 10 10 8 8
O reg o n 11 17 15 17 17
P en n sy lv a n ia 6 6 6 6 9
R h od e Island 9 N A N A N A 1 1
S ou th  C arolin a 5 5 8 14 8
S ou th  D ak ota 8 7 7 11 N A
T e n n e sse e 10 14 11 10 8
T e x a s 5 5 5 5 5
U tah N A N A N A N A N A
V erm on t N A N A N A N A N A
V irg in ia 6 6 10 8 8
W ash in gton N A N A N A N A N A
W est V irg in ia 12 N A 12 12 12
W isco n sin 1 1 8 12 12 N A
W y o m in g N A N A N A N A N A
G uam 3 3 3 4 4
NA = Not available, due to non-response or m issing data
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farms. These significant correlations provide evidence for construct validity o f the 
regulator}' climate scale for disaggregate, fish category data.
Construct validity was assessed for the regulatory climate scale on an overall state 
basis. State average regulatory climate scale values across fish categories were computed 
and correlations with the average of the state regulatory stringency self-assessments across 
all fish categories were computed. The state average scale values were also evaluated for 
correlations with the total number o f fish farms in each state. To adjust for possible effects 
of state size, the total number o f fish farms in each state was also divided by the total 
number o f farms in the state and by the total land in farms for each state to obtain two 
proportions: total number o f fish farms as a fraction o f a state's total farms, and total 
number o f fish farms as a fraction o f a state's total farmland. The data for number o f state 
farms and land in farms was obtained from the US DA/NASS Agricultural Statistics 1997. 
The results o f correlation analysis failed to show any statistically significant correlations 
between the average state regulatory climate scale values and total number o f  fish farms in 
the state or the proxies for average state regulatory stringency. Therefore, construct validity 
could not be demonstrated for aggregate state data.
Known-groups validation, which demonstrates that a scale can differentiate 
members o f one group from members o f another group based on their scale scores, is a 
useful construct validation procedure. However, as discussed previously in this chapter, 
meaningful between-group comparisons can only be justified when between-group measure 
invariance has been demonstrated. If these conditions are met, then between-group 
comparisons can be undertaken, using Analysis o f Variance (ANOVA).
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The tests of the independence o f observations assumption for factor analysis found 
that the patterns of factor loading were very similar across fish categories, and serves as 
evidence o f between-group measure invariance. An ANOVA was performed on the 
computed regulatory climate scale value for all observations to determine if  there are any 
statistically significant (a  = .05) differences in regulatory climate between fish categories. 
The ANOVA F-test results (F  = 2.576, p  = .039) indicated that at least one statistically 
significant difference exists between the fish categories. A Duncan’s multiple range test, 
described by Bums and Bush (1995), was performed to identify the pairs o f statistically 
significant differences between the fish category means. Results from the Duncan's test 
indicated that ornamentals are significantly different from freshwater gamefish and marine 
gamefish. To further investigate the fish category differences, ANOVA analyses and 
Duncan’s multiple range tests were also performed for the three subscales. Results 
indicated that there is no significant difference between fish categories for transferability. 
Ornamentals differed from commercial foodfish and freshwater gamefish in specification 
o f rights. Ornamentals and commercial foodfish were both significantly different from 
freshwater gamefish on the ownership subscale.
Summary
This chapter described the procedure for developing an objective, quantitative 
summated scale measure. The scale development procedures, including exploratory factor 
analysis and confirmatory structural equation modeling, were utilized to develop and 
validate a property rights-based summated scale measure o f state regulatory climate toward 
finfish aquaculture for five categories o f finfish: ornamentals, baitfish. commercial
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foodfish, freshwater gamefish and marine gamefish. The nine-item overall regulatory 
climate scale is comprised o f three 3-item subscales which represent three property rights 
conditions: transferability o f rights, rights specification, and ownership. The final 
aquaculture regulatory climate scale values for each state, by fish category, were listed in 
tabular form. Finally, ANOVA between-group comparisons indicated differences between 
the fish categories for the overall regulatory climate scale and the three subscales.
The next chapter will empirically test the conceptual relationship between 
institutional structure and state regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture. A model 
incorporating the regulatory climate scale measure as the dependent variable will be 
presented. Empirical estimation results for the model, for both ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and ordered probit analyses will be reported and discussed.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE INSTITUTIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS AND REGULATORY CLIMATE
In chapter 2, elements o f public choice theory and firm location theory were 
combined within an institutional economics framework to develop a theoretical model 
explaining the institutional relationships underlying firm location decisions. The 
theoretical model was then applied to the U.S. aquaculture industry to develop a conceptual 
model which illustrates the relationship between state institutional structure and regulatory 
climate, one decision factor in aquaculture firm location and species selection decisions.
This chapter empirically examines the relationship between state institutional 
structure characteristics and regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry. An 
empirically testable institutional economic model, based on the conceptual model from 
chapter 2. is developed, with aquaculture regulatory climate as the dependent variable and 
key state characteristics reported in the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey as 
independent variables. To estimate the empirical model, two alternative forms o f the 
regulatory climate scale developed in chapter 4 are used as dependent variables in a two- 
limit truncated regression and an ordered probit analysis. For both analyses, state 
institutional characteristics serve as the independent variables.
State Institutional Structure and the Aquaculture Industry
The implementation of legal and regulatory programs affecting the aquaculture 
industry are administered at the state level in the U.S. As a result, regulatory programs and
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permit requirements vary from state to state. The wide variation in state regulatory policies
toward the aquaculture industry have resulted in significant interstate differences in
regulatory climate, and may affect where fish are grown. The current highly variable
regulatory environment is perceived to be a major constraint to aquaculture industry
development (DeVoe and Mount, 1989; McCoy, 1996; Wypyszinski, et al., 1994).
The inadequacy o f existing state institutions to reconcile the expanding aquaculture
industry's needs with changing social and environmental protection goals has been the
source o f serious conflicts between the aquaculture industry and state regulatory institutions
(DeVoe and Mount, 1989). Over the last decade, there has been a recognized need to adjust
the structure o f  institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture industry's growth
and development. The demand for institutional change has resulted in major changes in the
states' approaches to the aquaculture industry and the evolution o f new institutions which
ensure attention to the industry’s changing needs.
Institutional Economic Model and Data Description
The conceptual model from chapter 2 which illustrates the relationship between
state institutional structure and regulatory’ climate, one decision factor in aquaculture firm
location and species selection decisions, can be expressed as an empirically testable
institutional economic model. The relationship can be given by:
Regulatory = /(definition o f  aquaculture, development plan, administrative (5.1) 
Climate agency, enforcement agency, finfish classification, region)
where the regulatory climate scale developed and validated in chapter 4 serves as the
dependent variable, and the independent variables are key state institutional characteristics.
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Regulatory Climate Dependent Variables
The regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) developed in chapter 4 is an 18-category 
ordinal scale, which permits a researcher to rank-order respondents. Anderson and Philips 
(1981) argued that, in some cases, an ordered categorical variable can be considered a 
coarsely measured version o f a continuous variable, and that it is reasonable to assume that 
the ordered categories correspond to non-overlapping and exhaustive intervals o f the real 
line. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994, p. 115) "treat a variable as continuous if  it provides 
11 or more levels, even though it is not continuous in the mathematical sense." Since the 
RCSCALE consists o f 18 separate categories, it can be considered as "assumed interval." 
with the values connoting a continuum o f labels which are equal distances apart. The 
designation o f the scale as interval appearing allows a higher level o f measurement and the 
application o f more powerful statistical techniques, such as linear regression, than can be 
used with ordinal scales (Bums and Bush, 1995).
If the RCSCALE is strictly considered an ordinal variable, practical interpretation 
is difficult, and linear regression is inappropriate as an estimation method. Limited 
qualitative dependent variable models would provide preferred estimation methods. The 
18-category ordinal dependent variable would be difficult to analyze because there are too 
many ordered alternatives (Hill, 1998). A strategy suggested by Hill (1998) is to partition 
the 18-category scale into a smaller number (no more than five or six) o f  ordered 
alternatives, based upon the distribution or clumping of values on the RCSCALE. This 
would enhance practical interpretation and allow estimation using limited qualitative 
dependent variable estimation methods.
159
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Traditional partitioning strategies for mound-shaped distributions are based on the 
Empirical Rule, which states that approximately 68 percent o f the measurements will fall 
within one standard deviation of the mean value, approximately 95 percent will fall within 
two standard deviations, and essentially all the measurements will fall within three standard 
deviations o f  the mean (McClave and Dietrich, 1988; Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams. 
1993). Use o f the Empirical Rule to partition the regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) 
would result in only three stringency categories (low, average, and high), because the 
RCSCALE negative kurtosis (-.808) resulted in a flattened distribution and a larger than 
normal standard deviation (4.46). The middle "average" stringency category would include 
RCSCALE values from 4-12. This range is considered too wide for practical interpretation 
and empirical estimation purposes.
An alternative five-category scale partitioning strategy, still based on standard 
deviations, was developed for this analysis. The middle "average" stringency category' was 
set one standard deviation wide, centered at the RCSCALE mean (8.08). The "average” 
category included RCSCALE values from 6-10. Additional categories, one standard 
deviation wide, were established with endpoint RCSCALE values one and two standard 
deviations above and below the "average” category endpoints.
The resulting partitioned regulatory' climate category (RCCAT) ordinal scale 
variable consists o f five categories, representing increasing levels o f regulatory stringency: 
very low, low, average, high, and very' high, coded as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Table 
5.1 describes the RCCAT and shows the RCSCALE values included in each RCCAT 
category. A descriptive analysis indicated that the RCCAT has observed minimum and
160
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Very Low 0 0 -  1
Low 1 2 - 5
Average 2 6 -  10
High j 1 1 - 1 4
Very High 4 15 - 17
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maximum values o f 0 and 4. respectively, a median value and mode o f 2. skewness o f .086, 
and -.440 kurtosis. The frequency distribution for the computed RCCAT values is given 
in Table 5.2. A histogram, with superimposed normal curve, illustrating the shape, center, 
and spread o f the distribution is shown in Figure 5.1. Computed regulatory climate 
category (RCCAT) values for each state and Guam are provided in Table 5.3.
In order to justify using the RCCAT as a proxy for the RCSCALE in empirical 
analysis, comparability between the RCSCALE variable and the RCCAT must be 
demonstrated statistically. Pearson correlations (for continuous variables) and Spearman's 
rank order correlations (for ordinal variables) between RCSCALE and RCCAT were 
computed to evaluate the strength o f  the relationship between the two variables. Very high 
correlation coefficients would indicate that the two variables are statistically comparable 
and that RCCAT can be substituted for RCSCALE in empirical analysis. The computed 
Pearson correlation (r=.960) and Spearman's rank-order correlation (r=.959) were both 
very close to 1.00 and statistically significant (a=.01). suggesting that RCSCALE and 
RCCAT are statistically equivalent.
An ANOVA analysis was also performed on the partitioned regulatory climate 
categories (RCCAT) value for all observations to determine if  there are any statistically 
significant (a = .05) differences in regulatory climate category (RCCAT) between fish 
categories. The ANOVA F-test results (F  = 2.940,/? = .022) indicated that at least one 
statistically significant difference exists between the fish category means. A Duncan's 
multiple range test was performed to identify the pairs o f statistically significant differences 
between fish category means. The results from the Duncan's multiple range test failed to
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Table 5.2 Frequency Distribution of Partitioned Regulatory Climate Category 
(RCCAT) Variable
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum. Percent
Valid Very Low 11 4.8 6.4 6.4
Low 43 18.7 24.9 31.2
Average 67 29.1 38.7 69.9
High 38 16.5 22.0 91.9
Very High 14 6.1 8.1 100.0
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0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Regulatory Climate Category
Figure 5.1 Histogram Illustrating the Shape, Center, and Spread of the 
Partitioned Regulatory Climate Category (RCCAT)
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Table 5.3 Computed Regulatory Climate Category (RCCAT) Values for Each 
State and Guam, by Fish Category
O rn am en ta ls B aitfish C o m m ercia l
F oo d fish
F resh w a ter
G a m efish
M arine
G a m efish
A lab am a L o w L ow V ery L ow A v e r a g e L o w
A la sk a N A N A N A N A N A
A rizo n a A v e r a g e A v era g e V ery H igh V ery  H ig h V ery  H igh
A rkansas V ery  L o w V ery  L ow V ery L ow L o w N A
C aliforn ia A v e r a g e A v era g e H igh H ig h H igh
C o lorad o A v e r a g e A v era g e H igh V ery  H igh N A
C o n n ecticu t N A N A N A N A N A
D elaw are L o w L ow A v era g e A v e r a g e A v e ra g e
Florida Very' L o w V ery  L ow V ery L ow A v e r a g e L o w
G eo rg ia H igh A v era g e A v era g e A v e r a g e A v e ra g e
H aw aii L o w L ow H igh A v e r a g e A v e ra g e
Idaho H igh H igh A v era g e H ig h N A
Illin o is L o w L ow L ow L o w N A
Indiana N A N A N A N A N A
Iow a V ery  L o w A v era g e H igh H igh N A
K ansas L o w L ow L ow L o w N A
K entucky L o w L ow L ow L ow N A
L ouisian a A v e ra g e L ow A v era g e A v e r a g e A v e ra g e
M aine N A N A H igh N A N A
M aryland A v e r a g e H igh H igh H igh H igh
M assachu setts N A N A N A N A N A
M ich igan A v e r a g e A v era g e A v era g e A v e ra g e L o w
M in nesota N A N A H igh N A N A
M ississip p i H igh A v era g e L ow A v e r a g e H igh
M issouri V ery  L o w V ery  L ow L ow V ery  L o w N A
M ontana H igh V ery  H igh V ery H igh V ery  H ig h N A
(table 5.3 continued)
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O rn a m en ta ls  B a itfish  C o m m e rc ia l F resh w ater  M arine
F o o d fish  G a m efish  G a m e fish
N ebraska A v e ra g e A v e ra g e A v e r a g e A v e ra g e N A
N ev a d a N A N A N A N A N A
N e w  H am psh ire A v e ra g e V ery  H igh H igh H igh V ery  H ig h
N e w  Jersey N A N A N A N A N A
N e w  M ex ico N A N A N A N A N A
N e w  Y ork N A N A H igh V e ry  H igh H ig h
North C arolina L o w L o w L o w L o w A v e r a g e
North D akota L o w A v era g e A v e r a g e H igh A v e r a g e
O hio A v e ra g e L o w A v e r a g e A v e ra g e N A
O klahom a A v e ra g e A v e ra g e A v e r a g e A v e ra g e A v e r a g e
O regon H igh V ery  H igh Very' H igh V e ry  H igh Very- H igh
P en n sy lvan ia A v e ra g e A v era g e A v e r a g e A v e ra g e A v e r a g e
R hode Island A v e ra g e N A N A N A H ig h
South C arolina L o w L o w A v e r a g e H igh A v e r a g e
South D akota A v e ra g e A v e ra g e A v e r a g e H igh N A
T en n essee A v e ra g e H igh H igh A v era g e A v e r a g e
T exas L o w L o w L o w L ow L o w
Utah N A N A N A N A N A
V erm ont N A N A N A N A N A
V irgin ia A v e ra g e A v era g e A v e r a g e A v e ra g e A v e r a g e
W ash ington N A N A N A N A N A
W est V irg in ia H igh N A H igh H igh H igh
W iscon sin H igh A v era g e H igh H igh N A
W y o m in g N A N A N A N A N A
G uam L o w L o w Low- L o w L o w
NA = Not available, due to non-resp o n se  o r m issing  data
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distinguish any statistically significant differences between ornamentals, baitfish and 
commercial foodfish, or between commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish, and marine 
gamefish. Ornamentals and baitfish were significantly different from freshwater gamefish 
and marine gamefish. These results are very similar to the ANOVA results, reported in 
chapter 4. from the homogenous group comparison with the original regulatory climate 
scale values.
State Institutional Characteristic Independent Variables
The choice o f state institutional characteristics to include as independent variables 
in the empirical analysis, along with the direction o f preliminary hypothesized impacts on 
regulatory climate, was developed from the literature on the constraints to aquaculture 
industry growth and development. The data for the independent variables were obtained 
from the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey, described in chapter 3.
Major industry efforts have been expended to have states legally declare aquaculture 
a form of agriculture, based upon the belief that agriculture status confers certain beneficial 
tax and legal protections. The Joint Subcommittee on Aquaculture (1993) concluded that 
the treatment o f aquaculture as a form o f agriculture would provide a positive development 
climate. Therefore, the definition o f aquaculture as agriculture is hypothesized to have a 
negative influence on the stringency o f state environmental regulations.
Many states have been formulating formal aquaculture development plans to 
promote industry growth and expansion. These plans, which undergo continual clarification 
and refinement, provide guidance for the establishment of contemporary developmental and 
regulatory mechanisms to accommodate the aquaculture industry’s needs (DeVoe and
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Mount. 1989). The presence o f  a state aquaculture development plan is hypothesized to 
reduce the stringency o f the regulatory climate.
In most states, regulation o f the aquaculture industry has evolved in state game and 
fish departments that are often oriented toward production and protection o f game species 
for recreational experiences rather than toward food production. An important theme with 
fish farmers is regulatory jurisdiction. Producers believe that jurisdiction over aquaculture 
belongs in state departments o f agriculture, which producers feel would provide economic 
advocacy and sympathetic industry regulation. The lead administrative and enforcement 
agencies will be modeled as either the state department o f agriculture, hypothesized to have 
a negative effect on regulatory' stringency, or a state natural resources/fish and wildlife 
agency, hypothesized to have a positive effect on regulatory stringency.
State fish and wildlife laws also classify fish species into categories, such as 
baitfish. ornamentals, foodfish and gamefish. Different classifications o f fish are regulated 
differently by state fish and game agencies. Based on survey results, there appears to be 
a continuum o f regulatory restrictiveness, with baitfish culture being subject to the least 
restrictions, followed by ornamental and commercial foodfish. Culture o f freshwater 
gamefish and marine gamefish can be highly restricted. As a result, regulatory stringency 
is hypothesized to be negatively influenced by ornamental and baitfish culture, but 
positively influenced by gamefish culture, when compared to commercial foodfish.
The 50 states maintaining widely varying rules and regulations create a bewildering 
array o f  regulations. The aquaculture industry is openly frustrated that requirements often 
vary so much between neighboring states that it is difficult to satisfy each state's
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regulations and remain competitive. Regional compacts offer hope for addressing a wide 
array of conflicting state regulations that are hindering aquaculture (Cline, Warren and 
Walker, 1994). There are several other reasons why the region may have significant 
impacts on state regulatory climate. For purposes o f  setting research priorities and 
disbursing federal aquaculture research funds, the USDA divides the United States into five 
regional aquaculture zones (northeast, southern, north-central, western, and tropical- 
subtropical), each serviced by a regional aquaculture center. Although there is considerable 
overlap, regions differ in terms o f environmental conditions, species cultured, population 
density, and importance and influence o f the aquaculture industry and environmental 
groups. It is hypothesized that regions with high population density', more liberal public, 
and more active environmental groups, such as the northeast and north-central regions, will 
have more stringent regulatory environments, while the southern region, with a long history 
of aquaculture production and more powerful industry groups, will have lower levels o f 
regulation and more favorable regulatory climate. These hypothesized regional effects are 
consistent with state and regional spatial regulatory effects observed by Hedge (1993) for 
federal environmental regulatory enforcement.
The independent variables included in the analysis, along with the dummy variable 
coding, are listed in Table 5.4. Since all independent variables are coded as dummy 
variables, the constant term in the empirical analysis represents the level of regulatory' 
stringency under base level conditions for all independent variables. The base level can be 
conceptualized as a state that has not defined aquaculture as agriculture, with no 
development plan, where the state fish and wildlife/natural resources agency is responsible
169
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Tabic 5.4 Independent Dummy Variable Coding and Descriptions
Variable Name Coding and Description
DEFINE (-) = 1 if aquaculture is legally defined as agriculture; 0 otherwise
DEVPLAN (-) = 1 if state has a formal aquaculture development plan; 0 otherwise
Administrative Agency :
AGADMIN (-) = I if lead administrative agency is state department of agriculture; 
0 otherwise
JOINTADM (+) = 1 if administration is joint between state departments of 
agriculture and natural resources/fish and wildlife agency; 0 
otherwise
COOPEXT (+/-) = 1 if Cooperative Extension plays a role in developing programs; 
0 otherwise
Enforcement Agency:
ENFORCE (-) = 1 if lead enforcement agency is state department of agriculture; 0 
otherwise
JOINTENF (+) = 1 if enforcement is joint between state departments of agriculture 
and natural resources/fish and wildlife agency; 0 otherwise
Finfish Classification:
ORNAMENT (-) = 1 if the finfish classification is ornamentals; 0 otherwise
BAITFISH (-) = 1 if the finfish classification is baitfish; 0 otherwise
FWGAME (+) = 1 if the finfish classification is freshwater gamefish; 0 otherwise
MARGAME (+) = 1 if the finfish classification is marine gamefish; 0 otherwise
U.S. Region:
NOREAST (+) = 1 if the state is located in northeast region; 0 otherwise
NORCENT (+) = 1 if the state is located in north-central region; 0 otherwise
TROPSUB (+/-) = I if the state is located in tropical-subtropical region; 0 otherwise
SOUTHERN (-) = 1 if the state is located in the southern region; 0 otherwise
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for both administration and enforcement o f aquaculture programs and regulations, and 
which is located in the western region o f the United States.
Empirical Models
Given the two alternative specifications o f the regulatory climate scale presented 
earlier, two different empirical models are appropriate for evaluating the hypothesized 
relationships between regulator}' climate and state institutional structural characteristics: 
two-limit truncated regression and ordered probit analysis. This section describes the 
theory underlying the two empirical models and the interpretation o f empirical model 
results.
Two-Limit Truncated Regression
The dependent variable in economic analysis can often only be observed within a 
limited range. In this case, values o f the random variable come from a distribution that is 
truncated at one, or both ends (Judge, et al.. 1985; Judge, et al., 1988). A truncated 
distribution is defined by Greene (1997; p. 949) as "the part o f the untruncated distribution 
that is above or below some specified value."
The latent underlying truncated regression model is given by Greene (1995) as:
where e, -  N[0,o2]. y" is unobserved; its observed dependent variable counterpart is *y\
y ' = /Tx, + e, (5.2)
and if y* < L,, then y, = unobserved (lower tail truncation)
if y* > U,, then y, = unobserved (upper tail truncation) 
if L, < y’ < U„ then y, = y* = /?x, + e, (5.3)
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The truncated regression model is not a linear regression model. When y, is restricted to 
the range [L„UJ, the conditional mean becomes
E[y, | x„ L < y, < U] = /?x, + a, [(<J)L - $ V)/(QU - $ L)] (5.4)
where (J), = <j>[0' - /?x,)/a, ], j = L„U, (5.5)
and -  <fr[(j - /?x,)/a, ], j = L„U, (5.6)
The terms (J) and <£ are the standard normal probability density and cumulative distribution 
functions, respectively (Greene, 1995).
Since OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent in the truncated regression context, 
estimation of the parameters o f the truncated regression model is accomplished through 
maximum likelihood estimation (Greene, 1995; Greene, 1997; Judge, et al., 1988). The 
log-likelihood for the truncated regression model is
InL, = lnri - ‘/2ln27t - ‘/-e,2 - ln[$(r|U  - y'x,) - ^(-qL - y'x,)] (5.7)
where y ' = (1/a)/?. Newton's method is used for estimation and the Hessian is used to 
estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix o f  the estimates (Greene, 1995; Greene, 1997). 
Ordered Probit Analysis
When the scale measure used as the dependent variable is discrete rather than 
continuous, conventional regression methods are inappropriate. Such behavior can be 
better described in probabilistic terms, using maximum likelihood estimation. According 
to Greene (1993), models that link the decision or outcome to a set o f factors can be 
constructed within the general framework o f probability models:
Prob(event j  occurs) = Prob(Y =f) = /^relevant effects: parameters] (5.8) 
These models attempt to relate the conditional probability o f a particular outcome to
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various explanatory factors, including the attributes o f the alternatives as well as the 
characteristics o f the decision makers (Judge et al., 1985).
When categorical variables are inherently ordered, as is the case with ratings and
rankings, multinomial logit or probit models fail to account for the ordinal nature o f  the
dependent variable. The ordered logit and probit models, based on random utility theory,
are widely used as a framework for analyzing such responses (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984;
Broomhall and Johnson, 1994; Greene, 1995 and 1993; Maddala, 1983; Sayers et al.,
1996). The ordered probit model has the following specification:
y*=/?'x + e (5.9)
where e ~ N[0,1]. y ' is unobserved; its observed counterpart is *y\ where
y -  0 if y ’ < |iQ, (5.10)
= 1 if p0 < y ' < |i„
= 2 if (a, < v‘ < g-,,
= J  if pj., < y '
and (i denotes unknown probability boundaries that are estimated with (S parameters in
equation (5.6). There is no significance to the unit distance between the set o f observed
values o f y; they simply provide the ranking (Greene, 1997; Maddala, 1983; Sayers, et al..
1996). The probabilities for each level o f g are given as:
ProbO = 0) = <J>(-p'x) (5.11)
Prob(y = 1) = <B(g, - p ' x )  - <£(-P'x)
Prob(y = 2) = $ ( g 2 - P ' x )  -  <B(p, -  p ' x )
ProbO = .7)= 1 - $(Pv-i-P'x)
where is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
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The ordered logit model results from the assumption that e has a standard logistic 
distribution instead of a standard normal distribution. According to Greene (1993), this is 
a trivial modification o f the formulation and appears to make virtually no difference in 
practice. However, the logit errors are uncorrelated, independent Weibull random variables 
distinguished by a skewed distribution and non-zero mean, which does not occur in nature. 
The probit assumptions are more consistent with economic theory, and thus, ordered probit 
is the preferred model for economic research (Hill, 1998).
Interpretation of Model Estimation Results
For both the two-limit truncated regression and the ordered probit analysis, 
interpretation o f the estimated models involves evaluation o f several aspects o f  the 
estimated model results. These characteristics include the parameter estimates, marginal 
effects, the overall significance o f the models, the models' goodness o f  fit. and in this 
application using cross-sectional data, possible violations o f model statistical assumptions, 
including collinearity and heteroskedasticity.
The model parameter estimates for both the two-limit truncated regression and 
ordered probit models can, as with OLS, be evaluated to determine if the signs o f  the 
estimated coefficients agree with theoretical or prior expectations. For both the two-limit 
truncated regression and ordered probit models, the estimated maximum likelihood 
coefficients are not the marginal effects o f  changes in the independent variables.
The marginal effects in the truncated regression model are the partial derivatives o f 
the expected values with respect to the vector o f characteristics, and are computed at the 
mean values o f the explanatory variables. The marginal effects are given in percentages,
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since the dependent variable is measured in logarithms (Greene, 1995; Judge, et al.. 1985). 
The marginal effects when truncation is at the left, at 0, are provided by Greene (1995) and 
computed using the expected value formula:
E[y | x ]  =  $ ( p ' x / o ) [ p ' x  + o t j j ^ C P ' x / o y O C p ' x / a ) ]  (5.12)
The partial derivatives are given as:
<3E[y ] x ] / d x  =  $ > ( p ' x / o ) P  (5.13)
Greene (1997) noted that since the truncated variance is between 0 and 1. the marginal 
effect for every element o f x  is less than the corresponding coefficient.
In the ordered probit model, determination o f marginal effects is more involved. 
Since there is no conditional mean function, marginal effects indicate the effects o f changes 
in the covariates o f the cell probabilities. For continuous independent variables, the 
marginal effects are given by the partial derivatives o f the probabilities computed in 
equation (5.8) with respect to the independent variables. To interpret binary variables, 
further calculation o f the changes in the estimated probabilities o f the outcomes is 
necessar>r. The change in the estimated probabilities is determined by calculating the 
difference between means o f the probability distribution o f the outcomes when the binary 
variable takes its different values (Greene, etal., 1997; Sayers, etal., 1996). Greene (1997) 
cautioned that interpreting marginal effects for the ordered probit model is less obvious 
than for other limited dependent variable specifications. Increasing one x  while holding P 
and // constant is equivalent to shifting the distribution. As the distributions shift, the signs 
o f  the probabilities and the partial derivatives change. Only the sign changes o f Prob(y = 
0) and Prob(y = J) are unambiguous. This makes interpretation of marginal probabilities
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more complicated when the ordered dependent variable has more than three categories 
(Greene, 1997).
Model Significance and Goodness-of-Fit Measures
For both the two-limit truncated regression and the ordered probit model, the 
likelihood ratio procedure can be used to test the overall significance o f the models under 
the null hypothesis:
H0: P: = P3 = - . . =  Pk = 0 (5.14)
H,: Not True
The likelihood ratio, k ,  is derived by computing the difference between the log-likelihood 
function evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates, L(P) and the log-likelihood 
function under the null hypothesis. L(0), according to the formula:
* = 2[L (P)-L(0)] (5.15)
which has a x2a-n distribution. A likelihood ratio test statistic larger than the appropriate 
X2a-n value leads to rejection o f the null hypothesis that all o f the parameter estimates 
except the intercept are not significantly greater than zero (Judge, et al., 1988).
The R2 goodness-of-fit measure is inappropriate for the two-limit truncated 
regression and ordered probit models, as both use the maximum likelihood estimation 
procedure (Broomhall and Johnson, 1994). A number o f alternative pseudo R2 measures 
are available for model evaluation when using maximum likelihood estimation. One
commonly used goodness-of-fit measure for models which use maximum likelihood
estimation is McFadden’s pseudo-R2, given by:
1 - [L(P)/L(0)] (5.16)
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The pseudo-R2 equals zero when L(P)=L(0) and equals one when the model is a perfect fit 
(Judge, et al., 1988). An alternative goodness-of-fit measure for qualitative choice models 
is Aldrich and Nelson’s R2AN, calculated by using the likelihood ratio statistic, X, and the 
sample size, N. R2AN is the ratio o f A/(A.+ N) and approaches one when the difference 
between L(p) and L(0) is large, indicating a better model fit (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984).
Collinearitv Diagnostics
Collinearity results from the existence of a linear relationship among some or all the 
explanatory variables in a regression model. The problem often arises from the non- 
experimental nature o f data collection in the social sciences. The classical linear regression 
model assumes that there is no collinearity because the presence o f  collinearity can have 
serious consequences for interpretation of econometric models. In the presence o f 
collinearity, estimated regression coefficients possess large standard errors. The specific 
consequences o f collinearity. as described by Greene (1997) and Judge, et al. (1988), 
include large variances and covariances of estimators, wider confidence intervals, 
insignificant /-ratios, and sensitivity o f estimators and their standard errors to small changes 
in data.
Given a data set and a model, there are a variety o f procedures for detecting and 
mitigating collinearity. The pursuit o f these mitigation procedures is dependent on the 
nature and perceived severity o f collinearity, which is a data problem. Consequently, any 
methods to detect collinearity must determine whether collinearity is present and the nature 
and severity o f the collinearity (Judge, et al., 1988).
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Detection o f collinearity can be initially based on an examination o f the simple 
pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficient between two regressors. If the correlation 
is high, for example, in excess o f 0.80, then collinearity is a serious problem. However, 
high zero-order correlations are a sufficient, but not necessary condition for the existence 
o f collinearity because it can exist even when the zero-order or simple correlations are 
comparatively low (e.g., less than 0.50). Examining the correlation coefficients can also 
fail to identify more complex patterns o f collinearity (Gujarati, 1988; Judge, et al.. 1988).
An examination o f the eigenvalues or eigenvectors o f the correlation matrix can also 
be used to detect collinearity, with small eigenvalues indicating collinearity problems. 
However, there is no accepted standard for determining how small an eigenvalue indicates 
collinearity problems. The condition index (Cl), which is derived from the eigenvalues, 
does provide an objective standard for identifying what constitutes small eigenvalues by 
measuring the relative difference between the maximum eigenvalue pmax and the kth 
eigenvalue p k. A condition number k is defined as
* = IW 'lh , (5.17)
An eigenvalue that is small relative to the yardstick pmax indicates a large degree o f 
collinearity. The condition index (Cl) is defined as:
Ct-(M_/lO” -<*)" t5.1S)
The largest condition index is also the index o f the correlation matrix. Acceptable ranges 
and magnitudes have been identified for the Cl which indicate potential collinearity
problems. For example, if  the Cl ranges from 5 to 10, weak dependencies exist. Moderate
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to strong collinearity is associated with a Cl value which exceeds 30 (Belsley, Kuh. and 
Welsch. 1980; Gujarati. 1988).
Variance inflation factors (vift) are the diagonal elements o f the inverse o f the 
correlation matrix, R '1 = (X 'X )'1 if  the regressor values are standardized. The diagnostic 
statistic for the variance inflation factors is derived from:
vif, = 1/(1- R,2) (5.19)
where R,2 is the multiple correlation coefficient o f the variable x, regressed on the other
independent variables (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch. 1980). A variance inflation factor greater
than 1.0 implies that the variable is not orthogonal to the other variables and that some 
degree o f collinearity is present. Values greater than 5.0 indicates a severe collinearity 
problem (Judge, et al.. 1988).
If severe collinearity has been detected and mitigation efforts are warranted, several 
tactics can be employed to reduce collinearity. However, collinearity is a data problem 
whose treatment, depending on its severity, may or may not be warranted by the economic 
theory underlying specification o f the theoretical model.
Heteroskedasticitv Diagnostics
One of the important assumptions o f the classical linear model is that the variance 
o f each disturbance term e, is a constant equal to o2. This is the assumption of 
homoskedasticity, or equal variance, which can be given as
Var(e,) = o2 (5.20)
When the variances are not constant, heteroskedasticity is present. Since maximum 
likelihood estimation in the presence o f heteroskedasticity yields inconsistent parameter
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estimates, the presence o f heteroskedasticity can be a serious problem. Heteroskedasticitv 
is likely to be more common in cross-sectional data than in time-series data. (Greene, 
1997; Judge, et al., 1985).
The presence o f heteroskedasticity can be detected by graphical methods and more 
precisely by statistical tests. Graphical evaluation for heteroskedasticity involves 
examining the estimated squared residuals plotted against the independent variables or the 
estimated means values o f the dependent variable, to see if  the residuals exhibit any 
spreading or contracting patterns. Alternatively, a statistical test o f  the null hypothesis o f 
homoskedasticity that a' = 0 can be based on the likelihood ratio statistic by comparing the 
values o f the log likelihood functions under the restricted (Hu) homoskedastic and 
unrestricted (H,) models (Greene, 1997; Judge, et al., 1988).
In both the two-limit truncated regression and ordered probit models, under the 
general model o f multiplicative heteroskedasticity. to correct for potential heteroskedastic 
errors the variance term can be specified as:
Vafte,) = o2exp(a' r,) (5.21)
where z, is a vector o f exogenous variables and a ' is a conformable parameter vector 
(Greene, 1995; Greene, 1997).
Empirical Results
Two separate models were estimated, using the LIMDEP 7.0 computer software 
(Greene. 1995) to examine the relationship between regulatory' climate and state 
institutional characteristics. The RCSCALE variable, treated as a truncated continuous 
variable, served as the dependent variable in a two-limit truncated regression analysis, and
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the RCCAT variable was the dependent variable in an ordered probit analysis. The key 
state institutional characteristics, described previously and listed in Table 5.4, were used 
as the independent variables in both analyses.
Collinearity and Heteroskedasticity Diagnostics
A variety o f collinearity diagnostics were performed to determine if any 
independent variables were collinear. The zero-order, partial, and part correlations, shown 
in Table G .l, failed to indicate the existence o f  any collinearity between independent 
variables. All variance inflation factor values were below 5.0, the value accepted as 
indicating collinearity (Judge, et al.. 1988). The condition index, shown in Table G.2. 
failed to reach the 30.0 value which Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest indicates the 
presence o f  significant collinearity. These collinearity diagnostics support the conclusion 
that collinearity between independent variables is not a significant problem.
The partial plots o f the squared residuals were examined to detect the presence o f 
heteroskedasticity. The residual plots for the four region dummy variables showed a 
pattern which suggested the possible presence o f heteroskedasticity associated with the 
region variables. To statistically test for the presence ofheteroskedasticity, likelihood ratio 
tests were performed for both the two-limit truncated regression and the ordered probit 
models. The likelihood ratio test statistic values for both the two-limit truncated regression 
model (X = 11.76) and the ordered probit model (X = 10.66) were below the (a  = 0.05) 
critical x2 value o f 24.99 for 15 degrees o f freedom. Thus, the null hypothesis o f 
homoskedastic variances is not rejected, and it was concluded that heteroskedasticity is not
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a serious problem in either model. As a result, the estimated homoskedastic model results 
are reported in the following sections.
Two-Limit Truncated Regression Results
The two-limit truncated regression model using RCSCALE as the dependent 
variable was estimated in LIMDEP 7.0 using 169 observations from the 230 observations 
generated by the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey. Sixty-one observations 
with missing data were excluded by the LIMDEP listwise deletion o f missing observations. 
The parameter estimates from the two-limit truncated regression analysis using RCSCALE 
as the dependent variable are shown in Table 5.5. The constant represents the level o f 
regulatory climate for a state having the base levels for all independent variables, described 
previously. The marginal effects are provided in Table 5.6.
Using a significance level o f five percent, the insignificance o f  the coefficient for 
DEFINE suggests that, unlike hypothesized, defining aquaculture as a form o f agriculture 
did not have a statistically significant effect on regulatory climate. This result was 
counterintuitive, and suggests that the major industry efforts to have aquaculture defined 
as agriculture will not affect the stringency of state regulations.
The establishment o f a formal state aquaculture development plan (DEVPLAN) 
had, as hypothesized, a statistically significant negative impact on regulatory climate. The 
marginal effect o f DEVPLAN (-1.886) was the second largest negative, state-controllable 
institutional characteristic, second only to transferring regulatory enforcement authority 
(ENFORCE) from state fish and wildlife agencies to state departments o f  agriculture. This
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Tabic 5.5 Empirical Results for the Two-Limit Truncated Regression Model of






Error z-value Sig. Level
Constant 16.642 1.272 13.081 0.000***
DEFINE 0.509 0.700 0.728 0.467
DEVPLAN -4.010 0.717 -5.593 0.000***
AGADMIN 2.761 0.822 3.361 0.001***
JOINTADM 2.058 0.912 2.257 0.024**
COOPEXT -0.139 0.814 -0.171 0.864
ENFORCE -4.778 1.175 -4.068 0.000***
JOINTENF 2.315 1.128 2.052 0.040**
ORNAMENT -2.209 0.820 -2.694 0.007***
BAITFISH -1.525 0.827 -1.844 0.065*
FWGAME 0.543 0.792 0.686 0.493
MARGAME 0.130 0.885 0.146 0.884
NO RE AST -5.011 1.149 -4.363 0.000***
NORCENT -8.595 1.145 -7.507 0.000***
TROPSUB -6.235 1.519 -4.105 0.000***
SOUTHERN -7.649 1.060 -7.214 0.000***
o 3.078 0.214 14.373 0.000***
N = 169
Log Likelihood Function -385.701
* Significant at the 10% level o f  probability 
** S ign ifican t at the 5%  level o f  probability  
*** Significant at the 1% level o f  probability
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Table 5.6 Two-Limit Truncated Regression Model Partial Derivatives of








DEFINE 0.240 0.329 0.742
DEVPLAN -1.886 0.337 0.535
AGADMIN 1.299 0.386 0.459
JOINTADM 0.968 0.429 0.214
COOPEXT -0.065 0.383 0.208
ENFORCE -2.248 0.552 0.390
JOINTENF 1.089 0.531 0.277
ORNAMENT -1.039 0.386 0.208
BAITFISH -0.717 0.389 0.195
FWGAME 0.256 0.373 0.220
MARGAME 0.061 0.416 0.157
NOREAST -2.357 0.540 0.189
NORCENT -4.043 0.539 0.252
TROPSUB -2.933 0.715 0.063
SOUTHERN -3.598 0.499 0.352
Conditional Mean at Sample Point 
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result suggests that a formal state aquaculture developm ent plan may be an  im portant tool
for states w ishing to reduce the stringency o f  regulations.
The coefficients for administrative agency (AGADMIN, JOrNTADM. and 
COOPEXT) provided unexpected results. The variable AGADMIN was significant, but 
the positive sign fails to support the hypothesis that transferring program administration 
responsibilities to state departments o f agriculture reduces regulatory stringency. Instead, 
in this analysis, the transferral o f administrative authority increases regulatory stringency. 
This suggests that transferring only administrative authority, without transferring 
enforcement, adds another layer o f bureaucracy which increases regulatory stringency. This 
result was supported by the result that joint administration (JOINTADM) also significantly 
increases regulatory stringency. A role by Cooperative Extension (COOPEXT) in 
developing and administering aquaculture programs did not significantly affect regulatory 
climate.
As hypothesized, transferring regulatory enforcement authority from state fish and 
wildlife/natural resources agencies to state departments o f agriculture (ENFORCE) had a 
large, significant negative effect on regulatory climate. The negative marginal effect for 
ENFORCE was the largest negative, state-controllable institutional characteristic. Only the 
region location variables had a greater negative effect on regulatory climate. Joint 
enforcement (JOINTENF) between state fish and wildlife/natural resources agencies and 
state departments o f agriculture significantly increased regulatory climate. This result is 
consistent with the administrative agency dual bureaucracy results discussed in the previous 
paragraph.
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O f the four fish category variables (ORNAMENT. BAITFISH, FWGAME, and 
MARGAME), only the ornamental category (ORNAMENT) was statistically significant 
at the a  = .05 level. The baitfish category (BAITFISH) was significant at the a  = . 10 level. 
The negative signs suggest that, as hypothesized, ornamentals and baitfish are subjected to 
lower regulatory climate than commercial foodfish. the base fish category. The 
insignificance o f the coefficients for the freshwater gamefish (FWGAME) and marine 
gamefish (MARGAME) variables failed to support the hypotheses that gamefish, both 
freshwater and marine, are subject to significantly higher regulatory stringency than 
commercial foodfish.
All four region variables (NOREAST, NORCENTRAL, TROPSUB. and 
SOUTHERN) were statistically significant al the a = .05 level, with negative coefficients. 
This suggests that regulatory stringency is highest in the western region, which represents 
the base region in this model. To provide more details on any significant differences 
between regions, an ANOVA was performed on the computed regulatory climate scale 
value for all observations to determine if there are any statistically significant (a  = .05) 
differences in regulatory climate between regions. The ANOVA F-test results (F - 22.109. 
p  = .000) indicated that at least one statistically significant difference exists between the 
regions. A Duncan's multiple range test was also performed to identify the pairs o f 
statistically significant differences between region means. Results from the Duncan’s test 
failed to distinguish any significant differences between the southern, north-central and 
tropical-subtropical regions. The northeast and western regions were both significantly 
different from one another and the other three regions.
186
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ordered Probit Model Results
The ordered probit model was estimated in LIMDEP 7.0 using 169 observations 
from the 230 observations generated by the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program 
Survey. Sixty-one observations with missing data were excluded by the LIMDEP listwise 
deletion o f missing observations. The dependent variable was the partitioned regulatory 
climate (RCCAT). The model was considered significant overall, based on the likelihood 
ratio test statistic (x2 = 122.313. p  = 0.00). The computed McFadden's pseudo-R2 of 0.254 
was comparable to other analyses using ordered probit. while the computed Aldrich and 
Nelson's R2AN was 0.420.
The ordered probit maximum likelihood estimates are provided in Table 5.7. and 
the marginal probabilities are given in Table 5.8. The estimated parameter signs and the 
statistical significance results for the ordered probit were comparable to the results obtained 
from the two-limit truncated regression, with several exceptions. The joint administration 
variable (JOINTADM), which was significant at the a = .05 level in the two-limit truncated 
regression model, was significant at the a  = .10 level in the ordered probit. The joint 
enforcement variable (JOINTENF), which was significant at a = .05 in the two-limit 
truncated regression model, was not statistically significant (p  = 0.240) in the ordered probit 
model. The BAITFISH fish category variable, which was significant at the a = .10 level 
in the two-limit truncated regression analysis, was significant at the a  = .05 level in the 
ordered probit model.
All region variables had negative coefficients and were statistically significant, 
using the a = .05 level of significance, similar to the results from the two-limit truncated
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Table 5.7 Empirical Results for the Ordered Probit Model of State Regulatory





Error z-value Sig. Level
Variable
Mean
Constant 4.725 0.511 9.249 0.000***





1 -3.723 0.000*** 0.544
AGADMIN 0.661 0.327 2.020 0.043** 0.468
JOINTADM 0.702 0.372 1.891 0.059* 0.201
COOPEXT -0.039 0.283 -0.136 0.892 0.213
ENFORCE -0.958 0.454 -2.109 0.035** 0.367
JOINTENF 0.564 0.481 1.174 0.240 0.260
ORNAMENT -0.745 0.253 -2.945 0.003*** 0.213
BAITFISH -0.566 0.267 -2.123 0.034** 0.201
FWGAME 0.245 0.268 0.915 0.360 0.213
MARGAME 0.162 0.389 0.416 0.677 0.148
NOREAST -1.472 0.461 -3.192 0.001*** 0.178
NORCENT -2.805 0.457 -6.137 0.000*** 0.254
TROPSUB -2.135 0.614 -3.479 0.000*** 0.059
SOUTHERN -2.751 0.429 -6.414 0.000*** 0.373
Log Likelihood Function -179.787
Restricted Log Likelihood -240.943
Likelihood Test T  d.f. = 15 122.313 0.000***
McFadden's Pseudo-R2 0.254 Aldrich and Nelson R2AN 0.420
Percent o f Right Predictions 63.91
* Significant at the 10% level o f  probability 
** S ign ifican t at the 5%  level o f  probab ility  
*** Significant at the 1% level o f  probability
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Table 5.8 Marginal Effects for Ordered Probit Model of State Regulatory
Climate Associated with State Institutional Characteristics
Variable RCCAT= 0 RCCAT = 1 RCCAT = 2 RCCAT = 3 RCCAT = 4
Constant 0.188 1.18 0.089 i ■*> -0.129
DEFINE 0.007 0.042 0.003 -0.047 -0.005
DEVPLAN -0.045 -0.284 -0.021 0.319 0.031
AGADMIN 0.026 0.166 0.013 -0.187 -0.018
JOINTADM 0.028 0.176 0.013 -0.198 -0.019
COOPEXT -0.002 -0.010 -0.001 0.011 0.001
ENFORCE -0.038 -0.240 -0.018 0.270 0.026
JOINTENF 0.023 0.141 0.011 -0.159 -0.015
ORNAMENT -0.030 -0.187 -0.014 0.210 0.020
BAITFISH -0.023 -0.142 -0.011 0.160 0.015
FWGAME 0.010 0.061 0.005 -0.069 -0.007
MARGAME 0.006 0.041 0.003 -0.046 -0.004
NOREAST -0.059 -0.369 -0.028 0.415 0.040
NORCENT -0.112 -0.703 -0.053 0.791 0.076
TROPSUB -0.085 -0.535 -0.040 0.602 0.058
SOUTHERN -0.110 -0.690 -0.052 0.776 0.075
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regression. An ANOVA analysis was performed on the partitioned regulatory climate 
categories (RCCAT) value for all observations to determine if  there are any statistically 
significant (a = .05) differences in regulatory climate category between regions. The 
ANOVA f'-test results (F = 25.051. p  = .000) indicated that at least one statistically 
significant difference exists between the region means. The Duncan’s multiple range test 
failed to distinguish any significant differences between the southern, north-central and 
tropical-subtropical regions. The northeast and western regions were both significantly 
different from one another and the other three regions. These results are identical to the 
ANOVA results for the original regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) values, reported in 
the two-limit truncated regression results section.
The marginal effects for the ordered probit model, reported in Table 5.8. provide 
several interesting insights into the effects o f the independent variables as the levels o f 
regulatory stringency (RCCAT) change. Although the overall effects o f both the state 
development plan (DEVPLAN) and agriculture enforcement (ENFORCE) was to reduce 
regulatory stringency, at the two highest stringency levels (RCCAT = 3 and RCCAT = 4) 
the existence of a state aquaculture development plan and transferring regulatory authority 
to state departments o f agriculture actually increased regulatory stringency.
The marginal effects for both state department o f  agriculture administration 
(AGADMIN) and joint administration (JOINTADM) were opposite of the DEVPLAN and 
ENFORCE results. Although the overall effect of both AGADMIN and JOINTADM was 
to increase regulatory stringency, AGADMIN and JOINTADM both tended to reduce the
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level o f  regulatory stringency for the two highest regulatory stringency categories
(RCCAT).
The ordered probit results, evaluated together with the two-limit truncated 
regression results, suggest that the stringency o f state environmental regulations is 
significantly affected by the hypothesized key state institutional characteristics. This 
indicates that the empirical institutional economic model, and the conceptual model upon 
which it was based, were both appropriate for evaluating the relationship between state 
institutional characteristics and state regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry. 
The consistency between the results from the two estimated models also provided further 
evidence that the two alternative forms o f  the regulatory climate dependent variable 
correlate well and can be viewed as close empirical substitutes.
Summary
This chapter empirically examined the relationship between state institutional 
structure characteristics and regulatory climate toward the aquaculture industry. An 
empirically testable institutional economic model, based on the aquaculture regulatory 
climate conceptual model introduced in chapter 2, was developed. Aquaculture regulatory 
climate served as the dependent variable and key state characteristics reported in the 1995 
State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey were used as independent variables. Two 
alternative forms of the regulatory climate scale developed in chapter 4 were used to 
estimate the empirical model. The original RCSCALE was the truncated, continuous 
dependent variable in a two-limit tobit regression. The RCSCALE was partitioned into a 
five-category regulatory climate category (RCCAT) variable, which was used as the
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dependent variable in an ordered probit analysis. Em pirical estim ation results for both
models were reported and discussed.
The final chapter will summarize the major findings from this research project. 
Major conclusions will be presented regarding the appropriateness o f  using property rights 
to measure regulatory climate, the ability to develop a scale to measure regulatory climate, 
and the relationship between regulatory climate and state institutional structure. Specific 
policy implications w ill be discussed, limitations o f  the research will be identified, and 
directions for future research on regulatory climate will be suggested.
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The social system contains three major components: the natural environment, the 
structure o f social conventions and rules, including institutions, that control humans7 
dealings with each other, and the superstructure containing the belief system and values. 
Institutions are social decision systems which provide the rules for the allocation o f scarce 
resources among competing uses. The system o f property rights is the institutional 
instrument which describes the set o f economic and social relations defining the position 
o f each individual with respect to the resource utilization.
Attenuations in property rights can result from actions by the state. Government 
regulations, including environmental regulations can be viewed as a form of property rights 
attenuation. The power o f government to regulate citizens7 behavior in order to protect the 
public's health, welfare, safety, and morals is vested in state government. State regulations 
that most directly affect businesses can take many forms, including environmental 
protection, health and safety codes, and transportation regulation.
States are responsible for implementing many o f the key environmental laws 
enacted during the last thirty years. Environmental regulations can have a huge impact on 
private business, which typically bears the brunt o f the cost o f environmental regulations. 
Since firms7 expenses associated with environmental regulation vary between states, one 
key policy issue is whether business location decisions may be affected by the stringency 
o f state regulations.
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The possible effects o f state environmental regulatory stringency on firm decision 
making have important implications for U.S. livestock agriculture. The U.S. livestock 
production and marketing system has been undergoing significant structural change toward 
industrialization for more than four decades. Farm structure has been evolving from small, 
diversified farms toward fewer, larger farms specializing in livestock production, integrated 
into marketing stages located in clusters near processing facilities and specialized 
infrastructure. Negative externalities have increased with the changing livestock sector 
structure, resulting in increased pressure on state governments to intervene by 
implementing stricter environmental controls and limiting the growth of livestock 
agriculture.
Livestock agriculture is now among the most heavily regulated sectors in most 
developed countries, including the United States. States have implemented a wide array 
o f environmental policy tools, with a great degree o f variation across states. The number 
o f possible combinations complicates attempts to classify and compare states' regulatory 
stringency toward agriculture. These variations in state policies may alter the comparative 
advantage o f a state and affect the location o f animal production. Although environmental 
restrictions cannot induce someone to move an existing farm, since natural capital is 
immobile, even in the long run, regulations can affect where specific animal species are 
raised. The stringency of state environmental quality regulations and their enforcement 
have been cited as an important factor influencing the location, growth and expansion 
decision o f livestock farms and related agribusinesses.
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Objectives of the Study
The overall objective o f this research was to examine the relationships between 
property rights, regulation, state institutional structure, firm decision making (location and 
species selection) and industry development as they relate to U. S. aquaculture industry, a 
rapidly expanding subsector o f livestock agriculture. The study was specifically designed 
to :(l) identify and review literature concerning the relationships between property rights, 
regulation, and industry development; (2) formulate a conceptual model o f  aquaculture 
industry regulation, illustrating the relationship between political actors, institutional 
structure, regulatory climate and firm decision making; (3) use the conceptual model as a 
framework to develop and validate a summated scale measure o f  state regulatory climate 
toward finfish aquaculture, with underlying dimensions based on four property rights 
conditions; (4) empirically evaluate the impact and significance o f key state institutional 
characteristics (lead administrative agency, enforcement agency, development plan, 
definitions o f  aquaculture and aquatic organisms, finfish classification, region) on the 
regulatory’ climate; and (5) provide policy recommendations to farmers and state 
aquaculture development and regulatory officials, based upon the results o f  the scale 
measure and empirical evaluation.
Previous Research
There is widespread belief that state environmental protection regulations can 
present a significant influence on the location o f economic activity, especially for highly 
polluting and heavily regulated industries. Numerous studies have found that state 
pollution control laws exert, at most, a moderate influence on the location o f a new
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manufacturing plant. Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f state environmental 
regulations, was identified in the relocation decisions by a majority o f  polluting industry 
CEOs and is the factor least likely to be regarded as unimportant. The few, limited studies 
on the effects o f environmental policies upon the location o f farms and related 
agribusinesses suggest that state environmental policies do appear to influence location, 
growth and expansion decisions o f agribusinesses.
The most difficult problem encountered in previous studies on the effects o f 
regulatory climate on manufacturing industry and livestock agriculture decision making 
was how to measure regulatory climate. Attempts to measure regulatory climate have met 
with only limited success. Existing measures o f regulatory stringency fall into two 
categories: proxies for environmental stringency, and direct measures. Environmental 
stringency proxies include measures o f state enforcement efforts and measures o f  industry 
compliance costs. Direct measures include quantitative environmental standards and 
qualitative indices.
Each type o f environmental stringency measure reviewed in this study has 
disadvantages. For example, measures o f enforcement effort may simply reflect the 
concentration o f heavily polluting industries within the state, rather than the intensity o f 
enforcement efforts. Compliance cost proxy measures depend on accurate measurement 
o f environmental spending, but there is considerable guesswork involved in determining 
pollution abatement costs. There are also problems controlling for state-specific 
characteristics that have nothing to do with regulatory stringency.
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Direct quantitative standards are not especially useful because they are often not 
comparable across states, are highly industry-specific, and are difficult to construct for 
empirical analysis. Quantitative measures do have a key advantage over qualitative indices 
o f allowing researchers to measure the marginal effects o f  regulation.
Existing qualitative indices do incorporate the stringency o f  common environmental 
laws affecting manufacturing industries, but development o f  qualitative indices has been 
limited to ad hoc procedures. No attempts to statistically examine correlations between 
indicators or mathematically validate indicator importance or weights, were reported for 
any established qualitative index.
None o f the established indices of environmental regulatory climate are tailored to 
agriculture. Efforts to use these indices to measure the stringency o f environmental 
regulations toward livestock agriculture and related agribusinesses have met with mixed 
results. One goal o f this research is to develop a quantitative summated scale measure 
which combines the advantages o f direct quantitative measures and qualitative indices. 
Theoretical F ram ew ork
The institutional approach to economic policy analysis provided the underlying 
framework for developing a theoretical model to explain how agribusiness location 
decisions may be influenced by institutional structure and regulatory stringency. 
Embedded within this framework were elements o f both public choice theory and firm 
location theory. Public choice theory argues that the relative influence o f political actors 
determines the important structural characteristics o f state institutions affecting industry. 
The institutional structure, in turn, influences the status o f the various location decision
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factors, including state regulatory climate. Finally, in accordance with firm location theory, 
location decisions are made based on an evaluation o f  the various firm location factors. 
Conceptual Model
Over the last decade, there has been a recognized need to adjust the structure o f 
institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture industry's growth and development. 
The demand for institutional change has resulted in major changes in the states' approaches 
to the aquaculture industry and the evolution o f new institutions which ensure attention to 
the industry's changing needs.
The theoretical model explaining firm location decisions, described above, was 
directly applied to the aquaculture industry' to develop and illustrate a conceptual model of 
the relationship between state institutions, regulatory climate toward fish culture, and firm 
decision making. Both the site and species selection decisions represent location decisions 
within the context o f  the conceptual model. These decisions are, in large pan. influenced 
by state regulatory' climate, which can be considered one location decision factor.
The process o f  establishing the state regulatory climate toward aquaculture begins 
with a bargaining process between the relevant political actors: industry' groups, 
bureaucrats, environmental groups, recreational interests, and consumer groups. The result 
is a pattern o f state institutional structure characteristics, which directly determines the 
state's regulatory climate. The choice o f state institutional structure characteristics 
important in the determination of regulatory climate toward finfish aquaculture was 
developed from the literature on the constraints to aquaculture industry growth and 
development. Important state characteristics included the legal definition o f aquaculture
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as a form o f agriculture, the existence o f a state aquaculture development plan, the lead 
state administrative and enforcement agencies, the finfish classification (baitfish, 
ornamental, commercial foodfish, freshwater gamefish, marine gamefish), and the region. 
Regulatory Climate Summated Scale
Regulatory climate, defined as the stringency o f state regulations influencing 
aquaculture, is a latent variable which cannot be easily measured in a direct fashion. A 
summated scale is a collection o f items intended to reveal the levels o f theoretical variables 
not observable by direct means. With a summated scale, each individual item is designed 
to be an observation o f the intended variable, with the strength o f the latent variable 
presumed to cause the set o f items to take on a certain value. The regulatory climate scale 
development process consisted o f six steps: (1) construct definition and construct domain 
specification, (2) generation o f an initial item pool, (3) determination o f measure structure, 
(4) reliability assessment and item analysis. (5) confirmatory factor analysis, and (6) 
validity assessment. Steps 3 and 4 are performed simultaneously in an iterative fashion.
Defining the latent variable involved carefully delineating the nature o f regulatory 
climate, including the underlying dimensions upon which regulatory climate was based, 
and from which the scale items were selected. In this research, property rights served as 
the underlying dimensions o f regulatory climate. Traditional neoclassical economic market 
models assume an ideal, well-defined private property rights structure, with exclusive and 
complete individual ownership o f resources. Randall (1987) identified four conditions 
necessary for an adequate set o f nonattenuated private property rights: ownership, 
specification of rights o f ownership, transferability o f  rights, and rights enforcement. Any
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limitation on the way in which property rights may be utilized, including government 
regulations, can be viewed as private property rights attenuations, with the growth o f 
government regulation weakening private property rights. The intensity o f  regulatory 
climate determines the level o f property rights attenuation.
The creation o f  the initial item pool was a critical step in scale construction. The 
fundamental goal was to systematically sample all content that is relevant to state 
regulatory climate, with multiple items identified to capture each of the dimensions. For 
the state aquaculture regulatory climate construct, the initial item pool consisted o f 18 items 
reflecting the existence and stringency o f regulatory conditions attenuating each o f the four 
property rights dimensions. The 18 items were obtained from a 1995 State Finfish 
Aquaculture Program Survey and a follow-up 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. Forty- 
five states and Guam participated in the surveys and provided answers for five categories 
o f finfish. including ornamentals, baitfish, commercial foodfish. freshwater gamefish and 
marine gamefish. resulting in 230 observations.
Once the first two steps in the scale development process were completed, a 
measurement model was proposed which showed the hypothesized relationship between 
regulatory climate and its underlying dimensions, as represented by the observed variables 
selected from the item pool. The measurement model formed an operational definition o f 
the latent variable from the theoretical definitions.
Initial determination of the scale’s structure was accomplished through exploratory 
factor analysis, a multivariate statistical method used to analyze the structure o f  the 
correlations among a large number o f variables in a data matrix by defining a set o f
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common underlying dimensions, or factors. The factor analysis was performed in an 
iterative fashion with item analysis and reliability assessment to "purify" the measure by 
discarding non-representative, poorly correlated items, and items which correlate with 
multiple factors, and, thus, reduce the number o f  items in the scale. The final result o f  the 
exploratory factor analysis, item analysis and reliability assessment suggested that 
regulatory climate could be represented by an 11-item overall scale with four distinct 
subscales representing the four property rights conditions: ownership, specification, 
transferability, and enforcement.
Confirmatory factor analysis, a special case o f structural equation modeling (SEM). 
was used to confirm hypothesized factor structures, refine the scale, and validate the 
dimensional structure o f the scale measure. Structural equation modeling is a 
comprehensive, multivariate statistical technique for testing hypotheses about relationships 
among observed and latent variables. SEM combines aspects o f multiple regression for 
examining linear dependence relationships and factor analysis for representing latent 
variables with multiple observed variables. SEM represents an efficient technique for 
estimating a series o f separate, interdependent multiple regression equations 
simultaneously, while accounting for measurement error in the estimation process.
The structural equation model, which consisted of two basic components 
(submodels), a measurement model and the structural model, was estimated with the 
LISREL computer package and generalized least squares (GLS) estimation, using a two- 
stage process. A matrix o f the polychoric correlations for the scale items served as the 
input data for the structural equation estimation. The polychoric correlation provides the
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best estim ation results when the observed variables are ordinal, with three or m ore
categories.
The 11-indicator, four-latent variable measurement model developed through 
exploratory factor analysis specified the indicators for each latent variable and described 
the measurement properties of each observed variable for estimating the causal 
relationships. The measurement model was estimated, but the enforcement latent construct 
and its two indicator items did not correlate adequately with the other three latent variables, 
and were dropped from the measurement model. A modified measurement model was 
specified, consisting o f three latent variables representing transferability, specification, and 
ownership. Each latent variable was defined by three observed variables. The nine- 
indicator. modified measurement model was re-estimated using a new polychoric 
correlation matrix and GLS estimation. All estimated regression coefficients were 
significant, and o f expected signs, with no offending estimates and satisfactory goodness- 
of-fit.
The structural model specified causal relationships among the latent variables, 
described the causal effects, and assigned the explained and unexplained variances. A 
structural model with regulatory climate as a second-order latent factor was specified and 
estimated, based on the estimated measurement model. All path regression coefficients 
were statistically significant at the a  = .10 level and o f the expected sign.
The confirmatory analysis suggested that state regulatory climate can be adequately 
represented by a nine-item, three-latent variable summated scale. The final regulatory 
climate scale consisted of three subscales which represent three of the four underlying
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property rights conditions: transferability, specification, and ownership. Each subscale 
(three items with item values ranging from 0 - 2 )  had a range o f  0 - 6, with the overall 
summated regulatory climate scale having a theoretical range from 0 - 1 8 .
To assess the construct validity o f the aquaculture regulatory climate scale, scale 
values were computed for each observation and category o f fish, and correlated with two 
proxies for state regulatory climate obtained from the State Finfish Aquaculture Program 
Survey 1998 Supplemental Questionnaire. These were the respondents' Likert scale self- 
assessments o f state regulatory climate toward aquaculture for each fish category and the 
number of fish farms in each o f the five categories. The scale's correlation with self- 
assessments o f  state regulatory climate was significant at the 0.01 level and o f the expected 
sign. The correlation between the regulatory climate scale value and the number o f  fish 
farms in each o f the five categories was significant at the 0.05 level and o f the expected 
sign, indicating a negative relationship between regulatory stringency and the number o f 
fish farms. These significant correlations provided evidence for construct validity o f the 
regulatory climate scale for disaggregate, fish category data.
Em pirical Models
The conceptual model which illustrates the relationship between state institutional 
structure and regulatory climate, one decision factor in aquaculture firm location and 
species selection decisions, was expressed as an empirically testable institutional economic 
model, where regulatory climate served as the dependent variable, and the independent 
variables were key state institutional structure characteristics.
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Regulatory Climate Dependent Variables
The mathematical properties o f the regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) dependent 
variable were found to have major empirical implications. The regulatory climate scale 
was designed as an 18-category ordinal scale, permitting rank-ordering o f respondents. An 
ordered categorical variable with 11 or more levels can be considered a coarsely measured 
version of a continuous variable, and treated as continuous, even though it is not continuous 
in the mathematical sense. Thus, RCSCALE was considered as "assumed continuous" for 
empirical purposes, with the values connoting a continuum o f labels which are equal 
distances apart. The designation of the scale as assumed continuous allowed its use as the 
dependent variable in linear regression analysis.
If the RCSCALE was strictly considered an ordinal variable, limited qualitative 
dependent variable models were appropriate for estimation, instead o f linear regression 
analysis. Since an 18-category ordinal dependent variable contains too many ordered 
alternatives to analyze with limited qualitative dependent variable techniques. RCSCALE 
was partitioned into a five-category regulatory climate category (RCCAT) dependent 
variable. The partitioning strategy, which was based upon the distribution and standard 
deviation of the RCSCALE. enhanced practical interpretation and allowed estimation using 
limited qualitative dependent variable estimation methods.
State Institutional Characteristic Independent Variables
The state institutional characteristics included as independent variables in the 
empirical analysis were determined from the conceptual model. The directions o f 
hypothesized impacts on regulatory climate, summarized below, were developed from the
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literature on the constraints to aquaculture industry growth and development. The data for 
the independent variables was obtained from the 1995 State Finfish Aquaculture Program 
Survey.
Major industry efforts have been expended to have states legally declare aquaculture 
a form o f agriculture, based upon the belief that agriculture status confers certain legal 
protections. Many states have been formulating formal aquaculture development plans to 
promote industry growth and expansion. The presence o f a state aquaculture development 
plan was expected to reduce the stringency o f the regulatory climate.
In most states, regulation o f the aquaculture industry has evolved in state game and 
fish departments. An important theme with fish farmers is regulatory jurisdiction. 
Producers believe that jurisdiction over aquaculture belongs in state departments of 
agriculture, which producers feel would provide economic advocacy and sympathetic 
industry regulation. The lead administrative and enforcement agencies were modeled as 
either the state department o f agriculture or a state natural resources/fish and wildlife 
agency.
State fish and wildlife agencies laws classify fish species into categories, such as 
baitfish, ornamentals, foodfish and gamefish. Different classifications o f fish are regulated 
differently by state fish and game agencies. The literature suggests that there appears to 
be a continuum of regulatory restrictiveness.
For purposes o f setting research priorities and disbursing federal aquaculture 
research funds, the USDA divides the United States into five regional aquaculture zones 
(northeast, southern, north-central, western, and tropical-subtropical), each serviced by a
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regional aquaculture center. Regions differ in terms o f environmental conditions, species 
cultured, population density, and importance and influence o f the aquaculture industry and 
environmental groups.
Empirical Analysis
Two separate models were estimated, using the LIMDEP 7.0 computer software 
(Greene, 1995) to examine the relationship between regulatory climate and state 
institutional characteristics. O f the 230 observ ations generated by the 1995 State Finfish 
Aquaculture Program Survey, 61 observations with missing data were excluded from the 
analysis. The remaining 169 observations were used for model estimation. A variety of 
col linearity and heteroskedasticity diagnostics were performed and indicated that neither 
collinearitv nor heteroskedasticity appeared to pose a significant problem for the two 
empirical models.
The RCSCALE variable, treated as a truncated continuous variable, served as the 
dependent variable in a two-limit truncated regression analysis, and the RCCAT variable 
was the dependent variable in an ordered probit analysis. The key state institutional 
characteristics, described previously, were used as the independent variables in both 
analyses.
Since all independent variables were coded as binary variables, the constant term 
represented the level o f regulatory climate under base level conditions for all independent 
variables. The base level was conceptualized as a state that has not defined aquaculture as 
agriculture, with no formal development plan, where the state fish and wildlife agency is
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responsible for both administration and enforcement o f aquaculture programs and 
regulations, and which is located in the western region of the United States.
Two-Limit Truncated Regression
Examination o f the signs, statistical significance, and marginal effects o f the two- 
limit truncated regression estimated parameter coefficients produced several important 
results. First, defining aquaculture as a form o f agriculture, while it may provide fish 
farmers with certain tax and legal benefits, did not have a statistically significant effect on 
regulatory climate. This result suggested that the major industry efforts to have aquaculture 
defined as agriculture in each state will not directly affect the stringency o f state 
regulations.
The establishment o f a formal state aquaculture development plan had a statistically 
significant negative impact on regulatory climate, with the magnitude o f the negative effect 
being the second largest negative, state-controllable institutional characteristic, second only 
to transferring regulatory enforcement authority from state fish and wildlife agencies to 
state departments o f agriculture. This suggests that a formal state aquaculture development 
plan may be an important tool for states wishing to promote aquaculture industry 
development by reducing the stringency o f regulations.
The coefficients for administrative agency provided some unexpected results. First, 
transferring administrative authority from state fish and wildlife/natural resources agencies 
to state departments of agriculture, without transferring enforcement authority, increased 
regulatory stringency. This result suggests that transferring administrative authority only, 
without transferring enforcement, simply adds another layer o f regulatory bureaucracy
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w hich increases regulatory stringency. This result was supported by the result that joint
adm inistration also significantly increases regulatory stringency.
A number o f states reported that the Cooperative Extension Sendee plays a role in 
developing and administering aquaculture programs. A role by Cooperative Extension did 
not significantly affect regulatory climate. Most Cooperative Extension aquaculture 
programs emphasize production and marketing technical assistance to producers. These 
types o f programs, typically, are not directly related to regulations.
Transferring regulatory enforcement authority from state fish and wildlife/natural 
resources agencies to state departments o f agriculture had a large, significant negative 
effect on regulatory climate. The negative marginal effect was the largest, state-controllable 
institutional characteristic which can be manipulated to reduce regulatory stringency. As 
expected, joint enforcement between state fish and wildlife/natural resources agencies and 
state departments o f agriculture significantly increased regulatory climate. This result is 
consistent with the dual bureaucracy explanation for the administrative agency results.
O f the four fish category variables, only the ornamental fish category was 
statistically significant at the a  = .05 level. The baitfish category was significant at the a 
= .10 level. The negative signs suggest that ornamentals and baitfish are subjected to 
significantly lower regulatory climate than commercial foodfish. the base fish category. 
All four region variables were statistically significant, with negative coefficients, 
suggesting that regulatory stringency is highest in the western region o f the United States, 
which represents the base region in this model.
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Ordered Probit Analysis
The ordered probit model was estimated in LIMDEP 7.0. The dependent variable was the 
partitioned regulatory climate (RCCAT). The model was considered significant overall, 
based on the likelihood ratio test statistic (x2 = 122.313, p  = 0.00).
The estimated parameter signs and statistical significance results for the ordered 
probit were comparable to the results obtained from the two-limit truncated regression, with 
several exceptions. Joint administration, which was significant at the a = .05 level in the 
two-limit truncated regression model, was significant at the a  = .10 level in the ordered 
probit. Joint enforcement had a statistically significant positive effect on regulatory climate 
in the two-limit truncated regression model, but w'as not statistically significant (p  = 0.240) 
in the ordered probit model. The baitfish category' variable, which was significant at the 
a = . 10 level in the two-limit truncated regression analysis, was significant at the a = .05 
level in the ordered probit model.
The ordered probit marginal effects provided insights into the changing effects of 
the independent variables as the levels o f state regulatory stringency change. At the highest 
regulatory stringency levels, the marginal effects o f four significant independent variables: 
state aquaculture development plan, state department of agriculture program administration, 
joint agency administration, and state department o f agriculture regulatory enforcement, 
were opposite of the overall effects.
Conclusions
In 1987, Randall proposed that four property rights conditions were necessary for 
an adequate set o f nonattenuated property rights: ownership, specification, transferability
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and enforcement. Since then, property rights theorists have expounded on the value of 
using a property rights approach in the economic analysis o f theoretical and policy issues 
concerning institutional constraints to resource control and use (Dale, 1992; Tietenberg, 
1992). However, attempts to empirically confirm or apply the four property rights 
conditions have been conspicuously lacking in the economics literature. This study has 
demonstrated that property rights conditions can be operationalized and used empirically 
as analytical tools.
One stated objective o f this research was to develop and validate an objective 
method for measuring state regulatory climate based on sound economic theory' and 
statistical techniques, rather than the ad hoc methods which have been utilized in the 
development o f  previous regulatory climate indices. Randall's property rights conditions 
provided the underlying dimensional structure for a nine-item, 18-categorv summated scale 
measure o f state regulatory climate consisting of three distinct subscales. The results 
demonstrated that, through the use o f factor analysis and structural equations modeling, 
state regulatory climate could be adequately and validly represented by three property 
rights conditions: ownership, specification o f rights, and transferability o f rights. The 
fourth theoretical property rights condition, rights enforcement, could not be empirically 
segregated as a separate condition, but in this empirical setting, was probably subsumed 
within the other three property rights conditions.
Previous regulatory climate studies have treated regulatory climate as one 
explanatory firm location decision variable, within a firm location theory context. This 
study took a different approach to regulatory climate by developing a theoretical
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institutional economic model, incorporating elements o f both public choice and firm 
location theories, to explain how state institutional characteristics impact the stringency of 
state environmental regulations. A conceptual model o f state regulatory climate toward 
fish aquaculture was formulated and empirically estimated to evaluate the impact and 
significance o f key state institutional characteristics and strategies on regulatory climate.
The mathematical measurement properties o f the regulatory' climate scale had major 
implications for both empirical estimation and practical interpretation. The treatment ofthe 
ordinal regulatory climate scale (RCSCALE) as assumed continuous, based on 18 
categories, provided more empirically interpretable results than did the partitioning ofthe 
scale into the regulatory climate category (RCCAT) variable, with five stringency 
categories. However, the RCCAT variable was more practically interpretable.
From an empirical perspective, both the two-limit truncated regression and the 
ordered probit analysis seemed to provide comparable results. The estimated parameter 
coefficient signs and statistical significance were almost identical between the two models. 
The empirical results indicated that the lowest level o f state regulatory stringency would 
be faced by a fish farmer raising ornamental fish in a north-central or southern state which 
had established a formal aquaculture development plan and vested enforcement of 
aquaculture regulations with the state department o f agriculture. The highest level of 
regulatory stringency is faced by a farmer raising gamefish species (either freshwater or 
marine) in a western state with no formal aquaculture development plan, and with both 
aquaculture program administration and regulatory enforcement shared jointly by the state 
department o f agriculture and the state fish and wildlife/natural resources agency.
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The two-limit truncated regression marginal effects provided the overall marginal 
impacts o f changes in state institutional structural characteristics on regulatory climate. 
The ordered probit marginal effects complemented the two-limit truncated regression 
marginal effects by providing insights into the effects o f changes in the independent 
variables as the levels of state regulatory stringency vary from low to high levels. The 
ordered probit marginal effects suggest that a state considering institutional changes to 
improve the level o f regulatory stringency toward the aquaculture industry must evaluate 
the existing level o f regulatory stringency before selecting and implementing institutional 
changes.
Policy Implications
The regulatory climate scale can serve as a useful policy tool for the aquaculture 
industry. Prospective fish farmers can use the scale as a location decision tool to compare 
states on the basis o f regulatory climate and fish category to identify those states with low 
regulatory' stringency. Existing farmers considering diversification into aquaculture, or fish 
farmers considering species diversification can use the regulatory climate scale as a species 
selection tool to compare their state’s regulatory stringency toward the five different 
categories o f fish, with the goal o f selecting a fish species from the category subject to the 
lowest possible degree of regulatory stringency within their state.
The regulatory climate scale should also prove useful to state development and 
regulatory officials. State officials can compare their state with surrounding states on the 
basis o f regulatory stringency toward aquaculture to evaluate their comparative advantage 
in attracting and retaining aquacultural enterprises. States with very low levels of
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regulatory stringency, such as Arkansas, Florida (except for freshwater gamefish), and 
Missouri can serve as model states for high stringency states wishing to reduce regulatory 
stringency and encourage aquaculture industry expansion within their state.
It was previously noted that, over the last decade, there has been a recognized need 
to adjust the structure o f institutional arrangements to facilitate the aquaculture industry’s 
growth and development. The empirical analysis o f  the effect o f state institutional structure 
on regulatory climate suggested two key state institutional changes that will significantly 
reduce the stringency o f state regulations and improve the regulatory climate toward fish 
aquaculture. First, the creation o f a formal state aquaculture industry development plan, 
which requires a commitment by state development and regulatory agencies to work 
together to chart the course for industry development, will have a significant, negative 
effect on the stringency of state regulations toward aquaculture. The second institutional 
change to reduce regulatory stringency involves the transfer o f aquaculture regulator}' 
enforcement authority from state fish and w'ildlife/natural resource agencies to state 
departments o f agriculture. Joint administration and/or joint enforcement simply adds an 
additional layer o f bureaucracy which increases regulator}' stringency.
Directions for Future Research
The demonstration that property rights conditions can be useful as analytical tools 
in empirical analysis suggests that future research be directed toward investigating other 
ways in which property rights conditions can be utilized empirically to evaluate economic 
policy issues. This research, using one data set, was unable to completely discriminate 
between the four separate property rights conditions which theory suggests are important:
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ownership, rights specification, transferability and rights enforcement. Enforcement o f 
rights appeared to be subsumed within the other three property rights conditions.
Whether the inability to empirically discriminate rights enforcement from the other 
three property rights conditions is a data-specific situation or holds as a general rule could 
not be determined from this research. The selection o f the item pool is a critical step in 
scale construction, with the conceptual framework determining the data selection 
procedure. Multiple items clearly representative o f state enforcement o f  aquaculture 
industry rights could not be identified, from the available data set, for inclusion in the initial 
item pool. Further research with other data sets should examine the distinctiveness and 
empirical relationship between the four property rights conditions.
The regulatory climate scale values computed in this study provide a picture o f  state 
regulatory climate toward the finfish aquaculture. However, the picture is simply one 
snapshot in time. State regulatory attitudes and institutional structure undergo continuous 
change in a dynamic process, based on bargaining between political actors: industry groups, 
bureaucrats, environmental groups, recreational interests, and consumer groups. As 
institutional structures change over time, the aquaculture regulatory climate scale provides 
a tool for evaluating changes in state institutional characteristics and regulatory climate.
In the development o f the conceptual model o f the aquaculture regulatory climate - 
institutional relationship, the direction o f causality assumptions between political actors, 
institutional structural characteristics, regulatory climate and firm decision making affected 
the model’s basic structure. Future research should test the causality assumptions, by 
examining changes in institutional structure, regulator}' climate and industry growth over
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time and both before and after regulatory changes. Additional future research could also 
further refine the conceptual model by identifying the state institutional characteristics as 
either structure or process variables. The relationships between the conceptual model 
developed in this research and other models explaining the factors influencing the evolution 
o f agricultural industries, including the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and life­
cycle theory, should also be investigated in the future.
Finally, the conceptual model, empirical model and regulatory climate scale were 
developed to investigate state regulatory climate toward the U.S. aquaculture industry. 
However, the models were based on general institutional economic principles and the items 
included in the final scale appear to be applicable to other forms of alternative livestock. 
Given this generalized nature o f the models and scale, they may lead, with little or no 
modification, to a more general property rights based regulatory climate scale with broad 
applications for evaluating state regulatory climate toward other alternative livestock 
species.
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July 18. 1995
Dear State Aquaculture Contact:
Aquaculture is one o f the fastest growing segments o f American agriculture, with a wide 
variety o f freshwater and marine fish species being cultured. Alternative specifications of 
property rights and/or regulatory authority can influence restrictions on possession or 
marketing o f cultured species, ultimately influencing economic viability. The development 
o f fish farming has also required increased levels o f regulation and resulting enforcement 
activities, with costs often exceeding the capability o f government agencies. Incentive- 
based programs offer an alternative policy option to ensure regulatory compliance, and can 
often be substituted for regulatory restrictions.
The Louisiana State University Department o f Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 
would like to request your assistance in examining the issues associated with the 
development and assignment o f property rights to cultured fish, and the use o f  incentive- 
based programs by state and territorial governments.
Please complete the enclosed questionnaire, which was designed to take only a few 
moments o f your time, and return it to us in the postage-paid envelope. Alternatively, you 
may FAX the completed questionnaire to us at (504) 388-2716. Your name and telephone 
number are requested so that we may contact you in case we need follow-up information 
on any answers.
In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive a summary o f the final results o f this 
research. Copies will also be made available to any other interested state or federal 
agricultural or wildlife management officials.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project. 
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by 
calling the LSU research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank your for your assistance.
Sincerely,
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Septem ber 18, 1995
Dear State Aquaculture Contact:
Two months ago we sent you a copy o f a survey on property rights issues and the use o f 
incentives in aquaculture. To date we have not received your completed survey. Your 
response is important to us as it reflects activities in your state or territory.
Please complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it to us in the postage-paid envelope. 
Alternatively, you may FAX the completed questionnaire to us at (504) 388-2716. Your 
name and telephone number are requested so that we may contact you in case we need 
follow-up information.
In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive a summary o f  the final results o f this 
research. Copies will also be made available to any other interested state or federal 
agricultural or wildlife management officials.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project. 
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by 
calling the LSU research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank your for your assistance.
Sincerely.
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STATE FINFISH AQUACULTURE PROGRAM SURVEY: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE USE OF INCENTIVES
In th is  first sec tio n , w e  w o u ld  lik e  to  k n o w  so m e  g en era l in fo rm a tio n  a b o u t your S tate’s fin fish  I  
aq u acu ltu re  program  and in d u stry . W e are req u estin g  y o u r  nam e a n d  te le p h o n e  num ber in c a se  w e  need  I  
to  fo llo w -u p . I
Y o u r  N a m e: ____________________________________________________________________________
T itle: ____________________________________________________________________________
A g e n c y :  ____________________________________________________________________________
State: ____________________________________________________________________________
P h o n e  p :______________________________________
Q - l  D o e s  yo u r  State h a v e  a fo rm a l aqu acu ltu re  d e v e lo p m en t program  or  in itia tive?  (p le a se  c ircle  o n e  
an sw er)
Y E S  N O  U N C E R T A IN
If Y E S , in w h at y ea r  d id  the aqu acu ltu re program  b e g in ? ____
Q -2  W hich agen cy  or in stitu tion  is r e sp o n s ib le  for: (p le a se  c ir c le  a ll that a p p ly )
a. D e v e lo p in g  and a d m in is ter in g  aquacu ltu re program s?
1 S T A T E  A G R IC U L T U R E  D E P A R T M E N T
2 S T A T E  F ISH  A N D  W IL D L IF E  D E P A R T M E N T
3 O T H E R  (p le a se  s p e c i f y ) ___________________
b. E nforc in g  a q u acu ltu re  reg u la tio n s?
1 S T A T E  A G R IC U L T U R E  D E P A R T M E N T
2 S T A T E  F ISH  A N D  W IL D L IF E  D E P A R T M E N T
3 O T H E R  (p le a s e  s p e c i f y ) ___________________
Q -3  Is aquaculture leg a lly  c o n s id e r ed  an agricultural a c tiv ity  in y o u r  S tate?  (p le a se  c irc le  o n e  answ er)
Y E S  N O  U N C E R T A IN
If Y E S , in w h at yea r  w a s  aq u acu ltu re  dec lared  to  be a g r ic u ltu r e ? ______
2j o
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Q -4  A p p rox im ate ly  how  m a n y  private fin fish  aquaculture fa c ilit ie s  are cu rren tly  o p era tin g  in y o u r  State?  
(fill in the b lank) __________
Q -5  D o es y o u r  State require that private fish farm s obtain  a gen era l l ic e n se  o r  p erm it to  operate  in y o u r  
State? (p le a se  c ircle  o n e  an sw er)
Y E S  N O  U N C E R T A IN
If  Y E S , is the general lic e n se  or perm it transferable upon  c h a n g e  o f  fish  farm  o w n ersh ip ?  (p le a se  
circle  o n e  answ er)
Y E S  N O  U N C E R T A IN
Q -6  Are fish  in aquacu lture fa c ilit ie s  leg a lly  co n sid ered  to  be: (p le a se  c ir c le  o n e  a n sw e r  for each  part)
a. P rivately o w n ed Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. E xem pt from  w ild life  la w s Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. L iv esto ck Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
Q -7  Please list, in d e sc e n d in g  order, the top  fou r  finfish  sp e c ie s  cu ltured  in private  aq u acu ltu re  fa c ilit ie s  
in your  state, based  o n  farm  g a te  m arket value.
1. _________________________
In the fo llo w in g  sec tio n , w e  w o u ld  lik e  to e x p lo re  issu es rela tin g  to the o w n ersh ip  and sp ec if ic a t io n  o f  
property  rights to d ifferen t c a te g o r ie s  o f  f in fish  in aquaculture o p e r a tio n s . F or all q u es tio n s , p lea se  
c ir c le  on e  an sw er for each  c a teg o r y . ]
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Q -8  W hen c o n fin e d  in an aqu acu ltu re  fa c ility , are the fo l lo w in g  c a te g o r ie s  o f  fish  co n sid ered  p rivate  
property, o w n ed  by the farm  operator?
a. O rnam entals Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. B aitfish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. C om m ercia l fo o d fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
d. Freshw ater g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
e. M arine g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
f. O ther Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
(sp ec ify )
Q -9  Is an aquacu lturist required to  obtain  a sp ec ia l lic en se  or  p erm it to  p o s se ss  and cu lture the fo llo w in g  
ca teg o r ies o f  fish?
a. O rnam entals Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. B aitfish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. C om m ercia l fo o d fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
d. F reshw ater g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
e. M arine g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
f. Other Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
(sp ec ify )
Q -1 0  For any Y E S  a n sw ers in Q -8  a b o v e , is the sp ec ia l p o s se ss io n  l ic e n se  or  perm it transferable up on  
ch an ge o f  fish  farm o w n ersh ip ?
a. O rnam entals Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. B aitfish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. C om m ercia l fo o d fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
d. F reshw ater g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
e. M arine g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
f. Other Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
(specify')
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Q -1 1 Is an aquaculturist required to design his facility to prevent escapem ent o f  the follow ing categories
Q -1 3
o f  fish ?
a. O rnam entals Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. B a itfish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. C o m m erc ia l fo o d fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
d. F resh w ater g a m e fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
e. M arine g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
f. O ther  
(sp e c ify )
Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
Is u n auth orized  r em o v a l o r  d estru ctio n  o f  cultured fish  from  an a q u a cu ltu re  fa c ility  lega lly  
co n sid ered  p o a c h in g  or th eft?
a. O rn am en ta ls P O A C H IN G T H E F T U N C E R T A IN
b. B a itfish P O A C H IN G T H E F T U N C E R T A IN
c . C o m m erc ia l fo o d fish P O A C H IN G T H E F T U N C E R T A IN
d. F resh w ater g a m e fish P O A C H IN G T H E F T U N C E R T A IN
e. M arine g a m efish P O A C H IN G T H E F T U N C E R T A IN
f. O ther  
(sp e c ify )
P O A C H IN G T H E F T U N C E R T A IN
Is a  written fish  in ven tory  or  p rod u ction  report required to ra ise  the f o l lo w in g  c a te g o r ie s  o f  fish in 
a co m m ercia l aqu acu ltu re fa c ility ?
a. O rnam entals Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. B aitfish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. C o m m erc ia l fo o d fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
d. F reshw ater g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
e. M arine g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
f. O ther  
(sp e c ify )
Y E S
2 3 6
N O U N C E R T A IN
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Q -1 4  Is a m arketing paper trail req u ired  for  a  fish  farm o p erator  to se ll  fa rm -ra ised  fish  from  the fo llo w in g
c a teg o r ies?
a. O rnam entals Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. B a itfish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. C o m m ercia l fo o d fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
d. F resh w ater g a m e fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
e. M arine g a m efish Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
f. O ther Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
(sp e c ify )
Q - 1 5 P lea se  descr ib e  any  s p e c if ic  l im ita tio n s  or r eg u la tio n s  on  the sa le  or  d isp o s it io n  of:
a. O rnam entals
b. B a itfish
c. C o m m ercia l fo o d fish
d. F reshw ater g a m efish
e. M arine g am e fish
f. O ther (sp ec ify )
In cen tiv e -b a sed  program s, in c lu d in g  d irec t p a y m en ts , en v iro n m en ta l su re ty  b o n d  or insurance  
req u irem en ts, p o llu tion  r igh ts sy s te m s , and  sp ec ia l ta x es can  o ffer  an alternative p o l ic y  o p tio n  to c o stly  
regu la tory  program s. In th is final s e c tio n , w e  w o u ld  lik e  to  e x p lo re  States' u se  o f  in c e n tiv e  program s 
to  p rom ote  regulatory c o m p lia n c e  b y  th e  f in fish  aqu acu ltu re industry.
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Q -I6  Has your State developed finfish aquaculture Best Management Practices? (please circle one
answer)
Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
If  Y e s , is fish farm er a d h eren ce  to  B M P 's vo lu n tary  or m andalury? (p le a se  c ir c le  o n e  a n sw er)
V O L U N T A R Y  M A N D A T O R Y  U N C E R T A IN
Q - 17 D o e s  y o u r  State h a v e  any o f  the f o l lo w in g  d irec t p ay m en t program s a v a ila b le  to  f in fish  aq u acu ltu re  
o p era tio n s?  D o not in c lu d e  F ed eral g o v e r n m e n t program s, (p le a se  c ir c le  o n e  a n sw e r  for  each  
ca teg o r y )
a. C o s t sharing Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. M atch in g  grants Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. S u b s id ie s Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
If  Y E S , p lea se  d escrib e:
Q -1 8  D o e s  y o u r  State m andate any o f  th e  f o l lo w in g  en v iron m en ta l lia b ility  r eq u irem en ts for  fin fish  
aqu acu ltu re op eration s?  (p le a se  c ir c le  o n e  a n sw er  for each  ca teg o ry )
a. S u rety  bonds Y E S
b. L iab ilitv  Insurance Y E S
N O
N O
U N C E R T A IN
U N C E R T A IN
If  Y E S , p lease  d escrib e:
Q -1 9  S p ec ia l taxes, fees  o r  a sse ssm e n ts  can  b e  lev ie d  on  an industry, w ith  receip ts u sed  fo r  e n v iro n m en ta l  
or natural resource p rogram s. D o e s  y o u r  State lev y  an y  o f  the fo llo w in g  o n  th e  f in fish  aqu acu ltu re  
industry? (p lea se  c irc le  o n e  a n sw er  fo r  ea ch  ca teg o ry )
a. S p ec ia l taxes
b. S p ec ia l fees







U N C E R T A IN
U N C E R T A IN
U N C E R T A IN
If Y E S , p lea se  d escr ib e , in c lu d in g  th e  u se  o f  receipts:
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Q-20 Does your State issue permits for aquaculture effluent discharges? (please circle one answer)
Y E S  N O  U N C E R T A IN
If  Y E S , p lea se  c ircle  the nu m b er c o rr esp o n d in g  to the d isch a rg e  perm it fe e  structure:
1 N O  FEE
2 F L A T  FEE
3 C A T E G O R IC A L  FEE, B A S E D  O N  F A C IL IT Y  T Y P E  (P O N D , F L O W -T H R U , E T C .)
4  G R A D U A T E D  FEE B A S E D  O N  A N N U A L  F ISH  P R O D U C T IO N
5 G R A D U A T E D  FEE B A S E D  O N  E F F L U E N T  C O N C E N T R A T IO N
6 G R A D U A T E D  FEE B A S E D  O N  W A T E R  F L O W  R A T E
7 O T H E R ___________________________
Q -2 I  C o m p lia n c e  w ith en v iro n m en ta l q u a lity  standards can  be en h a n ced  th rou gh  th e  u se  o f  po llu tion  
righ ts sy s tem s . D o es y o u r  State u se  a n y  o f  the fo l lo w in g  sy s tem s w ith  the f in f ish  aquacu ltu re  
industry? (p le a se  c ircle  o n e  a n sw er  fo r  ea ch  c a teg o ry )
a. T radable d ischarge perm its Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
b. D isch a rg e  reduction cred its Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
c. W aste  d ep osit-refu n d  sy stem Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN -
d. H abitat m itiga tion  ban k ing Y E S N O U N C E R T A IN
If  Y E S , p lea se  describe:
Is there a n y th in g  e ls e  you  w o u ld  lik e to sh are  w ith  us about th is su rv ey  or f in f ish  a q u a cu ltu re  in you  
State?  I f  so , the sp a ce  b e lo w  is p rov id ed  fo r  that p u rp ose . Y o u r  co n tr ib u tio n  to  th is  e f fo r t  is  greatly  
a p p recia ted .
D epartm ent o f  A g r icu ltu ra l E c o n o m ic s  and A g r ib u s in ess  
1 0 1 A g r icu ltu ra l A d m in istra tio n  B u ild in g  
L o u is ia n a  S ta te  U n iv ersity  
B aton R o u g e , L o u is ia n a  7 0 8 0 3  
F A X : 5 0 4 -3 8 8 -2 7 1 6
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APPENDIX A.3
1995 STATE FINFISH AQUACULTURE PROGRAM 
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND FREQUENCY TABLES
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Tabic A.3.1a Frequency Table of States with a Formal State Aquaculture 
Development Plan
Does your state have a formal aquaculture developm ent program or initiative?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 22 47.8 47.8
No 22 47.8 95.7
Uncertain 2 4.3 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.lb Frequency Table for State Aquaculture Development Program
Beginning Year
In what year did the aquaculture development program begin?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
1973 1 2.2 2.2
1976 1 2.2 4.3
1980 1 2.2 6.5
1981 1 2.2 8.7
1984 1 2.2 10.9
1987 2 4.3 15.2
1988 6.5 21.7
1989 6.5 28.3
1990 4 8.7 37.0
1991 1 2.2 39.1
1992 4 8.7 47.8
No Answer 24 52.2 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.2a Frequency Table of State Agency Responsible for Developing and
Administering Aquaculture Programs
Which state agency or institution is responsible for developing and administering
aquaculture programs?
Frequency Percent
Agriculture Dept 28 60.9
Fish & Wildlife Dept 15 32.6
Natural Resources Dept ->J 6.5
University - Coop Extension 10 21.7




* Total exceeds total number o f survey respondents (46) because multiple answers were 
allowed.
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Tabic A.3.2b Frequency Table of State Agency Responsible for Enforcing
Aquaculture Regulations
Which state agency or institution is responsible for enforcing aquaculture regulations?
Frequency Percent
Agriculture Dept 15 32.6
Fish & Wildlife Dept 37 80.4
Natural Resources Dept 13 28.2
University - Coop Extension 0 0.0
Health Dept 1 2.2
Other 0 0.0
No Answer 2 4.3
Total* 68
* Total exceeds total number o f  survey respondents (46) because multiple answers were 
allowed.
Table A.3.3a Frequency Table of States which Legally Consider Aquaculture an 
Agricultural Activity'
Is aquaculture legally considered an agricultural activity in your state?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 31 67.4 67.4
No 9 19.6 87.0
Uncertain 5 10.9 97.8
No Answer 1 2.2 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.3b Frequency Table for the Year in which Aquaculture was Declared an 
Agricultural Activity
If  YES. in what year was aquaculture declared to be agriculture?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
1976 1 2.2 2.2
1979 2 4.3 6.5
1981 1 2.2 8.7
1987 2 4.3 13.0
1988 4 8.7 21.7
1989 1 2.2 23.9
1990 T 4.3 28.3
1991 J 6.5 34.8
1992 4 8.7 43.5
1993 1 2.2 45.7
1994 j 6.5 52.2
1995 1 2.2 54.3
No Answer 21 45.7 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.4 Summary Statistics for the Number of Private Finfish Aquaculture 
Facilities Operating in Each State
Approximately how many private finfish aquaculture facilities are currently operating in 
your state?_____________________________________________________________________
N 43 Mean 114.1
Minimum 0 Std Deviation 119.6
Maximum 400 Total 4908
Table A.3.5a Frequency Table of States Requiring a General License to Operate a 
Fish Farm
Does your state require that private fish farms obtain a general license or permit to operate 
in your state?__________________________________________________________________
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 38 82.6 82.6
No 6 13.0 95.7
Uncertain 1 2.2 97.8
No Answer 1 2.2 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.5b Frequency Table for Transferability of General License upon Fish
Farm Ownership Change
If YES. is the general license or permit transferable upon change o f Fish farm ownership?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 14 30.4 30.4
No 20 43.5 73.9
Uncertain 4 8.7 82.6
No Answer 8 17.4 100.0
Total 46 100.0
Table A.3.6 Frequency Table of Legal Status of Fish in Aquaculture Facilities
Are fish in aquaculture facilities legally considered to be:
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Privately
Owned




22 47.8 19 41.3 4 8.7 1 2.2
Livestock 17 37.0 16 34.8 11 23.9 2 4.3
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TableA.3.7 Frequency Table of States’ Top Four Finfish Species Cultured in
Private Aquaculture Facilities
Please list, in descending order, the top four finfish species cultured in private aquaculture 
facilities in your state, based on farm gate market value.
First Second Third Fourth
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Baitfish 0 0 .0 4 8 .7 1 2 .2 ->J 6.5
Black Bass I 2 .2 2 4.3 7 15.2 2 4.3
Bluegill spp 0 0 .0 1 2 .2 J 6.5 4 8.7
Carp s p p 0 0 .0 1 2.2 2 4.3 4.3
Catfish spp 14 30 .4 4 8.7 4 8.7 4 8.7
Flounder 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 2.2 0 0 .0
Gamefish
fingerlings
0 0 .0 1 2.2 j 6.5 1 2 .2
M ilkfish 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 2.2 0 0 .0
Mullet 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0.0 1 2 .2
No. Pike 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 2 .2 0 0 .0
Ornamental 2 4.3 1 2 .2 0 0 .0 4.3
Redfish 0 0 .0 1 2 .2 0 0 .0 0 0.0




0 0 .0 5 10.9 7 15.2 -> 6.5
Sturgeon 0 0.0 1 2 2 0 0.0 1 2.2
Tilapia 4 8.7 8 17.4 -> 4.3 4 8.7
Trout spp 19 41.3 6 13.0 1 2 .2 1 2 .2
W alleye 0 0 .0 3 6 .5 0 0.0 0 0.0
Y ellow
Perch
0 0 .0 1 2 .2 J 6.5 0 0.0
No Answer 2 4.3 5 10.9 9 19.6 17 37 .0
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Table A.3.8 Frequency Table of Private Property Status of Fish in Aquaculture
Facilities, by Fish Category
When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f fish considered 
private property, owned by the farm operator?______________________________________
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Ornamental 40 87.0 0 0.0 2 4.3 4 8.7
Baitfish 41 89.1 0 0.0 2 4.3 ** 6.5
Commercial
Foodfish
42 91.3 0 0.0 2 4.3 2 4.3
Freshwater
Gamefish
40 87.0 1 2.2 1 4.3 j 6.5
Marine
Gamefish
28 60.9 0 0.0 1 15.2 11 23.9
Other 9 19.6 1 2.2 2 4.3 34 73.9
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Tabic A.3.9 Frequency Tabic for State Special License Requirement to Possess and
Culture Fish, by Fish Category
Is an aquaculturist required to obtain a special license or permit to possess and culture the 
following categories o f fish?_____________________________________________________
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Ornamental 19 41.3 21 45.7 2 4.3 4 8.7
Baitfish 22 47.8 18 39.1 2 4.3 4 8.7
Commercial
Foodfish
28 60.9 14 30.4 2 4.3 2 4.3
Freshwater
Gamefish
29 63.0 12 26.1 6.5 T 4.3
Marine
Gamefish
22 47.8 8 17.4 5 10.9 1 1 23.9
Other 9 19.6 4 8.7 1 2.2 32 69.6
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Table A.3.10 Frequency Table for Transferability of Special License upon Fish Farm
Ownership Change, by Fish Category
For any YES answers in Q-9 above, 
change o f Fish farm ownership?
is the special license or permit transferable upon
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent F requency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Ornamental 9 19.6 15 32.6 4 8.7 18 39.1
Baitfish 10 21.7 14 30.4 6 13.0 16 34.8
Commercial
Foodfish
13 28.3 17 37.0 4 8.7 12 26.1
Freshwater
Gamefish
14 30.4 18 39.1 5 10.9 9 19.6
Marine
Gamefish
6 13.0 16 34.8 6 13.0 18 39.1
Other 4 8.7 5 10.9 4 8.7 j j 71.7
2 5 1
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Table A.3.11 Frequency Table for Requirement to Design Facility to Prevent
Escapement, by Fish Category
Is an aquaculturist required to design his facility to prevent escapement o f  the following 
categories o f fish?_______________________________________________________________
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Ornamental 26 56.5 10 21.7 6.5 7 15.2
Baitfish 19 41.2 17 37.0 -VJ 6.5 7 15.2
Commercial
Foodfish
27 58.7 13 28.3 2 4.3 4 8.7
Freshwater
Gamefish
23 50.0 16 34.8 4.3 5 10.9
Marine
Gamefish
19 41.3 11 23.9 ->J 6.5 13 28.3
Other 14 30.4 2 4.3 2 4.3 28 60.9
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Table A.3.12 Frequency Table for Legal Classification of Unauthorized Removal or 
Destruction of Fish as Poaching versus Theft, by Fish Category
Is unauthorized removal or destruction o f  cultured fish from an 
considered poaching or theft?
aquaculture facility legally
Theft Poaching Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Ornamental 35 76.1 1 2.2 5 10.9 5 10.9
Baitfish 35 76.1 1 2.2 5 10.9 5 10.9
Commercial
Foodfish
36 78.3 1 2.2 4 8.7 5 10.9
Freshwater
Gamefish
35 76.1 1 2.2 5 10.9 5 10.9
Marine
Gamefish
25 54.3 1 2.2 6 13.0 14 30.4
Other 11 23.9 1 2.2 0 6.5 31 67.4
253
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A.3.13 Frequency Table for Written Fish Inventory' or Production Report
Requirement, by Fish Category'
Is a written fish inventory or production report required to raise the following categories 
o f fish in a commercial aquaculture?______________________________________________
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Perceni
Ornamental 10 21.7 29 63.0 1 2.2 6 13.0
Baitfish 14 30.4 25 54.3 6.5 4 8.7
Commercial
Foodfish
17 37.0 24 52.2 1 2.2 4 8.7
Freshwater
Gamefish
17 37.0 24 52.2 2 4.3 6.5
Marine
Gamefish
12 26.1 20 43.5 -»j 6.5 11 23.9
Other 5 10.9 7 15.2 1 2.2 ■"» -> j j 71.7
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Table A.3.14 Frequency Table for Marketing Paper Trail Requirement to Sell Farm-
Raised Fish, by Fish Category'
Is a marketing paper trail required for a Fish farm operator to sell farm-raised fish from the 
following?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Ornamental 13 28.3 24 52.2 5 10.9 4 8.7
Baitfish 17 37.0 21 45.7 4 8.7 4 8.7
Commercial
Foodfish
25 54.3 16 34.8 2 4.3 3 6.5
Freshwater
Gamefish
26 56.5 13 28.3 j 6.5 4 8.7
Marine
Gamefish
16 34.8 13 28.3 4 8.7 13 28.3
Other 7 15.2 2 4.3 j 6.5 34 73.9
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Tabic A.3.15 Description of State Limitations on the Sale or Disposition of Farm 
Raised Fish, by Fish Category
Please describe any specific limitations or regulations on the sale or disposition of:
Ornamentals Certain restricted species, and certain species cannot be raised in ponds 
Cannot dispose in any surface waters
Baitfish Certain species not allowed
No live baitfish sales in some areas
Cannot be exported out o f  state without an exporter’s license 
Cannot be imported except for purposes o f  feeding your own fish
Commercial Stocking in public waters requires regulatory' agency approval 
Foodfish Seasonality o f  sales possession
License to transport, and sales slip to accompany shipping
Freshwater Maximum size limits 
Gamefish Can only be sold for pond stocking purposes
Sale only to som eone possessing a wildlife stocking permit 
Transport permit required to transport live gamefish
Marine Must meet state species and marking requirements for release if  ranching 
Gamefish Red drum can be sold as a food item only with paper trail and Fish & Game 
notification
Marine gamefish treated as exotics
Other Sale o f  non-native species only to permitted facilities within the state 
Certain species are illegal to culture or sell in the state
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Table A.3.16a Frequency Table for State Finflsh Aquaculture Best Management 
Practices
Has your state developed finflsh aquaculture Best M anagem ent Practices?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 9 19.6 19.6
No "1J J 71.7 91.3
Uncertain 2 4.3 95.7
No Answer 2 4.3 100.0
Total 46 100.0
Table A.3.16b Frequency Table for Mandatory' versus Voluntary Fish Farmer 
Adherence to Best Management Practices
If YES. is fish farmer adherence to BMP's voluntary or mandatory?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Voluntary 4 8.7 8.7
Mandatory 4 8.7 17.4
Uncertain 1 2.2 19.6
No Answer 37 80.4 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.17 Frequency Table for State Direct Payment Programs Available to
Finfish Aquaculture Operations
Does your state have any o f the following direct payment programs available to finfish 
aquaculture operations? Do not include Federal government programs.
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency- Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Cost
Sharing
2 4.3 40 87.0 J 6.5 1 2.2
M atching
Grants
2 4.3 40 87.0 J 6.5 1 2.2
S u b sid ies 1 2.2 41 89.1 6.5 1 2.2
Table A.3.18 Frequency Table for State Mandated Environmental Liability 
Requirements for Finflsh Aquaculture Operations
Does your state mandate any o f the following environmental liability requirements for 
finfish aquaculture operations?___________________________________________________
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Surety
Bonds
7 15.2 34 73.9 4 8.7 1 2.2
Liability
Insurance
2 4.3 36 78.3 5 10.9 3 6.5
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Table A.3.19 Frequency Table for State Special Taxes, Fees or Assessments Levied
on Finfish Aquaculture Operations
Special taxes, fees or assessments can be levied on an industry, with receipts used for 
environmental or natural resource programs. Does your state levy any of the following on 
the finfish aquaculture industry?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent F requency Percent Frequency Percent
Special ->J 6.5 39 84.8 1 2.2 3 6.5
Taxes
Special 9 19.6 32 69.6 1 2.2 4 8.7
Fees
Assessment 5 10.9 37 80.4 1 2.2 3 6.5
Table A.3.20a Frequency Table for State Aquaculture Effluent Discharge Permits
Does your state issue permits for aquaculture effluent discharges?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 34 73.9 73.9
No 6 13.0 87.0
Uncertain 4 8.7 95.7
No Answer 2 4.3 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.20b Frequency Table for State Discharge Permit Fee Structure
If YES, please circle the number corresponding to the discharge permit fee structure:
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percent
No Fee 9 19.6 19.6
Flat Fee 8 17.4 37.0
Categorical Fee. based on facility type n 6.5 43.5
Graduated Fee. based on annual fish
production
1 2.2 45.7
Graduated Fee. based on effluent 
concentration
J 6.5 52.2
Graduated Fee. based on water flow rate 4 8.7 60.9
Other J 6.5 67.4
No Answer 15 32.6 100.0
Total 46 100.0
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Table A.3.21 Frequency Table for State Direct Pollution Rights Systems Used with 
the Finfish Aquaculture Industry
Compliance with environmental quality standards can be enhanced through the use o f  
pollution rights systems. Does your state use any o f the following systems with the finfish 
aquaculture industry?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer

















2 4.3 34 73.9 6 13.0 4 8.7
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January 20. 1998
Dear State Aquaculture Contact:
Aquaculture is one o f the fastest growing segments o f American agriculture, with a wide 
variety o f freshwater and marine fish species being cultured. During 1995-1996, your 
office participated in the State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey o f state property rights 
specifications, regulations, and incentive-based mechanisms for management o f  the 
aquaculture industry. Enclosed, as promised, is a survey summary and a copy o f  the article 
"Summary o f a National Survey on Environmental Management in the Aquaculture 
Industry." published in the Louisiana Rural Economist.
The Louisiana State University Department o f Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness 
would again like to request your assistance. We are combining the results from two 
surveys, the 1995-1996 State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey and the 1993 National 
Association o f State Aquaculture Coordinators (NASAC) U.S. Aquatic Animal Health 
Services Study, to develop a scale to measure the stringency of state aquaculture 
regulations toward different categories o f finfish. However, we need your help to update 
and clarify some of the information from the two previous studies.
Please complete the enclosed short questionnaire, which was designed to take only a few 
minutes o f your time, and FAX the completed questionnaire to us at (504) 388-2716. Your 
name and telephone number are requested so that we may contact you in case we need 
follow-up information on any answers. In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive 
a summary o f the final results o f this research.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project. 
Additional information and answers to any questions can be obtained by calling the LSU 
research team at (504) 388-2763.
Thank you for your assistance.
Sincerely,
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February 20, 1998
Dear State Aquaculture Contact:
One month ago we sent you a package o f information which included a short supplemental 
questionnaire designed to update and clarify some o f  the information from two previous 
studies in which your office participated. To date we have not received your completed 
questionnaire. Your response is important to us as it reflects activities in your state or 
territory.
Attached is another copy of the State Finfish Aquaculture Program Survey 1998 
Supplemental Questionnaire. Please complete the enclosed questionnaire and FAX it to 
me at (504) 388-2716.
In appreciation for your assistance, you will receive a summary of the final results o f this 
research. Copies will also be made available to any other interested state or federal 
agricultural or wildlife management officials. Your name, address and telephone number 
are requested so that we may ship the final results to you, or contact you in case we need 
follow-up information.
We would be pleased to answer any questions you might have about the research project. 
Additional information and answers to any question you might have can be obtained by 
calling me at (504) 388-2757.
Thank your for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Ferdinand F. Wirth 
LSU Regents’ Fellow
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STATE FINFISH AQUACULTURE PROGRAM SURVEY 
1998 SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
In this first s e c t io n ,  w e  w o u ld  l ike  to know  s o m e  genera l  in form ation  abou t  your  state's f infish  
aquaculture program  and industry. W e are request ing  y o u r  n a m e  and  te leph o ne  n u m ber  in c a se  w e  
need  to fo l lo w -u p .
Your Name & Title: _______________________________________________________________
Agency: ________________________________________________________________
Street Address: _______________________________________________________________
City, State &  Zip Code: ________________________________________________________________
Telephone #:   Fax ??: _____________________
Q-1 Approximately how many private finfish aquaculture facilities are currently operating in your state?
_________________ facilities
Q-2 Please estimate the number o f private fish farms in your state raising each o f  the follow ing
categories o f  fish.
a. Ornamentals _________________
b. Baitfish _________________
c. Commercial foodfish _________________
d. Freshwater gamefish _________________
e. Marine gamefish _________________
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In the following section, w'e would like to explore issues relating to the regulation o f  different categories 
o f  finfish in aquaculture operations. For all questions, please circle one answer for each fish category.
Q-4 Does your state in any way limit or restrict the sale or marketing o f  the following categories o f  
farm-raised fish?
a. Ornamentals YES NO UNCERTAIN
b. Baitfish YES NO UNCERTAIN
c. Commercial foodfish YES NO UNCERTAIN
d. Freshwater gamefish YES NO UNCERTAIN
e. Marine aamefish YES NO UNCERTAIN
Q-5 When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f  fish exempt from your 
state's wildlife lawrs?
a. Ornamentals YES NO UNCERTAIN
b. Baitfish YES NO UNCERTAIN
c. Commercial foodfish YES NO UNCERTAIN
d. Freshwater gamefish YES NO UNCERTAIN
e. Marine gamefish YES NO UNCERTAIN
Q-6 When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f  fish legally considered  
livestock in your state?
a. Ornamentals YES NO UNCERTAIN
b. Baitfish YES NO UNCERTAIN
c. Commercial foodfish YES NO UNCERTAIN
d. Freshwater gamefish YES NO UNCERTAIN
e. Marine gamefish YES NO UNCERTAIN
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0 - 7  D o e s  y o u r  state require  a health certif ication for the f o l lo w in g  ca tegor ies  o f  farm -ra ised  fish  
enter ing  the  state?
a. O rnam enta ls Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
b. Baitf ish Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
c. C o m m e rc ia l  foodf ish Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
d. F reshw ater  g a m e fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
e. M arine  e a m e f i sh Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
0 - 8  D o e s  y o u r  state require a health certif ication for the  fo l lo w in g  c a teg o r ie s  o f  farm-raised fish sh ip p e d
w ith in  the state?
a. O rn am en ta ls Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
b. Baitf ish Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
c. C o m m e r c ia l  foodfish Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
d. Freshw ater  g a m e fish Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
e. M arine  g a m e f i s h Y E S N O U N C E R T A I N
Q -9  P lease  rate the o v era l l  s tr ingency  o f  y our  state 's  regu la t ion  o f f i s h  farm ing for e ach  fish c a teg o r y .  
U se  a s c a l e  from 1 to 5. w h er e  1 represents e x tre m e ly  len ient  regu la t ion  and 5 represents e x tr e m e ly
str ingent  regu la t ion ,  (c irc le  one  nu m ber  for each  fish c a te g o r y )
Extremely Extremely
Lenient Stringent
a. O rn am en ta ls  1 2  3 4  5
b. Baitf ish  1 2  3 4  5
c. C o m m e rc ia l  foodf ish  1 2  3 4  5
d. F reshw ater  g a m e fi s h  1 2  3 4  5
e. M arine  g a m e f i s h  1 2  3 4  5
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Is there a n y th in g  e ls e  y o u  w o u ld  lik e  to share w ith  us a b o u t th is su rv e y  or fin fish  aquacu lture in y o u r  
State?  I f  so , the sp a c e  b e lo w  is p rovided  for  that p u rp o se . Y o u r  co n tr ib u tio n  to this e ffo r t is g rea tly  
app reciated .
Thank you for your participation. Please FAX this completed questionnaire to 
Ferdinand Wirth at (504) 388-2716.
D epartm en t o f  A gricu ltural E c o n o m ic s  and A g r ib u s in ess  
101 A gricu ltural A d m in is tra tio n  B u ild in g  
L ouisian a  S ta te  U n iv e r s ity  
B aton  R ou ge, L o u is ia n a  7 0 8 0 3 -5 6 0 4
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Tabic B.3.1 Summary Statistics for Number of Private Finfish Aquaculture
Facilities Operating in Each State
Approximately how many private finfish aquaculture facilities are currently operating in 
your state?
N 41 Mean 120.2
Minimum 2 Std Deviation 151.9
Maximum 609 Total 4929
Table B.3.2 Summary Statistics for Number of Private Fish Farms in State Raising 
Each Category of Fish, by Fish Category'
Please estimate the number o f private fish farms in your state raising each o f the following
categories o f fish
N  M in im u m  M axim um M ean Std . T otal
D e v ia tio n
O rnam entals 37 0 153 10.2 27.8 378
B aitfish 39 0 150 12.5 28.6 486
C o m m e rc ia l F oo d fish 40 0 600 66.1 113.4 2642
F resh w ater  G am efish 40 0 280 34.1 58.4 1362
M arine G am efish 39 0 28 1.8 4.9 69
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Table B.3.3 Frequency Table of States with a List of Prohibited Fish Species
Does your state have a list o f fish species that are prohibited from entering state waters?
Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Yes 35 81.4 81.4
No 4 9.3 90.7
Uncertain ■*> 7.0 97.7
No Answer 1 2.3 100.0
Total 43 100.0
Tabic B.3.4 Frequency Table of States Limiting or Restricting the Sale and 
Marketing of Farm-Raised Fish, by Fish Category
Does your state in any way limit or restrict the sale or marketing o f  the following categories 
o f farm-raised fish?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
O rnam ental 10 23.3 31 72.1 2 4.7 0 0.0
B aitfish 18 41.9 24 55.8 0 0.0 1 2.3
C o m m erc ia l
F o od fish
18 41.9 24 55.8 0 0.0 1 2.3
F reshw ater
G a m efish
30 69.8 11 25.6 1 2.3 1 2.3
M arine
G a m efish
21 48.8 15 34.9 4 9.3 nJ 7.0
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Table B.3.5 Frequency Table of States Exempting Fish Confined in an Aquaculture
Facility from Wildlife Laws, by Fish Category
When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f fish exempt from 
your state's wildlife laws?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
O rnam ental 2 2 51.2 18 41.9 7.0 0 0 . 0
B aitfish 19 44.2 23 53.5 1 2.3 0 0 . 0
C om m ercia l
F oodfish
24 55.8 19 44.2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0
F reshw ater
G am efish
2 1 48.8 2 2 51.2 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0
M arine
G am efish
15 34.9 2 0 46.5 4 9.3 4 9.3
Table B.3.6 Frequency Table of States Which Legally Consider Fish Confined in 
an Aquaculture Facility as Livestock, by Fish Category
When confined in an aquaculture facility, are the following categories o f fish legally 
considered livestock in your state?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
O rnam ental 12 27.9 18 41.9 13 30.2 0 0.0
B aitfish 16 37.2 17 39.5 10 23.3 0 0.0
C om m ercia l
F oodfish
20 46.5 14 32.6 9 20.9 0 0.0
F reshw ater
G am efish
15 34.9 18 41.9 10 23.3 0 0.0
M arine
G am efish
10 23.3 17 39.5 14 32.6 2 4.7
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Tabic B.3.7 Frequency Table of States Requiring a Health Certification for Farm-
Raised Fish Entering the State, by Fish Category
Does your state require a health certification for the following categories o f farm-raised fish 
entering the state?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
O rnam ental 8 18.6 34 79.1 1 2.3 0 0.0
B aitfish 11 25.6 30 69.8 1 2.3 1 2.3
C o m m ercia l
F oodfish
17 39.5 20 46.5 0 0.0 6 14.0
F reshw ater
G a m efish
9 20.9 27 62.8 J 7.0 4 9.3
M arine
G am efish
11 25.6 21 48.8 2 4.7 9 20.9
Table B.3.8 Frequency Table of States Requiring a Health Certification for Farm- 
Raised Fish Shipped Within the State, by Fish Category
Does your state require a health certification for the following categories o f farm-raised fish 
shipped within the state?
Yes No Uncertain No Answer
Frequency Percent Frequency- Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
O rnam ental 6 14.0 37 86.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
B aitfish 0 0.0 43 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
C om m ercia l
F oodfish
0 0.0 36 83.7 0 0.0 7 16.3
F reshw ater
G a m efish
4 9.3 32 74.4 6 14.0 1 2.3
M arine
G am efish
4 9.3 28 65.1 2 4.7 9 20.9
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Table B.3.9a F requency Table for Respondent Rating of Overall Stringency of State 
Regulation of Fish Farming, by Fish Category'
(1 to 5 scale, where 1= extremely lenient and 5= extremely stringent)
Please rate the overall stringency o f your state’s regulation o f  fish farming for each fish 
category. Use a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents extremely lenient regulation and 5 
represents extremely stringent regulation.
N = 43 1 2 «■> 4 5 No answer
Ornamentals 11 6 13 5 8 0
Baitfish 16 9 15 1 1 1
Commercial Foodfish 6 14 7 5 5 6
Freshwater Gamefish 4 16 13 5 1 4
Marine Gamefish 6 12 8 4 10
Table B.3.9b Summary' Statistics for Respondent Rating of Overall Stringency of 
State Regulation of Fish Farming, by Fish Category 
(1 to 5 scale, where 1= extremely lenient and 5= extremely stringent)
Please rate the overall stringency o f your state’s regulation o f fish farming for each fish 
category. Use a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represents extremely lenient regulation and 5 
represents extremely stringent regulation.
N Minimum Maximum M ode Mean Std.
Deviation
Ornamentals 4 3 1 5 2 .8 4 1.43
Baitfish 4 2 1 5 1 2 .1 0 1.03
Commercial Foodfish 3 7 1 5 2 2 .7 0 1 .29
Freshwater Gamefish 3 9 1 5 2 2 .5 6 .9 4
Marine Gamefish 33 1 5 2 2 .6 1 1 .25
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Table C.l KMO and Bartlett’s Tests of Data Adequacy for Factor Analysis
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure o f Sampling Adequacy: .654
Bartlett's Test o f Sphericity: Chi-Square 421.701
d f 55
Sig. .000













E xtraction  M ethod: P rincipal C om ponent A nalysis.
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Table C.3 Percentage of Total Variance Explained: Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings
Component Eigenvalues % of Variance Cumulative %
1 2.927 26.610 26.610
2 1.581 14.370 40.980
1.381 12.554 53.534
4 1.217 11.061 64.596
5 .834 7.583 72.178
6 .764 6.945 79.123
7 .644 5.854 84.977
8 .520 4.730 89.707
9 .449 4.085 93.792
10 .357 3.249 97.041
11 .326 2.959 100.00
E x tra c tio n  M e th o d : P rin c ip a l C o m p o n en t A n aly s is .
Table C.4 Percentage of Total Variance Explained: Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings
Component Eigenvalues % of Variance Cumulative %
1 2.109 19.170 19.170
2 2.003 18.210 37.380
-»
J 1.637 14.882 52.262
4 1.357 12.334 64.596
E x tra c tio n  M e th o d : P rin c ip a l C o m p o n en t A n aly s is .
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PrivProperty .217 -.146 -.161 .773*
Escape .701* .185 -.044 .079
Exempt WLavv .017 .171 .784* .211
HealthCertE .804* .183 .106 .011
HealthCertW .722* -.076 .259 -.057
Livestock .105 -.004 .676* -.146
PaperTrail .019 .798* .124 .008
MktRestrict .256 .418 .518* -.265
Report .475* .569* -.361 -.118
SpLicense .162 .845* .172 .075
Theft -.272 .178 .124 .774*
*  S ig n if ic a n t  fa c to r  lo ad in g , based  on  .05 s ig n if ic a n c e  lev e l ( a ) .  a  p o w e r  level o f  80  p e rc e n t, an d  s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  
a s su m e d  to  be tw ic e  th o se  o f  co n v e n tio n a l co rre la tio n  c o e ff ic ie n ts .
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Tabic D.l Item - Total Scale Statistics

















PrivProperty 8.1919 19.9103 -.0794 .1892 .6840
Escape 7.0058 15.8889 .3965 .2921 .6372
ExemptWLavv 7.2151 16.8248 .2497 .2748 .6675
HealthCertE 7.5814 15.8354 .4355 .3721 .6297
HealthCertW 8.0640 18.2707 .2991 .2517 .6591
Livestock 7.1919 17.5127 .2083 .1658 .6723
PaperTrail 7.1686 15.4392 .4367 .3536 .6283
MktRestrict 7.2326 15.3257 .4538 .3376 .6246
Report 7.5523 16.4709 .3211 .3839 .6524
SpLicense 6.9651 14.6304 .5813 .5057 .5971
Theft 8.0988 19.9025 -.0696 .1407 .6908
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Table D.2 Reliability Coefficients (a) for Overall Scale and Four Factors
Coefficient Alpha (a) Standardized Alpha
Overall 11-Item Scale .6732 .6050
Transferability (3 items) .6376 .6610
Specification (3 items) .6861 .6860
Ownership (3 items) .5523 .5490
Enforcement (2 items) .3819 .4079
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Table E.l Polychoric Correlation Matrix Analyzed (Ridge Option taken with 
Ridge Constant = 1.00)
HCE ESC HCW SL REP MPT EXR LSR MR
HCE 2.00
ESC 0.67 2.00
HCW 0.82 0.95 2.00
SL 0.45 0.35 0.13 2.00
REP 0.51 0.54 0.49 0.62 2.00
MPT 0.29 0.24 0.18 0.77 0.42 2.00
EXR 0.07 0.12 0.21 0.42 -0.19 0.21 2.00
LSR 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.14 -0.11 0.26 0.34 2.00
MR 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.63 0.29 0.42 0.52 0.34 2.00














N o tes: T h e  firs t v a lu e  in e a c h  ce ll is th e  P earson  co rre la tio n
T h e  se co n d  v a lu e  in  e a c h  c e ll, sh o w n  in p aren theses, is th e  s ta n d a rd  e r ro r  o f  th e  e s tim a te  
T he th ird  v a lu e  in e a c h  cell is th e  e s tim ated  t v a lu e
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Table E.3 Generalized Least Squares LISREL Measurement Model Estimates:
Regression Coefficients and Error Variances (No. of Iterations = 12)






ESC = 0.84*Transfer 
(0. 11)
7.90
Errorvar. = 1.16 
(0.16) 
7.38












REP = 0.64*Specific 





MPT = 0.71*Specific 
(0 . 11 )
6.39





















V a lu e s  in p a re n th e se s  re p re se n t th e  s ta n d a rd  e rro rs  o f  the  es tim a tes  
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Tabic E.4 Measurement Model Goodness-of-Fit Statistics
Degrees of Freedom = 24
Minimum Fit Function Chi-Square = 41.69 (P = 0.014)
Normal Theory Weighted Least Squares Chi-Square = 62.44 (P = 0.000029) 
Estimated Non-centrality Parameter (NCP) = 38.44 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for NCP = (18.81 ; 65.74)
Minimum Fit Function Value = 0.18
Population Discrepancy Function Value (F0) = 0.17
90 Percent Confidence Interval for F0 = (0.082 ; 0.29)
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.084 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for RMSEA = (0.059 : 0.11)
P-Value for Test o f Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05) = 0.016
Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI) = 0.46 
90 Percent Confidence Interval for ECVI = (0.37 ; 0.58)
ECVI for Saturated Model = 0.39 
ECVI for Independence Model = 0.67
Chi-Square for Independence Model with 36 Degrees of Freedom = 135.57
Independence AIC = 153.57
Model AIC = 104.44
Saturated AIC = 90.00
Independence CAIC = 193.51
Model CAIC = 197.64
Saturated CAIC = 289.71
Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) = 0.15 
Standardized RMR = 0.083 
Goodness o f Fit Index (GFI) = 0.96 
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) = 0.92 
Parsimony Goodness of Fit Index (PGFI) = 0.51
Normed Fit Index (NFI) = 0.69 
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.73 
Parsimony Normed Fit Index (PNFI) = 0.46 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.82 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 0.84 
Relative Fit Index (RFI) = 0.54
Critical N (CN) = 237.11
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Table E.5 Measurement Model Summary Statistics for Fitted Residuals
Smallest Fitted Residual = -0.41 Stemleaf Plot
Median Fitted Residual = 0.03









Table E.6 Measurement Model Summary Statistics for Standardized Residuals
Smallest Standardized Residual = -4.06 Stemleaf Plot
Median Standardized Residual = 0.32
Largest Standardized Residual = 5.14 -4(1
- 3(6
- 2(2
Largest Negative Standardized Residuals: - 1|333200
Residual for SL and HCW -4.06 -0|6554333300
Residual for EXR and REP -3.62 0|1233469
1|00225557
2|15667
Largest Positive Standardized Residuals: 3|0169
Residual for ESC and ESC 3.07 4(1
Residual for HCW and ESC 3.03 5)1
Residual for HCW and HCW 4.07
Residual for SL and SL 3.89
Residual for REP and ESC 2.72
Residual for REP and REP 5.14
Residual for EXR and EXR 3.61
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Table F.l Generalized Least Squares LISREL Structural Model Estimates:












Errorvar.= 0.34 R2 = 0.66
“ Statistically significant at a  = .05 
b Statistically significant at a . = .10
Table F.2 Covariance Matrix of Latent Variables
Transfer Specific Owner RegClimate
Transfer 1.00
Specific 0.45 1.00
Owner 0.48 0.61 1.00
RegClimate 0.59 0.75 0.81 1.00
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Table F.3 LISREL Structural Model Modification Indices
The Modification Indices Suggest Adding: Decrease in Chi-Square New Estimate
a Path to REP from Transfer 10.0 0.50
an Error Covariance between SL and HCW 1.4 -0.34
an Error Covariance between EXR and REP 8.6 -0.34
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Table G.l Correlations and Collinearity Statistics for State Institutional
Characteristics Independent Variables
Correlations Collinearity Statistics
Variable Zero-Order Partial Part Tolerance VIF
DEFINE .051 .081 .057 .713 1.402
DEVPLAN -.298 -.370 -.283 .580 1.726
AGADMIN .050 .205 .149 .437 2.289
JOINT ADM .030 .207 .151 .521 1.918
COOPEXT -.078 .022 .016 .659 1.518
ENFORCE .036 -.214 -.156 .231 4.333
JOINTENF -.030 .113 .081 .299 3.346
ORNAMENT -.165 -.184 -.133 .651 1.535
BAITFISH -.122 -.131 -.094 .658 1.520
FWGAME .146 .088 .063 .652 1.535
MARGAME .116 .059 .042 .685 1.459
NOREAST .253 -.295 -.219 .410 2.437
NORCENT -.155 -.528 -.441 .353 2.834
TROPSUB -.140 -.290 -.215 .567 1.763
SOUTHERN -.320 -.534 -.449 .321 3.114
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Table G.2 Collinearity Diagnostics for State Institutional Characteristics 
Independent Variables

















Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Ferdinand F. Wirth, III, was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on June 3, 1952. He 
received a bachelor o f arts degree in 1976 from the University o f Maryland, with dual 
majors in Biological Sciences and Psychology. Following graduation, he worked for 13 
years in the business community as the owner o f a small insurance and mutual funds 
agency, and later as a marketing representative in the medical equipment and supplies 
industry. In 1988, Ferdinand enrolled as a full-time graduate student at the University o f 
Delaware, where, in 1989, he earned a master of science degree in agricultural economics, 
with a concentration in Marketing. His thesis won the 1990 Food Distribution Research 
Society's Applebaum Outstanding Master’s Thesis Award. He spent an additional year 
with the University o f Delaware as a Research Associate in the Department o f Food and 
Resource Economics. In January 1991. he accepted a position as the Agricultural 
Marketing and Development Administrator for the Delaware Department of Agriculture. 
In late 1993. Ferdinand became the Agricultural Development Officer for Loudoun County. 
Virginia. In August 1994. he accepted a Louisiana Board o f Regents Graduate Fellowship 
in the agricultural economics doctoral program at Louisiana State University. He will 
receive his degree o f Doctor o f Philosophy in agricultural economics, with minors in both 
economics and marketing, in August, 1998.
296
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: F e rd in a n d  F r a n c i s  W ir th , I I I
Major Pield: A g r i c u l t u r a l  Econom ics
Title of Dissertation: D evelopm ent an d  A sse s sm e n t o f  a  P r o p e r ty  R ig h ts




Ju n e  23 , 1998





















/A P P L IE D  A  IIVWGE . In c
1653 East Main Street 
- Rochester, NY 14609 USA 
■ -  —  Phone: 716/482-0300 
 ^  Fax: 716/288-5989
O  1993. Applied Image. Inc.. All Rights Reserved
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
